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TITLE: WORK AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN A MASS CONSUMPTION SOCIETY: CANADA

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Canada

DRAFT STUDY

prepared for

TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS
(Privy Council Office)

PROJECT NO.: 2 (a)

Submitted: JULY 1968

[Studies]

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INTRODUCTION

The basic assumption of this paper is that industrial relations, like other forms of human behaviour and relationship, are strongly influenced, if not determined, by the environment. This environment we see as made up not only of economic forces, but also all those social, psychological, cultural and political conditions which influence what workers and management want from their work and from society, their ideas of what is a just distribution of profits and responsibility and their attitudes toward each other on the job, at the bargaining table, or in the society at large.

The exact assignment undertaken was limited to affluence, conspicuous consumption and the demand for more as related to industrial relations. However, we felt that these factors alone could not be isolated from such other current influences on industrial relations as technological change, educational levels and various forms of labour mobility. We found, in fact, that affluence, consumption norms, education, mobility and technological change formed a kind of interdependent circle, wherein the influence of one element on the worker could be understood only in relation to

the other elements. How can we understand, for example, a worker's demand for more without understanding the effects of his experience with high wage levels, job and credit opportunities, and education, all of which have raised his aspirations and expectations? And must we not add to these the effect of technological change and general mobility which sometimes support affluence and consumption norms and at other times threaten their continued existence, at least for a particular individual?

The first five chapters are concerned, then, with the setting; that is, with those factors characteristic of the mass consumption society which seem to us to be the source of new work and social experiences, particularly for workers. From new experiences spring new attitudes, toward themselves and their union representatives, toward management and society, which will be reflected in industrial relations.

Chapters VI, VII, and VIII are an attempt to spell out what these attitudes and experiences are, particularly on the workers' side, since industrial conflict is usually sparked by labour unrest. To put it another way, in a capitalist society, property rights are the original source of power and prestige. Management has inherited from owners the assumption that any rights to control and profit not

specifically given away remain its prerogative. Therefore, industrial conflict is almost always caused by some challenge to this assumption by workers or their unions. The Life Styles and Structural Strains chapters, and, to a large extent, the Industrial Relations chapter are an effort to discern how and why the environment is causing the worker to challenge assumptions about the distribution of prestige, power and profits made in the past, not only by management, but also by unions. In this exploration we have sought to understand the basis of current unrest and, more importantly, to anticipate what the future may hold.

It is essential to bear in mind that in this paper we are not so much concerned with describing present day society in Canada as with picking out those elements which are emerging and which we believe will be of increasing importance during the coming decades. Public policy must deal with the future, for the present is already past by the time it can be implemented. The Canadian semi-skilled worker of 1968 is not, on the average, as highly educated or as well paid as the "modern" worker we have described in the chapter on Life Styles. However, he is, in the U.S., and we have every reason to believe that, *ceteris paribus*, he will be so well educated and paid in Canada in the near future. It is with

such a worker in mind, therefore, that plans must be made.

We hope that Chapter IX, Conclusions and Recommendations, points both to the future and to adjustments which public policy might make in order to facilitate industrial relations both now and then.

CHAPTER I

A DEFINITION OF AFFLUENCE

Anyone who has visited one of the more primitive villages of India or Africa needs no statistics to be convinced that the average Canadian and his town are wealthy by comparison. However, the effort to define who is and who is not affluent and why has been of interest to a number of scholars lately. This is fortunate, since it is not part of our task in this paper to search for such precise definition, yet we do need some definition which will serve our frame of reference. Two recent studies seem particularly well suited: Jean Fourastié's The Causes of Wealth, and W.W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth.

The Affluent Nation

Fourastié maintains that a nation begins to accumulate wealth when it no longer requires a major part of its labour force to provide the simple necessities of existence, i.e., there is enough food so that starvation no longer threatens important proportions of the population. This can only be accomplished through technical change which raises

productivity.¹ "Enough to eat" is defined by generally accepted standards of the number of calories per day required to maintain normal functioning of the body, or approximately 2,700 to 2,800. Even today, only three-tenths of the human race, living in the Soviet Union, Western Europe, the United States, and the British dominions have reached this level of living.²

The way in which this occurs is of interest to us, since the forces set in motion lead, other things being equal, to a continually rising standard of living. Fourastié states that the order of development is necessarily that first, science and mathematics provide the means for improved technology, second, that man begins to use these means to make agriculture more productive.

As soon as productivity is sufficiently high so that the people are protected from famine, the realignment of the labor force begins. The distribution of labor changes so that the structure of total production responds to the demands of increasing consumption.³

His tables do not show Canadian food consumption, but Tables I-IV, compiled by Fourastié and included here, all show Canadian real wages, national income and standard of living to be high as compared to other nations and continuing to rise. There can be no doubt that Canada is an affluent nation.

These tables also show something else of equal importance. Any discussion of affluent nations must take into account the fact that those nations, which have not yet managed to raise productivity enough to feed their populations dependably, fall relatively further behind as time passes. As Fourastié notes, "the two most numerous populations of the earth, the Chinese and the Indians, occupy a situation with respect to nutrition which is very similar to that of the French under Louis XIV⁴.....The world of today simultaneously contains communities that have hardly evolved at all in 2,000 years and others that are in full transition to a new human condition."⁵

Without being quite so extreme (although Canada does have, in her Eskimos, a people like this), the same can be said of each affluent nation: rising productivity and affluence does not affect everyone at the same time and in the same way. The spectacle of the United States engaging in an anti-poverty program in the midst of the greatest, most widely dispersed wealth in the history of mankind is evidence of this. But Canada also has her Indians and Eskimos, the Maritimes, the Gaspé and other pockets of people who have not shared equally in the general rise in the standard of living. These may be hardcore unemployables, whose plight is due to

some personal deficiency which makes them, at least under present methods of handling them, perpetual wards of the society. There are other kinds of unemployment or underemployment and poverty which are the result of technical change--the redundant or obsolete job or skill or product all leave some groups stranded and unable to participate in the general well-being. In some cases, the technological difficulty may be compounded by social or psychological inability or unwillingness to become mobile, to go where the opportunities are. These people are as surely bound to their soil or occupation as was the medieval peasant, and with very similar results.

That these pockets exist in Canada is well demonstrated by N. K. Dhalla, who shows in These Canadians that in 1961 in the Atlantic Provinces 41.9% of the prewar immigrant and native-born non-farm families had an income of less than \$3,000 (the general North American crude standard for measuring privation at the time, and accepted by Dhalla).⁶ Another example is that 84% of the farms in Newfoundland gross less than the \$2,500 regarded as the poverty line for farms. Similar comparison can be made between Montreal which has 3.6% less than the national average of non-farm families earning less than \$3,000 and the south shore of the Gaspé which has 26.8% more than the national average, representing

26,342 families.⁷

Estimates of what is subsistence or the poverty line will of course vary from place to place and from time to time. However, the same criterion should hold for individuals as for nations: when a man's income is more than he needs for subsistence, i.e., simply to feed, clothe and shelter himself at some level regarded as minimal, but adequate, in his society, then he begins to have disposable income, some small "wealth" which he can use at his own discretion. Indeed, as Fourastié has shown, one of the features distinguishing the affluent society from the non-affluent is the proportion of income that is spent for food and is well illustrated by Table V comparing the structure of national consumption and national production for France of 1800 with the United States of 1950. This also shows the direct relationship between consumption, productivity and labour force distribution, a relationship which we will explore more fully in the course of this paper. Finally, it shows the same pattern reflected in the individual worker's budget: the lower the income the greater the proportion of the income which must be spent on food. This has been shown more recently in relation to the French-Canadian family by Tremblay and Fortin,⁸ and is included here as Table VI.

W. W. Rostow in his The Stages of Economic Growth suggests that there are five stages along the way from subsistence to mass consumption societies: (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for take-off (in which time a nation begins to change in values, in scientific development, in political and social institutions in such a way as to set the stage for industrialization), (3) the take-off (when a nation begins rapid expansion of industries and application of technology to industry and to agriculture, capital begins to accumulate, strong political and social pressures for modernization develop), (4) the drive to maturity (10-20% of the national income is regularly invested in the economy, permitting output regularly to outstrip the increase in population; the economy has the technological and entrepreneurial skills to produce anything it wants to) and (5) the mass consumption society (defined as a period when real income per head rose to a point where a large number of people could afford more than food, clothing and shelter, and leading sectors of the economy shift towards production of durable consumers' goods and services).⁹

Rostow sets Canada's take-off period as between 1896 and 1914, since during this time the net investment rate reached 10%.¹⁰ He goes on to maintain that Canada entered

the economic stage of high mass consumption even before it reached full maturity. He dates Canada's reaching technological maturity at about 1950.¹¹

Principal Characteristics of the Mass Consumption Society

Since we are most interested in the stage in which Canada's economy is now, we will start with Rostow's description of some of the salient characteristics which make the mass consumption economy different from what has gone before. In the first place, as we have already mentioned, disposable income exists for a majority of the population for the first time in the history of mankind. Second,

the structure of the working force changed in ways which increased not only the proportion of urban to total population, but also the proportion of the population working in offices or in skilled factory jobs--aware of and anxious to acquire the consumption fruits of a mature economy.... It is in this post-maturity stage ...that...Western societies have chosen to allocate increased resources to social welfare and security. The emergence of the welfare state is one manifestation of a society's moving beyond technical maturity; but it is also at this stage that resources tend increasingly to be directed to the production of consumers' durables and to the diffusion of services on a mass basis, if consumers' sovereignty reigns.¹²

Perhaps the two most important elements in the affluent, mass consumption society, then, are that a

redistribution of income has occurred so that the group with middle range incomes is larger than the groups at top and bottom and that these middle range incomes are high enough to afford some discretionary income. That Canada clearly belongs in this category is demonstrated by Dhalla's Table No. VII showing the existence of and the steady rise over time of total and per capita personal disposable income for Canada as a whole and for each province. That this disposable income can be expected to continue to be available to the majority of the population is shown by Table VIII and Dhalla's extrapolation of these trends to 1970 in Table IX.

Canada's most striking example of affluence occurs in the area along the St. Lawrence from Quebec City down to Windsor, which Thayer Taylor has called the 17 million market heartland of Canada.¹³ This area demonstrates all the characteristics of the mature, mass consumption economy, including affluence. First, it represents a rapidly growing urban population, largely devoted to manufacturing, with heavy emphasis on consumer goods and a preponderance of people employed in professional, managerial, clerical and skilled jobs. (See Table X.)

Second, these 17 cities show the distribution of income toward the middle and upper levels which is necessary

for an affluent area or economy, and these incomes are high enough to provide a comfortable to substantial amount of discretionary income, or what Taylor calls Effective Buying Incomes. For example:

(1) Although families in the heartland represent only 37% of all Canadian households, they comprise more than half of those in Canada making \$10,000 or more a year, and 43% of the units in the \$4,000-\$9,999 range. Also, only 29% of Canada's low income families, with incomes below \$4,000 live in the 17 market complex.

(2) These people have Effective Buying Income representing 44% of the Canadian total and 41% of total retail sales.

(3) An evidence of this buying power is the investment in consumer goods, often also used as an index of affluence. In the heartland, 98% of the homes have refrigerators, as compared to 92% in all of Canada; 91% have TV sets vs. 83% in Canada; car ownership varies from a low of 53% in Montreal to a high of 84% in Sarnia. Using the purchase of two or more durable goods of the same kind as an index of affluence, 7% of heartland homes have two or more TV sets, as compared to 4% for all Canada and 8% have two or more cars (7% for Canada).¹⁴

Summary

We will accept for the purposes of this paper Rostow's definition and will assume, what seems to be the case, that Canada is an affluent nation, whose citizens, for the most part, have more money than they need to survive

(with acknowledgement of the existence of pockets of deprivation). We assume, furthermore, that this state of affairs has progressed to a point where Canada is involved heavily in production and consumption of consumer goods, i.e., it is a mass consumption economy.

Because we are concerned with the effect of affluence on industrial relations we have ignored the effects of poverty or the threat of poverty, except for purposes of contrast. That average individual affluence (using this term only in the modest sense that income is high enough to provide some discretionary income) is rising and will continue to rise in Canada is so well documented by Table VIII and by trends in other countries, that we feel safe in assuming that it will be of increasing importance as an environmental influence. This is particularly true so far as industrial relations are concerned, since it is the organized worker in technologically advanced industries who is the first to achieve the heady experience of a little income in excess of his survival needs.

Footnotes for Chapter I

1. Fourastié, J., The Causes of Wealth, translated by Theodore Caplow, Free Press of Glencoe, Ill., pp. 100 ff.

2. Ibid., pp. 123-124.
3. Ibid., p. 124.
4. Ibid., p. 103.
5. Ibid., p. 115.
6. Dhalla, N. K., These Canadians, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1966, p. 268.
7. Ibid., pp. 419 and 447.
8. Tremblay, M. A., and Fortin, G., Les comportements économiques de la famille salariée de Québec, Université Laval, Quebec, 1964, p. 100.
9. Rostow, W. W., The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 4-10.
10. Ibid., pp. 42, 43.
11. Ibid., p. 59.
12. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
13. Taylor, T. C., "Seven Million Customers All in a Row," in Litvak, I. and Mallen, B., eds., Marketing: Canada, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1964, pp. 41 ff.
14. Statistics used in this section drawn from Taylor, op. cit., in Litvak and Mallen, op. cit.

Tables for Chapter I

TABLE I - *Real National Income Per Capita in Colin Clark's International Units,
with an Assumed Working Year of 2500 Hours*

NATIONS	PER CAPITA INCOME OF LABOR FORCE		PER CAPITA INCOME OF TOTAL POPULATION			
	1955-56	1909-13	1921-24	1925-29	1930-34	1935-38
United States	1,389	484	506	590	438	545
Canada	1,350	402	459	550	435	529
Argentina and Uruguay	1,150	297	382	446	403	488
South and Central America	—	—	—	150	—	—
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1,206	434	403	502	488	584
Ire	770	262	253	261	284	311
Norway	662	154	203	215	220	279
Sweden	850	165	240	275	301	367
Denmark and Iceland	800	229	242	264	297	347
Finland	500	94	64	125	168	200
France	804	279	502	510	316	358
Spain	600	200	240	245	250	260
Portugal	570	115	100	110	120	125
Holland	650	258	345	357	306	335
Belgium and Luxemburg	700	197	209	261	270	315
Germany and Austria	700	263	279	292	261	340
Switzerland	1,000	265	396	463	410	455
Italy	410	132	134	152	149	153
U. S. S. R.	325	102	57	95	90	103
Soviet States	350	160	68	100	100	117
Poland	350	117	84	117	117	117
Czechoslovakia	450	141	147	169	161	161
Hungary	420	92	120	145	135	161
Denmark States	300	81	85	102	102	102
Australia	1,200	350	416	476	425	521
New Zealand	1,612	440	512	550	530	710
Japan	380	46	72	102	113	139
India, Burma and Ceylon	193	—	—	64	—	—
China, Korea and Formosa	—	—	—	44	—	—

Source: Jean Fourastié, The Causes of Wealth
Glencoe, Free Press, 1960, p.106

TABLE II

Recent Trends In National Income and the Cost of Living in Several Countries

	1929	1930	1933	1939	1945	1949	1953	1955
South Africa:								
National Income (billions of pounds sterling)	260	235	395	435	700	923	1,252	1,546
Cost of living (Index, 1948 = 100)	72	70	63	68	91	104	132	140
United States:								
National Income (billions of dollars)	87	75	67	72	179	216	313	344
Cost of living (Index, 1948 = 100)	71	69	59	53	81	99	111	113
Canada:								
National Income (billions of dollars)	47	42	40	43	98	132	129	230
Cost of living (Index, 1948 = 100)	79	73	65	65	80	104	120	123
Germany:								
National Income (billions of Reichsmarks)	76	70	82	90	45	63	109	147
Cost of living (Index, 1948 = 100)	77	74	64	64	82	107	102	114

Source: Jean Fourastié, The Causes of Wealth, Glencoe Free Press, 1959, p. 108 - 109

TABLE III

—Per Capita Income, Various Countries, in U. S. Dollars around 1948

United States	1,525	Spain	182
Switzerland	950	U.S.S.R.	181
New Zealand	933	Chile	180
Canada	895	Hungary	163
Australia	812	Turkey	143
Sweden	805	Japan	143
Denmark	781	Colombia	132
United Kingdom	777	Bulgaria	113
Belgium, Luxemburg	646	Brazil	112
France	418	Mexico	106
Czechoslovakia	345	Guatemala	103
Germany	336	Greece	95
Uruguay	331	Peru	82
Venezuela	322	India	(75)
Argentina	315	Bolivia	55
Italy	225	China	(50)
Poland	190	Philippines	41

Source: W. S. and E. S. Woylinsky, *World Population and Production* (The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1953), pp. 395, 399. as taken from J. Fourastié.

The Causes of Wealth, Glencoe Free Press, 1960, p. 112.

TABLE IV

—Various Indexes of the Level of Living, around 1938

	Consumption of sugar (kilos per capita)	Consumption of tobacco (kilos per capita)	Consumption of tea, coffee, cocoa (kilos per capita)	Consumption of oranges and bananas (kilos per capita)	Telephone instruments (per thousand of the population)	Telegrams dispatched (per thousand of the population)	Radio sets (per thousand of the population)	Automobiles (per thousand of the population)	Locomotives (per thousand of the population)
United States	49	2.7	8	27	160	161	189	190	52
Great Britain	46	1.7	11	16	58	123	171	37	48
Canada	46	—	—	—	—	—	122	100	—
Australia	—	—	—	—	70	—	131	100	—
Sweden	36	—	—	—	100	—	151	30	—
Norway	27	0.9	7	8	68	123	—	18	21
Holland	41	3.3	13	10	42	65	—	17	17
France	23	1.8	5.6	7	35	99	77	45	50
Germany	25	1.8	3.3	6	50	44	—	14	37
Italy	9	1.2	1.3	11	9	74	15	8	14
Spain	11	1.2	1.4	17	9	62	—	8	16

1—Various Indexes of the Level of Living, around 1953

	Consumption of sugar (kilos per capita)	Consumption of tobacco (kilos per capita)	Consumption of tea, coffee, cocoa (kilos per capita)	Consumption of oranges and bananas (kilos per capita)	Telephone instruments (per thousand of the population)	Telegrams dispatched (per thousand of the population)	Radio sets (per thousand of the population)	Automobiles (per thousand of the population)	Locomotives (per thousand of the population)
United States	44.5	5.5	10.3	41.3	369.4	134	990	382	28.7
Great Britain	36.5	2.8	7.2	10.7	112.7	119	360	81	41.9
Canada	43.5	4	6	24.6	214.6	150	565	242	34.3
Australia	66.6	2.1	5	25.6	161.2	493	—	251	—
Sweden	43.1	1.4	8.1	18	240.4	116	330	94	—
Norway	26.9	1.3	6.8	17.9	144.8	222	270	57	21.4
Holland	37.9	2.8	10.6	12.3	85.5	76	235	57	12.9
France	25.2	1.9	4.9	18.7	59	60	220	88	29.2
Germany	25.5	1.7	3.1	10.8	54.3	53	255	42	27.9
Italy	13	1.5	1.8	19	27.9	77	115	23	13.1
Spain	—	1.6	0.5	19.3	26.1	70	55	7	13.2

Source: J. Fourastié, The Causes of Wealth, Glencoe Free Press, 1960, p. 116.

TABLE V

—The Structure of National Consumption and National Production
(Percentage Distributions)

	At Farm Prices (primary)	FOOD Processing Services (tertiary)	HOUSING & Other Services (secondary)	Other— Goods (secondary)	TOTAL
<i>France, 1900:</i>					
Structure of the worker's budget	78	5	10	7	100
Structure of the national product	70	18		12	100
Structure of the labor force	80	12		8	100
<i>United States 1950:</i>					
Structure of the worker's budget	20	20	25	35	100
Structure of the national product	18	55		28	101
Structure of the labor force	20	50		30	100

Source: J. Fourastié, The Causes of Wealth,
Glencoe Free Press, 1960, p. 140

TABLE VI

Budgets types pour divers niveaux de revenu disponible

Postes	Classes de revenu (en dollars)						
	1,600	2,600	3,500	4,500	5,500	6,500	7,400
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Nourriture	46.1	41.3	37.9	34.1	30.9	29.7	26.9
Logement	21.1	18.1	19.0	18.5	18.0	19.6	19.2
Vêtement	5.9	7.4	7.4	7.5	7.8	7.6	6.9
Mobilier	4.7	5.9	6.3	7.1	7.2	7.7	12.1
Transports	3.0	4.5	5.5	6.9	8.2	8.1	8.1
Assurances	3.0	4.4	5.8	6.7	6.6	7.4	8.2
Remboursements	1.6	4.7	4.9	5.7	7.3	7.1	7.0
Soins médicaux	6.3	4.7	3.7	3.5	3.6	2.7	2.8
Tabac et boissons	3.6	4.1	3.7	3.7	3.3	2.7	2.5
Éducation	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.8	2.7	2.8
Loisirs	1.2	1.4	2.1	2.8	3.0	2.6	2.3
Total	98.6	98.8	98.7	98.7	98.7	97.9	98.8

Source: M.A. Tremblay and G. Fortin, Les Comportements Economiques de la Famille Salariée du Québec, Les Presses de L'Université Laval, 1964, p. 100

TABLE VII

TOTAL AND PER CAPITA PERSONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME IN
1964 CONSTANT DOLLARS

Province	Average 1949- 1953	Average 1954- 1958	Average 1959- 1963	1964	Esti- mate 1970
<i>A. Total income (million dollars)</i>					
Newfoundland.....	239	325	418	492	672
Prince Edward Island.....	73	82	104	125	168
Nova Scotia.....	665	726	870	967	1,260
New Brunswick.....	448	520	623	718	882
Québec.....	4,383	5,553	6,956	8,124	10,794
Ontario.....	6,933	8,879	10,901	12,423	16,716
Manitoba.....	998	1,145	1,390	1,565	2,016
Saskatchewan.....	1,172	1,102	1,351	1,456	1,806
Alberta.....	1,341	1,652	2,087	2,355	3,192
British Columbia.....	1,779	2,376	2,853	3,263	4,410
Yukon and N.W. Territories....	25	38	45	49	84
Canada.....	17,996	22,398	27,598	31,537	42,000
<i>B. Per capita income (dollars)</i>					
Newfoundland.....	658	785	909	1,002	1,233
Prince Edward Island.....	745	820	1,000	1,168	1,541
Nova Scotia.....	938	1,049	1,180	1,272	1,546
New Brunswick.....	863	937	1,042	1,164	1,330
Québec.....	1,077	1,197	1,324	1,461	1,722
Ontario.....	1,496	1,629	1,752	1,886	2,209
Manitoba.....	1,276	1,377	1,509	1,634	1,940
Saskatchewan.....	1,395	1,251	1,465	1,544	1,826
Alberta.....	1,421	1,465	1,570	1,645	1,921
British Columbia.....	1,517	1,684	1,750	1,877	2,178
Yukon and N.W. Territories....	1,660	1,267	1,216	1,195	1,787
Canada.....	1,277	1,387	1,515	1,640	1,933

(Source: DBS, *National Accounts, Income and Expenditure* [Different years]. The estimates for 1970 have been prepared by the author. The figures in current dollars were converted to 1964 constant dollars by using the implicit price index for personal expenditures on consumer goods and services published in the above DBS reports. Excluded from Canada's total is the income of Canadians who are temporarily abroad; e.g., pay and allowances of Canadian Armed Forces overseas.)

AS taken from N.K. Dhalla, These Canadians,
McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 30

TABLE VIII

1964 Income Distribution In Canada		% of the total
	Households	
Under \$2,000.....	807,200	16.8
\$2,000-2,999.....	508,700	10.6
\$3,000-3,999.....	602,200	12.5
\$4,000-4,999.....	748,400	15.6
\$5,000-5,999.....	674,300	14.0
\$6,000-9,999.....	1,097,000	22.8
\$10,000 and over.....	367,200	7.7
Total.....	4,805,000	100.0

Source: N.K. Dhalla, These Canadians,
McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 22

TABLE IX

Projection of Income Distribution in Canada to 1970		% of the total
	Households	
Under \$2,000.....	436,000	8.0
\$2,000-2,999.....	216,000	3.9
\$3,000-3,999.....	334,000	6.1
\$4,000-4,999.....	454,000	8.3
\$5,000-5,999.....	1,023,000	18.6
\$6,000-9,999.....	2,200,000	40.1
\$10,000 and over.....	824,000	15.0
Total.....	5,487,000	100.0

Source: N.K. Dhalla, These Canadians,
McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 29

TABLE X

Occupation	Canada	17-Market Area
Managers	8.33%	9.16%
Professional-technical	9.72%	11.49%
Clerical	12.89%	18.08%
Sales	6.35%	7.29%
Farm	10.03%	1.06%
Craft	24.10%	27.77%

Source: T.C. Taylor, "Seven Million Customers
All in a Row", in Marketing: Canada,
McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 46

CHAPTER II

THE MASS CONSUMPTION SOCIETY: CANADA

"Give a West Virginia miner a bathroom and he'll keep coal in the bathtub." It is a common myth and possibly a common occurrence that people accustomed to poverty do not know how to use material advantages even if they get them. We suspect, however, that this occurs mostly when the material advantage, whether money or a bathroom, is a wind-fall, not to be relied on or not affecting in any basic way the standard of living of the recipient. To the West Virginia miner with low wages, frequent layoffs, and a family ill-fed and ill-clothed, a bathtub seems irrelevant, if not outrageous. A place to keep fuel may be more important.

In contrast, the experience of high wages and steady employment gives a man hope. He begins to think he can count on some security and even to improve his standard of living on a permanent basis. It then becomes worth while to try harder and to plan. In Canada, what he usually plans to buy are consumer durable goods: a house, a car, a refrigerator, because these things represent a long-term

improvement in his style of life.

At this point, the behaviour of the consumer becomes economically important, as important, George Katona argues, as capital behaviour. He argues that consumers, in buying durable goods, are making an investment and that their investments of this sort, by creating a demand, are contributing to the national income and to the enduring wealth of the economy. His Table I, reproduced below, is an effort to compare U.S. business expenditures with consumer expenditures and he comments, "Whatever the shortcomings of the statistical data, it is apparent that consumers' investment expenditures on durable goods and housing are at least as large as business investment expenditures."¹

Recent Changes in Widely Fluctuating Money Outlays
(in Billions of Dollars)

Annual Outlays	1950	1955	1958	1960	1961	1962
Business construction and equipment	29.0	39.3	40.5	47.3	46.1	50.1
Consumer durable goods	30.4	39.6	37.6	44.8	43.7	47.5
Residential construction	14.1	18.7	18.0	21.1	21.0	23.3

Katona proceeds to argue that, because consumers are less organized and slower to respond as a group to economic fluctuations than is business, the effect of consumer investment in the economy is to smooth out or reduce crises and fluctuations. It contributes, in other words, to economic stability.

What the consumer wants to buy is a function of his perceived needs and desires which are largely socially determined. The most important determinant of whether and when a consumer will invest in durable goods is his optimism or pessimism about the future--his own and that of the outside world.² Discretionary consumer demand is thus a function both of ability and of willingness to buy, the latter made up of motives, attitudes and expectations which may change independently of changes in income, although current income remains the most important determinant of ability to buy.

Not the only one, however. The consumer is often able to do something about his income and if his expectations of the future are optimistic he may buy things he wants on an installment plan, since he believes he will be able to pay in the future. His wife may go to work to help raise the general family income or to make possible specific purchases, and he himself may take on a second job. In this

case, the consumer's willingness to buy changes his ability to do so and consumption is seen as no longer dependent on income in the classical economic sense.

This is a very important difference if Katona is correct, and one that concerns us here because it changes the relationship of the average man to his economy and his society. As we shall see, in this and in many other ways, the worker, the average man, the consumer, the majority of citizens no longer feel themselves helpless in the face of economic forces over which they have no control and of which they have little understanding. Business and government policies and activities contribute enduring wealth, but so do those of the consumer, and consumers have a growing ability to determine the quantity, quality and timing of their contribution. This has come about because wages have risen to a point higher than a man needs to stay alive, and because a growing economy offers expanding job opportunities. The worker is free to decide how to spend this disposable or discretionary income and when. He begins to plan for the future. It is the first important contribution of affluence to modern life.

Let us consider these two fairly new sources of increased income: the working wife and installment buying.

Wives have always worked when the husband's income was not sufficient to meet the subsistence needs of the family and they still do under these circumstances. What is new is the increasing number of wives who work to improve the family style of life, or even to help meet installment payments. Credit has been extended to consumers in various forms for a long time, but the growth in its use by all socio-economic groups, especially in the lower half of the income scale, is so great as to constitute a major new factor in our economic life.

The Role of Working Wives

In the last twenty-five years, particularly since 1941, there has been an increase in labour force participation rates of married women over the age of thirty-five and of middle-class status. At the same time there has been a decisive change in the age pattern or "participation profile" of married women, in which young married women drop out of the labour force during child-bearing years, and then return (Table I). Since wives are more likely to be employed when they are between the ages of thirty-five and fifty-four, it is clear that their earnings are influential in helping family income to reach its peak at this time. The difference between male income and total family income is smallest when

the husband is between twenty-five and thirty-four, a time when the smallest proportions of wives are working.³

Of far greater importance than age in determining the labour force participation of married women is education. For women as a whole, regardless of marital status, the higher the level of education, the higher the level of labour force participation at each age,⁴ no matter what income her husband makes. (See Table II.) Among the tentative explanations offered for this association is that education may increase a woman's tastes for a higher standard of material living for herself and her family, and that this would act as a stimulus to labour force activity.⁵ Secular improvements in education in Canada will undoubtedly serve to reinforce this trend.

However, while the trend for middle-class women to work is clear,⁶ and while it is often fairly affluent families who supplement their income, present statistics do indicate that within any occupational category the wives of husbands earning less are more likely to be employed. Hence, although labour force projections may point to a gradual upsurge in employed women from middle and upper socio-economic brackets, in general, the lower the husband's income, the more likely his wife is to work.⁷

Also, if her husband is unemployed at a given time, a woman is more likely to be in the labour force, and similarly, if her husband has a record of broken employment over a period of time. "The rapidity with which she, or members of her family will make themselves available for employment will depend upon the family's standard of living and social position prior to the unemployment of the breadwinner, the credit worthiness of the family, their accumulated savings, and their employment qualifications."⁸

In addition to the actual size of income, income satisfaction and perceived financial need are considered important. Marion Sobel discovered that wives were more likely to enter the working force when their family income dropped from its former level than when it remained stable or increased.⁹ Moreover, families striving for upward mobility and taking as their reference groups families with incomes higher than their own, often augmented their income through maternal employment.

In sum, the basic transition in the past twenty years has been away from the situation in which women were forced into employment, with their labour the primary source of family income, to one in which women were drawn into employment to raise family living standards and other related

reasons. Clearly, the capacity and willingness of wives to get jobs has added to the family's capacity to acquire "discretionary income."

The Use of Consumer Credit

The Porter Commission on Banking and Finance reported that, following 1945, rising levels of income and employment, low levels of personal debt, the rising output of durable goods to replace and extend the aging stock of such assets in the hands of consumers, and other factors affecting the willingness and ability of individuals to incur debt, led to a strong consumer credit demand and the rapid growth of institutions prepared to meet it.¹⁰ Total consumer credit jumped from \$835 million in 1948 to \$2,517 million ten years later, and continued to grow rapidly through succeeding years, reaching the \$7,076 million mark in 1965. The most rapid increase has been in installment credit for durable goods. While it is true that a steady rise in national income has paralleled the rapid growth of aggregate consumer credit, the ratio of consumer credit to personal disposable income has also risen secularly. Consumer credit of all kinds now amounts to about 20.2% of personal income, as compared to 7.5% in 1948.

It should be made clear, however, that although consumer credit has increased in size relative to income since 1948, aggregate consumer debt has risen much less than aggregate consumer assets; the Porter Commission claims that the average household in Canada reports total debt equivalent to only 18% of assets, with 3/4 of this total indebtedness being in the form of mortgages and not installment debt. The survey also revealed that 50% of the households in their study of consumer finances (for description of sample, see bibliography) had no installment or mortgage debt, a further 29% had repayment commitments equal to between 30% and 49% of income. While some consumers may incur installment debt beyond their capacity to handle (as we shall see later), this does not seem to be the case in general.

The Porter Commission discovered that those in the lower income groups in Canada used credit the most, followed by average and then high income groups, although charge accounts were most frequent at the higher income levels. Families who expect their income to rise use credit more than those who expect it to stay the same or decline. Young people, possibly because they are in a stage of life when incomes normally do rise, use credit far more than older age groups--in fact, there is a gradual decline with age. The Porter Com-

mission also found that labourers, skilled and unskilled, use credit more than any other occupational group, followed by clerical workers. Farmers and retired workers use it least. See Tables III, IV and V .) Finally, steady employment causes people to buy on the installment plan, whereas unemployment, periodic or chronic, discourages the use of credit.

In general, most users of credit seem to act rationally and budget their debt burden according to their income expectations over the life of their repayment obligations.¹¹ An exception to this pattern, found generally in the U.S. and Canada, was noted by Fortin and Tremblay. In Quebec, the lowest income group tends to use credit with greater frequency the more unstable their financial situation becomes.¹² Fortin and Tremblay do not try to explain why the Québécois should differ from other North Americans in this way, but their study suggests that at the lowest income levels there is a hopelessness and helplessness that leads to this abuse of credit.

Consumer credit, then is used primarily by young people who are steadily employed at semi-skilled or unskilled

labour (followed in frequency of use by skilled, clerical and other middle income occupations) and whose income is rising or expected to rise. It is interesting to note that our findings suggest that wives, on the other hand, most often go to work when family prospects are poor, or declining, or at least not likely to reach some desired standard on the basis of the husband's income alone. Of course, educated wives seem to have aspirations or an ability and desire to work which are somewhat independent of family income. These solutions make it possible for the lower and middle income family to stabilize its standard of living or improve it, at the discretion of the members, and help to shorten the gap of advantage between one social and economic group and another. The high wages and increasing job opportunities resulting from advancing technology, plus consumer credit and working wives, have provided the majority of Canadian families with enough "discretionary income" to obtain a standard package of the good things of life as defined by their contemporaries.

Given the ability of the consumer to buy, what does he buy? Do consumption patterns change with the arrival of the mass consumption society?

Consumption Patterns

Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether a house purchase has the same meaning for a working man as for a middle-class entrepreneur, there is considerable evidence that there is a tendency for everyone to want the same things and even to buy the same things. The difference between the car that a \$6,000 a year man buys and the one a \$10,000 a year man buys is in the price or quality, but both will have cars. Patterns of family expenditures in Canada for 1964 by age, income, occupation and education of the head of the family show a surprising consistency in the proportions of income spent for various goods and services.¹³ Although absolute amounts increase with income, the proportions do not vary much, suggesting that it is quantity and quality of goods rather than the nature of the expenditure that changes with increased income. The only really striking correlation of difference is in expenditures by education of head of household. The higher the education of the head, the more is spent on education by the family and this difference moves (except for a slight dip in the "partial secondary school" category) in a steady curve from .6% of the income of a person with primary school education to 2% of the income of university graduates. Within occupational categories,

managers spent exactly the same proportion of their income on household appliances as did labourers and their expenditure on car purchase amounted to 6.1% of their income, whereas skilled craftsmen spent 6.2%. Average dollar expenditure, however, does vary with occupation and with income.

One interesting point to be observed is that with income held constant the family of a 25 year old spends approximately the same amount as that of a 45 year old. For example, the expenditure averages for all income groups at age 25-34 in 1964 was \$6,566, and the average expenditure for ages 45-54 was \$6,734. This suggests that there is a standard expenditure package which a family takes on almost as soon as it is formed and which varies little with age. This in turn suggests a very important change in social patterns which may be traced directly to affluence, but also, as we shall see later, to education and other experiences in the mass consumption society. In the past there was an age grading system, generally accepted by child and adult alike, which dictated that young people had to save and earn the fruits of comfort and security over a lifetime. They expected and were expected to have life a little harder at the beginning, with fewer of the material things of life than their parents had. However, as the parent of any teen-ager knows, young people

now expect to have whatever their parents' style of life affords them. Besides, their parents have trained them, as has the society at large, that there is no particular virtue in either saving or waiting for what they want. They want immediately what everyone else of their income, occupational and educational level has.

Insofar as we can tell, furthermore, those in the 45-54 age group have changed their pattern of consumption, during their lifetime. The man who was 54 in 1964 was 24 himself in 1937. We can therefore compare the expenditures of a family of a 25 year old in 1937 with such a family of today. DBS figures were, in 1937-38, divided into French and British families, and we must further allow for the change in dollar value of different goods and services. Nevertheless, the pattern of expenditures shown in Table VI is quite different from those shown in the 1964 tables. Food, for example, represented for families whose head was between 25 and 34 in 1964 (all classes of income) 20.1% of the family budget, shelter 17.4%, clothing 7.8%, household operation 4.6%, transportation 12.7% to list a few of the biggest changes. The first four items have diminished since 1937 in the proportion they take of the budget, while transportation (including purchase and operation of a car) has doubled.

This suggests that the man who grew up in the pre-affluent, depression-ridden thirties now has acquired the same tastes, the same view of the "good things of life" as his son who has never known anything but affluence. The difference in experience and values which these two periods are felt to represent apparently has little effect on consumption patterns. It seems evident that consumption patterns in a mass consumption society tend toward uniformity for all age, income and occupational groups.

Leisure Patterns

Another important indication of the existence of what David Reisman and Howard Roseborough have called "the standard package"¹⁴ is in the use of leisure. The increased incidence and use of leisure on a mass basis is one of the characteristics of an affluent society and supports many service, recreational, and even some basic industries, such as the automobile, for example.

There is evidence to suggest that the availability of leisure time, in combination with discretionary income, may offer a way out of the rigidity of status definitions based on one's occupation or work hierarchies. For example:

As a man from Mars would see it, they (the \$4,000 a year family and the \$20,000 a year family) live equally good lives because they both have cars and plenty of food. It is doubtful that he would see any important differences between the public course golfers and the White Sulphur Springs variety.¹⁵

In other words, on his own time a man can and does pursue the same activities and often in very much the same way as his boss. Both will have and use T.V. sets, automobiles, fishing rods, do-it-yourself kits, may own or rent summer cottages, go skiing in the winter, etc. We do not mean to imply that the amount of time or money, or even the proportion of income spent on these things, will be the same for the worker as for the boss, but simply to indicate that here again they want and, by and large, have the same things. As Denney observes:

It is the similarity, not the difference, that is most striking in these patterns. The steady increase in all expenditures as American families go up the income ladder has the odd side effect that they all buy the same package of life and leisure, wrapped up in a different style.¹⁶

Our statistics on Canadian family expenditures indicate that the same can be said of Canada.

That possession of a certain package of goods and their consumption in leisure pursuits is an important new way of obtaining status, prestige and of breaking out of class

hierarchies is demonstrated by statements comparing work and leisure made by British workers to F. Zweig. One, for example, said, "I am working class only in the works but outside I am like anyone else." And another, "Here I am a worker but outside I am a human being."¹⁷ As Reisman comments, in regard to lower income groups in the U.S., "these people look to their leisure time and consumership for the satisfactions and pride previously denied them by the social order."¹⁸

The student of industrial relations, however, should note that, in general, higher income is preferred by all ages and all occupations in preference to more leisure, at least up to the higher brackets of income. The Survey Research Center in 1960 found that in a national U.S. sample 48% of men and 51% of women felt they had about the right amount of leisure; 37% of men and 36% of women felt they had too little. Those who said they had too much leisure are predominantly older people.¹⁹ Apparently, the group that feels it has too little leisure are those under 45 who have more than \$7,500 income, whether because they are in the hard-working years of their career or job, or whether income is reaching a point where "discretionary time" becomes more interesting than "discretionary income" is not clear. Zweig found that British workers prefer to work overtime, when possible,

rather than to take extra leisure, because they regard the extra money as more important.²⁰ The Fortune magazine article on early retirement plans for workers in the U.S. indicated that older people do not want to retire early and often do so only to take other or different work.²¹ Finally, that income comes first was found by Hecksher and De Grazia in the Harvard Business Review study of executive leisure. When asked whether they would prefer more leisure or increased income, 71.8% of executives under 40 years of age said they would prefer more income. Of those over 50 years old, 55.1% would prefer more leisure, but this group is more likely to have reached an income peak already, and one which satisfies most of their desires. For the entire group sampled, 54.7% would choose higher income.²² The importance of this evidence for industrial relations may be that union demands for a shorter work week and early retirement do not reflect workers' desire for more leisure time, but are efforts to spread the work and avoid lay-offs.

The Importance of Consuming

The standard package of consumption changes continually as to specific commodities, as new ones appear on the market and old ones become obsolete, and as the content of the "good life" is redefined. Although some observers

worry about what will happen when everyone in the society has all the goods they can possibly use, others maintain that while desire for a particular object, such as a house or a car, may be satiated, the satisfaction of these wants gives rise to others (for example, house furnishings or gasoline, or simply to new and better models) and that therefore there is no end to the desire to buy. In any case, it is clear that what is good enough for this year is, for most people, not quite enough for next year and that this continual restless goal changing must be an important experience, among other similar ones, in an age of continuous technological, social and moral change. Pécaut, in a report to OECD on workers' attitudes to technical change, hypothesizes, on the basis of studies of European and American workers, that the greater the extent of a workers' dedication to and participation in these continuously changing consumption patterns or "norms", the more he is willing to accept change in his work and the more he is willing to move geographically or occupationally to take advantage of opportunity--which, of course, brings higher incomes.²³ Technical progress and continuing affluence depend upon a working force of people who can adapt to change in these ways.

We have shown that Canada, like other mass consumption

societies, has an economy geared to the production and consumption of consumer goods and services and that the role of the consumer as investor and contributor of wealth is now as important as that of government or business in the continued growth and stability of the economy. If, as Katona believes, continued high level consumption and production depends, at least partly, on consumer willingness and ability to buy, then his optimistic faith in the economy and his own future become important considerations of public policy. Whether his desire to buy a product is derived from advertising, the mass media, from the opinion leaders, or from a man's co-workers and neighbours, or from all these together, the fact seems to be that in "keeping up with the Jones-es" and in having enough discretionary income to participate in the "good life" as defined by his society, a majority of Canadian citizens have at the same time found an escape from demeaning or frustrating work and from social stratification which defines some people as less worthy than others because of the work they do, or the conditions under which they live. These form powerful motives, evidently, to increase income, by whatever means possible, and even, if the future looks rosy, to barter some future gains for immediate ones. The carrot of increasing affluence produces better results than the stick of economic insecurity, as Galbraith, among others, has noted.²⁴

In terms of industrial relations we would expect this to lead to ever higher wage demands, although as we shall see, job security, which enables a worker to meet installment payments, is of equal and often competitive importance.

Finally, if this desire to participate in everchanging consumption goals of his society enables a worker to accept technical change (which by increasing productivity provides continuing affluence), then we see that the "desire for more" is both socially useful and economically necessary.

Footnotes for Chapter II

1. Katona, George, The Mass Consumption Society, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1964, p. 21.
2. Ibid., pp. 300 ff.
3. Ostry, Sylvia, "The Female Worker: Labour Force and Occupational Trends," in Changing Patterns in Women's Employment, Department of Labour, 1966, p. 6, 9.
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5. Ibid., p. 19.
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TABLE I
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN, 20-64 YEARS OF AGE, BY AGE AND SCHOOLING
CANADA, 1961

Age of Wife	Years of Schooling					
	Elementary		Secondary		University	
	Less than 5	5 and over	1-3	4-5	Some	Degree
15 years and over	14.3	23.1	31.0	40.0	47.3	47.0
20-24	25.1	35.9	45.9	64.5	65.0	64.3
25-29	19.99	28.0	29.1	36.9	44.4	43.0
30-34	18.2	20.0	32.4	37.6	44.0	44.6
35-39	20.3	27.7	35.5	40.6	52.7	55.7
40-44	15.0	20.8	27.6	34.4	43.0	50.6

As taken from "The Female Worker: Labour Force and Occupational Trends", by

Source: 1961 Census, Bulletin 4.1-11.

Sylvia Ostry, in Changing Patterns in Women's Employment, p. 20

TABLE II
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MARRIED WOMEN, BY SCHOOLING AND FAMILY TYPE, BY INCOME OF HUSBAND

Education of Wife and Family Type	Income of Husband					(6) Total
	(1) Under \$3,000	(2) 3,000-4,999	(3) 5,000-6,999	(4) 7,000-9,999	(5) 10,000 and over	
Total	26.6	24.9	26.2	14.2	5.4	22.4
One or more children under 6						
Elementary or less	12.0	9.4	6.2	5.2	6.2	9.7
High school	19.0	15.5	16.0	5.2	4.5	12.8
University	56.2	24.5	15.7	8.8	5.6	15.3
Some children under 6						
Elementary or less	23.5	21.0	17.1	12.4	10.6	20.6
High school	38.6	36.4	28.7	18.1	9.7	29.5
University	56.1	53.7	44.2	29.0	11.4	33.3
No children						
Elementary or less	28.1	27.0	31.3	14.2	13.6	26.1
High school	46.9	49.5	42.4	27.9	14.1	44.0
University	60.2	63.0	57.3	46.6	20.5	51.4
Participation of Married Women by Education						
Elementary or less	\$1,256					17.5
High school	\$1,764					21.0
University	\$2,840					36.2

Source: Population Sample, 1961 Census.

1. Excludes the families, living in urban and rural non-farm areas, headless in labour force.

2. Non-farm income of women in urban and rural non-farm areas: 1961 Census, Bulletin 4.1-1.

As taken from "The Female Worker: Labour Force and Occupational Trends" by Sylvia Ostry, in Changing Patterns in Women's Employment Department of Labour, 1966, p. 22

Distribution of Households Within Age Groups,
by Ratio of Annual Instalment Debt Amortization Payments* to Total Income,
Seven Canadian Cities, 1962

Ratio of Annual Debt Amortization Payments excluding Mortgage Payments to Total Income	AGE OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD					
	29 years and under	30 - 39 years	40 - 49 years	50 - 64 years	65 years and over	All Households
	percent					
No income or negative income with amortization payments	—	1.1	1.6	3.8	1.6	1.8
No amortization payments	58.3	67.2	74.7	80.4	92.7	73.5
Up to 4.99%	5.7	9.5	6.6	2.3	2.2	5.8
5 - 9.99%	11.0	5.8	6.4	5.3	2.4	6.2
10 - 14.99%	9.5	7.9	4.4	3.8	—	5.5
15 - 19.99%	7.9	4.0	3.4	1.6	—	3.4
20% and over	7.7	4.5	3.0	2.9	1.1	3.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	dollars					
Average payment	259	212	133	95	27	153
Median payment	—	—	—	—	—	—
Average payment — payers only	620	669	553	597	476	615
Median payment — payers only	477	540	468	519	360	480

* Excludes mortgage payments.

Source: Porter, Royal Commission on Banking and Finance,
Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1964, p. 66

TABLE IV

DISTRIBUTION OF BALANCE SHEETS OF HOUSEHOLD BY AGE AND OCCUPATION OF
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, SEVEN METROPOLITAN AREAS, LATE 1962

	Assets % ^b					Debts % ^a					
	Liquid ^d	Other Cash Pro- ducing ^e	Pen- sions, Trusts, Estates ^f	Owned Homes ^g	Total \$	Mortgages		Instal- ment ^h + + +	Other	Total	Net Worth
						Owned Homes ^g	Rental Property				
Age - Years											
29 and under	12.3	27.9	15.5	44.3	5,977	21.5	0.3	6.5	4.3	32.6	67.4
30 to 39	8.2	27.1	4.5	60.2	14,728	26.4	1.2	2.2	1.9	31.7	68.3
40 to 49	7.1	31.7	6.2	55.0	23,726	16.3	2.0	1.1	1.0	20.5	79.5
50 to 64	12.0	42.5	3.7	41.8	29,317	6.6	2.2	0.8	0.8	10.4	89.6
65 and over	17.7	38.0	7.2	37.1	27,598	2.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	3.1	96.9
Occupation											
Professional	11.2	34.7	4.4	49.7	31,678	13.3	1.3	1.2	1.5	17.4	82.6
Business Executive	6.1	59.2	5.2	29.6	64,049	8.3	2.3	0.9	1.2	12.6	87.4
Clerical	16.9	15.0	8.7	59.4	12,450	17.8	—	1.9	0.8	20.5	79.5
Sales	11.8	20.6	5.5	62.1	18,391	22.5	2.8	1.6	1.6	28.5	71.5
Skilled Labour	10.9	16.8	4.9	67.4	12,301	18.8	2.2	2.2	1.2	24.5	75.5
Unskilled Labour	12.3	4.8	4.5	78.5	7,376	28.1	0.8	2.4	1.1	32.3	67.7
Retired	17.5	41.5	0.2	40.8	23,878	2.3	0.1	0.3	0.5	3.2	96.8
Other	13.8	27.5	12.3	46.4	16,505	9.8	—	0.6	0.6	11.1	88.9
Average per Household ⁱ %	10.6	35.2	5.5	48.8	100.0	13.5	1.6	1.3	1.1	17.6	82.4
" " \$	2,156	7,183	1,118	9,964	20,421	2,752	331	274	234	3,591	16,830

See Table 2-3 for footnotes and source.

* as a percentage of assets. ** due to error, % of installment
debt should be roughly doubled.

Source: Porter, Royal Commission on Banking and Finance,
Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1964, page 20 Table 2-4

Distribution of Households Within Income Classes, by Ratio of Annual Instalment Debt
Amortization Payments* to Total Income, Seven Canadian Cities, 1962

Ratio of Annual Debt Amortization Payments to Total Income	TOTAL INCOME (in dollars)												Un- classified	All house- holds
	Under 1,000	1,000- 1,999	2,000- 2,999	3,000- 3,999	4,000- 4,999	5,000- 5,999	6,000- 6,999	7,000- 7,999	8,000- 8,999	9,000- 9,999	10,000- 14,999	15,000- 25,000	Over 25,000	
percent														
No income or nega- tive income with a mortgage	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1.8
With a mortgage	94.0	75.7	67.8	77.7	82.1	71.0	72.0	75.9	77.4	79.5	90.4	100.0	-	73.5
10 to 14.99%	-	2.2	-	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	10.3	4.8	2.9	-	-	5.6
15 to 19.99%	1.2	3.9	3.0	3.0	7.7	7.0	6.1	4.9	5.0	8.3	1.1	-	-	6.2
20 to 24.99%	-	3.7	7.7	4.0	3.1	2.0	3.9	6.4	6.2	6.0	1.8	-	-	5.5
25 to 29.99%	-	2.2	5.2	1.0	7.2	5.0	4.1	3.4	-	1.4	-	-	-	3.4
30% and over	4.2	4.3	14.3	4.7	4.6	2.0	4.2	-	1.1	-	3.3	-	-	3.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
dollars														
Average payment...	6	77	183	97	195	134	230	146	147	132	254	-	-	153
Median payment...	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average payment - payers only	103	292	507	430	509	603	841	603	633	591	2,609	-	-	615
Median payment - payers only	110	-	432	312	576	430	552	403	600	500	2,032	-	-	480

* Excludes mortgage pay-

** includes zero or negative income.

Source: Report, Royal Commission on Banking and Finance,
Broadcast 10, Inc., Queen's Printer, 1964,
p. 35.

TABLE VI

—British Family Living Expenditures According to Father's Age

Father's Age	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64
Number of Families.....	307	472	294	46	307	472	294	46
Dollar Averages				Percentages				
Food.....	287	437	47	463	28.7	29.8	31.2	31.8
Shelter.....	280	401	270	242	26.8	29.5	19.0	17.1
Children's Living.....	88	104	17	151	6.5	7.1	7.1	1.6
Children's Education.....	130	165	17	157	16.6	11.5	11.8	1.7
Household Operation.....	131	121	112	119	9.7	8.3	7.5	8.5
Health.....	69	65	0	63	5.1	4.4	4.1	1.2
Personal Care.....	24	25	0	24	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Gifts.....	16	17	162	75	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.6
Recreation.....	98	92	95	70	7.3	6.0	6.0	1.6
Children's Education and Vocational.....	9	18	67	25	0.7	1.2	2.4	1.2
Community Welfare and Gifts.....	36	45	45	45	2.7	2.5	3.0	3.5
Total.....	1,317	1,316	1,315	1,411	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CBS' Family Income and Expenditure in
Canada 1957-1958. King's Printer
Ottawa, 1961, p. 182

CHAPTER III

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Although there have been affluent individuals or groups in the past, affluent societies are not possible until a high level of technological development has been reached. One of the most salient features of technological development is that it involves continuous, unending change. And here we do not mean simply that production methods may change from one generally accepted and stable one to another equally widespread and stable, or that the social relationships on and off the job which technical changes give rise to are only a move from one fixed point to another. What seems to characterize the age of automation and mass consumption is a state of "fluidity", in which a man may expect in his own life time to change his job, to be retrained, to change his social and geographic environment, his friends, his community, his standard of living, even his beliefs and values, not once but perhaps many times. And he knows that he can only dimly guess what life will be like for his children. We do not have to go back to feudal times to appreciate the qualitative difference between life under these circumstances and life

under conditions of relative stability. Even at the turn of the century, very few of the above conditions would have held true for the average man.

Technological change and automation in particular are important to our study, because:

(1) Such developments and the process of continually improving productivity per man hour which advanced technology represents are both the cause of worker affluence and are the result of economic activities of an advanced and affluent society. A highly developed technology presupposes the existence of a large enough body of trained scientists, technicians, managers and workers to invent, plan, operate and service its factories, plus consumers who are trained and educated to want and use its products, and a final group of people trained to repair and service the product. The number of trained people required to produce, use and service the automobile, to take just one obvious example, becomes most apparent when one imagines trying to produce one in a really underdeveloped society. In short, for automation to exist we must have the physical capital to invest in expensive machinery, the human capital to invent, plan, produce, service and use it and the certainty that the ever-increasing volume of goods produced will be consumed at a profitable level in ever-expanding markets.

(2) The relations between labour and management are a function of the work environment as well as of the larger social environment, and attitudes toward each other which are expressed in grievances or collective bargaining may be formed in either place. It is important therefore to understand how the daily work contacts between workers and management are changing and what we may expect in the future. It is also important to understand technological change in the context of the larger society where industrial relations become public and of public concern.

(3) Canada, in common with other western industrial nations, can be expected to experience the same kinds of changes in the same direction (i.e., toward automation) and, therefore, any consideration of industrial relations in Canada should take this into account, with due consideration of features in the Canadian situation which may produce variations in the pattern.

Here we will be primarily concerned with changes in relations of worker to worker and worker to manager within the industrial plant. The chapter on affluence showed the growing importance of the white collar and service workers in the labour force of Canada as of other mass consumption economies. We know that teachers, civil servants, nurses

and technicians are joining unions and negotiating collective contracts. Furthermore, we believe that the white collar worker will increasingly share the work experience of blue collar workers as automation in the office proceeds, and that we can safely assume that in concentrating on industrial experience and industrial workers we have a good index of trends in the world of work and labour-management relations.

Let us assume, then, that the existence of a trend toward increasingly automatic factories is evidence of an affluent, mass consumption society and of a society most of whose members have a rather high level of education or technical training. What effects does such an environment have on the attitudes of workers and management which might be expected to be reflected in industrial relations?

The New Work Environment

The introduction of automation, or the continuous process plant, in which a greater and greater proportion of the work is performed, regulated and controlled by machines rather than by men has been another giant stride in increased productivity comparable to, although not as great as, the introduction of mass production techniques in the Twenties.¹ This has not, however, had quite the effects originally

expected, since completely automated plants are very rare and most industries which are automated at all tend to automate certain parts or sections of their operations and not others, because machines do not exist yet to take over every kind of work, and in some cases it does not now appear to be more efficient or economical to replace men with machines.²

Technically, then, automation or continuous process production is the latest stage in a continually changing production technology. It is still developing and, on the other hand, is rarely encountered in a pure form. Usually it is introduced partially, and factories are more or less automated, the degree of automation, its quality, kind and extent determining the work and social changes experienced by the workers. Insofar as generalizations can be made, however, Bright finds that, whereas set-up and maintenance men encounter an increase in skill and responsibility requirements where automation is low or medium, further automation tends to reduce these requirements except for a few positions. The work of engineers and technicians is narrowed and concentrated in a few specializations, with the exception of those engaged in research and high level planning operations. The production workers' jobs require progressively less dexterity, less knowledge of art or theory, less experience, less

physical effort, less judgment and less decision making and they have less control of the work pace as automation becomes more intensive and extensive.³

While control is in the hands of the individual, skill and judgment are the premium characteristics. As the machine takes over guidance, knowledge of the machine regulation becomes more important. And as controls become more and more comprehensive in prescribing the operating action, skill and knowledge requirements increase, and then start to diminish. Judgment grows less important since the controls take over decisions. However, responsibility grows because misdirected action has great impact or can do great damage. At some point, as the controls become more sensitive and responsive to the requirements of the operating environment and the task, the machine assumes responsibility just as it has already assumed skill, knowledge, and judgment requirements. Thus, increasing mechanization modifies the worker's contributions and also changes their economic value.⁴

There is some argument about whether technological change necessarily brings unemployment, but for the purposes of this paper, the weight of evidence seems to be that some kinds of skill do disappear, that individuals and even groups may be downgraded or shifted to other kinds of work, and that "the major factor of displacement seems to be the reduced manpower requirements of the A-unit (an automated factory or part thereof). At present the effects are not obvious because of the slow pace of automation and perhaps the constant pressure of labour unions. In order to diminish

resistance, management has planned manpower reduction policies so that vested interests would be the least hurt. This involved first the gradual elimination of temporary help, and, as a second step, the limitation of new hiring. Thus, after a time the total payroll shrinks to the desired proportions."⁵ We might add that efforts to retire older workers early and to postpone the age at which young people appear on the labour market through demanding higher educational qualifications serve the same purpose. Although statistically it may be difficult to prove that automation produces unemployment,⁶ it is perfectly clear that some jobs do disappear and some groups do suffer as a result of technological change, the disappearance of the blacksmith being perhaps the simplest well-known example.

In Canada, between 1957-1961, the Department of Labour made a study of five industries in an attempt to estimate the effects of technological change on manpower, both as regards its quantity and its quality. The findings, reproduced in Chart I of this Chapter, show that in these plants the use of semi-automatic and automatic machines resulted in a reduction in the number of semi-skilled and unskilled workers and an increase in the demand for maintenance workers. At the same time there is a large increase in office

or clerical workers, including machine operators, but an overall fall in employment of 3%. Since maintenance workers tend to be more carefully selected in automated or semi-automated plants because of the high cost of the machinery and of breakdowns, and since, also, the number of clerical and administrative employees goes up, one can see that the "quality" of the labour force also rises with automation. If Bright is correct, however, this was true in Canada, at that time, under those average conditions of automation for those five industries.

Although the amount of physical distance between workers varies with the degree of automation and the kind of plant, there is in general a tendency for there to be greater physical distance between work stations and less contact between workers in automated than in pre-automated factories. In some cases only telephone contact is possible between workers. Some workers are unhappy about this isolation. Investigators in the U.S. and in England also found that workers complain that they have fewer opportunities for promotion in the continuous process system.⁷

With smaller work forces, fewer job classes, fewer levels of supervision and increasingly complex technical work environments, many workers feel the promotional ladders they had planned to climb are shortened or shattered.

There is less opportunity for advancement into supervisory positions; career lines are often destroyed. Accumulated skills may be wiped out, and requirements substituted which the worker does not have the education to acquire.⁸

Wage losses are often reported in the beginning by production workers, especially if they are on piece rates or productivity incentive schemes, because until they learn to operate the new machines they may actually make less. During this early stage of adaptation to more automated machinery, the men feel that the job requires much greater mental alertness and they are keenly sensible to the greater responsibility. On mass production lines each man was responsible for a much smaller portion of the process and a mistake was less costly than under continuous process production. Under these pressures many workers feel that the tension and strain are much greater than in older methods.

Management, too, has its problems, for as the structure of the production system changes, so also must the structure of authority and responsibility. Relationships tend to become more formal, the function of management grows in importance with technical change and more recruits are needed with formal and specialized qualifications. "It becomes more difficult than before to rise from the ranks and

there is a possibility, at least in the transitional phase, of rivalry among groups who differ in function or personal background."⁹ Coordination and control within the ranks of an increasingly complex management become more difficult and Scott suggests that "the trend towards specialization may in time lead to the creation of a management group composed entirely of professional men, who are formally recruited and trained and who possess definite qualifications."¹⁰

There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether supervision is better or worse, but in any case it is clearly different. More technical knowledge is required of the foreman or supervisor; he has responsibility for a larger segment of the productive process and often of more men. Many workers feel that supervision becomes more impersonal and more exacting. Durand, in a study of French workers, describes how the hierarchies of skill and responsibility flatten, since the mistake of the lowest paid operator may be as costly and as difficult to remedy as that of the highest ranking, and supervisor and operator alike function on the basis of plans handed down from technicians in planning departments.¹¹

Socio-Psychological Reaction
to Technical Change

It can be argued that the difference between craftsmanship or unit production, mass production and continuous process production, which are only stages on a continuum of technical efficiency, are in human terms differences so great as to constitute very different social environments and foster different attitudes towards fellow workers, towards management, towards the union and the society at large, and to change the meaning of work and leisure. In this section we will explain some of these differences and worker reactions to them. At the same time it is important to remember that all three types of production are present at the same time in the society and even in a given plant. The new work environment of automation is important because it predicts the future and any public policy must to a large extent be based on what the situation will be then, rather than what it is now. But worker (and management and staff) attitudes will vary with the degree of technical advance represented by their predominant work experience, and with the length of time they have been in it.

Men's attitudes toward technological change, or specifically automation, vary with occupational level.

The staff, who identify with management's interest in efficiency and whose ranks may actually grow as a result of automation, are inclined to be enthusiastic about installation of automated machinery. Skilled workers and white collar workers are likely to feel that relative to other workers that they may suffer a demotion and their skills may lose status. They see that even though they may lose nothing in wages or status in an absolute sense, they lose relatively to production workers whose position improves. They may, on the other hand, be in greater demand, as maintenance workers become more important. The least enthusiastic about prospects of automation in their factory are the production workers, who are most threatened by loss of their jobs or of promotion chances. As Scott found: "the higher the occupational status, the greater is the support for technical change in the face of unpleasant social consequences (such as unemployment) the greater is the support for the rights of management and the less is the approval of union claims."¹²

However, workers' attitudes change as they get used to the new plant. Most surveys show that workers begin by being suspicious and anxious about the new machinery and techniques. Their suspicions and anxieties are based on a realistic fear that they may lose their jobs (or that someone

will), or be downgraded, or lose old skills which may have required a lifetime to perfect and on which their prestige among fellowworkers is based. If they were skilled workers, their use of these skills may have been an important part of their work satisfaction. Older workers worry about whether they will be able to perform on the new and unfamiliar machinery at such high speeds, and show a simple reluctance to learn new methods.

Walker found that the reactions of men in an automated U.S. steel plant changed as they adapted themselves to the new process. Interviews conducted one and two years after the introduction of automated machinery indicated that workers found the isolation from other workers, the increased tension and responsibility, tighter supervision, lack of satisfactory pay increases, and the loss of past skills to be sources of dissatisfaction. On the other hand, after three years, the same men reported that they were in general pleased with the change. They liked the variety of their jobs, the responsibility, the sense of understanding their part in the whole process as related to other parts, the improved physical setup (cleaner, better lighting), the reduction of hard manual work, and the status they enjoyed in the community as a result of being in the most modern factory or part of it.

Also, they had mastered the process, had fewer stoppages and breakdowns and higher productivity, thus higher wages.¹³

Bright found the same pattern and comments that "Automation, by spreading the worker's station over a greater span of the production activity, is a definite contributor to job enlargement and its benefits for the individual."¹⁴

There seem to be, however, certain universal reactions to the new work environment which do not vary with the time of exposure. With affluence and technological advance workers tend to develop (1) greater equalitarianism, and (2) an instrumental or extrinsic view of their work, even a considerable personal detachment from it.

Trend Toward Equalitarianism

The tendency toward greater equalitarianism seems to be a result of several factors. We have discussed the fact that automation results in fewer job classifications with less difference between the highest and lowest as to wages or responsibility, and that new, more easily learned skills tend to replace old skills.

Walker interviewed workers in a newly installed

continuous seamless pipe mill at the Lorain works of U.S. Steel as to whether they thought they had more chance for promotion in the new mill than in the old. One worker compared the new mill to the old in terms which demonstrate the flattening of job hierarchies:

"The jobs are now all about the same. On the old mills, you could go from a job class 4 up to a job class 20, and there were about thirty jobs on the mill. On Number 4 everything is around job class 9 to class 16 and there are not as many of them."¹⁵

Durand found that among French workers this was also reflected in the informal relationships to each other. Less respect was accorded on the basis either of skill or authority, and skilled workers, formerly enjoying prestige because they possessed difficult to acquire skills, were called "the old ones" and were sneered at because they did not know how to run the new machines.¹⁶

One of the most striking proofs of this equalitarian trend is furnished by a comparative report on six national studies of workers' adjustment to technical change published by the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. In the Netherlands and in France a "reversal of the élite" was found to have occurred in the automated steel mills studied. Young men with lower wages had received more wage increases

than others and 40% of those in the highest paid group before the change had an actual decrease in wages.

The explanation for this trend seems to lie in a change of emphasis from qualifications based on long experience on the job to formal educational qualification. In Holland this has clearly happened. Workers with more than primary education have received more wage increases and less wage decreases, irrespective of age, than those whose education ceased at the primary level. But in France too, the same pattern seems to have been repeated.¹⁷

This pattern was not found in Britain where the seniority principle was the mechanism for selection and promotion.

But the report continues:

In addition, differences in the educational system must also be taken into account, for formal educational qualifications were rarely possessed by the steel-workers in the British firm.¹⁸

Not only is there less difference between the wages, prestige and responsibility between workers, but there is also less difference between workers and their supervisors. This is important not only for its effect in equalization on the job, but also because it is reflected in broader social attitudes.

D. Lockwood and J. Goldthorpe are currently engaged

in a study of three technically advanced plants in Luton, England. They point out that the mass production, assembly line environment is quite likely, because of fragmentary tasks, held together by the speed of the conveyor belt, and close supervision (both management determined), to produce both more management-labour conflict and more working-class awareness than does continuous process production.

With mass production, management exercises strict control over workers and often exerts strong pressure upon them in order to maintain the efficiency of the technical system; but with process production efficiency no longer depends to the same extent on worker effort, nor, thus, on managerial activity of the kind in question. The system sets the pace for all concerned.¹⁹

They believe that unit and continuous process production are less likely to produce attitudes leading to social and industrial conflict than is mass production.

The operative is not at any rate likely to be alienated to the extreme which is found where work is fragmentary and meaningless. Finally, the nature of the work situations typically created by unit and process production is such that the propensity for management-worker conflict is relatively low. The relationship between supervisor and worker tends to assume a quite different pattern from that characteristic of mass production industry, the emphasis being far less on the exertion of authority and pressure and far more on the giving of information and advice. In other words, the social structure of unit and process production is probably less conducive to the development of a dichotomous social imagery and collectivist social ethic than is the work milieu of mass production.²⁰

It is interesting to note that this assumption was at least partially borne out by the fact that these workers described the English social class system as made up (in their view) of only three classes: the poverty-stricken, the very rich, and in between, a huge middle class which included everybody else right up through lower levels of management.²¹ Money was regarded as the most important determinant of class position.

Change in Meaning of Work

The second universal and important result of advanced technology, which seems to be true for both mass production and continuous process production, is that work, once considered one of the principle sources of man's satisfaction, his status, prestige, and the centre of his important social relations, changes its meaning. It now becomes simply a means to an end, i.e., making a living and, of course, the higher the standard the better.

We have already mentioned that as compared to mass production assembly lines, the continuous process plant creates physically greater distances between workers and somewhat more formal relationships between workers and between workers and supervisors. The break-up of the time

honoured work team and the social meaning with which it was presumed to invest work has not turned out to be as seriously disrupting as expected. Even more significant has been the futility of trying to make work as intrinsically meaningful and satisfying for the assembly line worker as it once was for the craftsman, and in some respects this alienation of man from his work is carried a step farther with automation. Dublin suggested in 1955 that three out of four workers in three industrial plants in the middle west of the U.S. did not regard work as their central life interest, and did not make nor seek their most important social relationships on the job.²² This has been confirmed by Lockwood and Goldthorpe's study which shows that workers have an almost totally instrumental view of their work and do not have or particularly want close personal relationships with their fellow workers.

To the extent that men choose to define their work as a means to extrinsic ends, they are unlikely to regard the workplace as a milieu appropriate or favourable to the development of highly rewarding primary relationships..... So far as work goes, emotionally significant experiences and 'significant others' will tend neither to be looked for nor, thus, to be greatly missed in their absence.²³

Work, then, has changed in its meaning, since the days of unit work, and men, at least at the blue collar level, are not likely to invest themselves or their egos in

the performance of the kind of tasks required in mass assembly or continuous process industries. Dubin²⁴ finds that the worker now turns his interests and involvements to family, community, and other non-work areas. He still has sufficient attachment to his job to be dependable and efficient in it because it is the means to his real satisfactions. Lockwood and Goldthorpe feel that such attitudes may be adaptive to the increasing impersonality of work places and supervision. "The man who sees his work primarily as a means to extrinsic ends will have far less need for approval and commendation so far as the work-place is concerned, and will thus be able to accept with some equanimity supervisory behaviour of a remote and impersonal kind."²⁵ Naville believes that this detachment from his work which the modern worker exhibits may free him for wider, more creative pursuits, and that it is totally useless to expect a man to gain satisfaction of his deeper needs from work over which he has so little direct control.²⁶

Finally, we should note that this detachment from his work makes it easier for the worker to accept continual change, certainly in his work. He thus satisfies Alex Inkeles' first criterion of the modern man: his readiness for new experience and his openness to innovation and change.²⁷

Since it is asserted by all observers that economic growth and technical change are dependent on the mobility of labour (technical as well as geographical), then it is evident that this willingness to accept change is also an important factor in the affluence of both the individual worker and the society.

Reinforcing Factors

To complete the picture, it may be argued that the detachment from work, in combination with affluence, which gives the worker both the incentive and the means to turn from involvement in his work to involvement with his family and leisure or non-work activities, leads him to participate in mass consumption norms. To fix up his house and buy a car, a refrigerator, clothes, and the kind of holiday which make up the mass consumption package is to enter a world where one man is as good as another, and the flattening of hierarchies experienced at work is reinforced. It is also to enter a world of continually changing desires and expectations, as well as values. As Pécaut says, "By arousing a favourable attitude to change in the way of living and consumption, modern cultural norms prepare the individual for a favourable attitude (toward change) in his

working life."²⁸ Pécaut therefore hypothesizes that technical change will be more easily accepted the more the individual participates in modern consumption norms. In this way also the worker furthers his own affluence and that of his society.

It should be reiterated here that rising levels of education tend to reinforce the pattern described above and perhaps even to accelerate its pace. As Alex Inkeles comments:

Almost all serious scientific investigations ...have shown the degree of modernity to rise with increases in the amount of education he has received...in schools emphasizing the more modern type of curriculum..... This effect depends in part on the direct instruction provided, but we assume as well that the school as a social organization serves as a model of rationality, of the importance of technical competence, of the rule of objective standards of performance, and of the principle of distributive justice reflected in the grading system.²⁹

We have already mentioned the importance of education to mobility of all kinds, and to income level. And in the chapter on consumption norms we have shown that the highly educated are likely to be the pace setters in consumption norms, partly because they are educated to the broadest aspirations, partly because they are likely to be more affluent. Here it is only necessary to add that if a

worker (or a technician, or a clerk) has had more education than his supervisor or shop steward (as may well be the case if they represent different generations), then he is, also, for this reason unlikely to accept age-grading or even job level differences as worthy of deference. He will have a wider view of possibilities, greater aspirations and expectations than his superiors and a firm conviction that only skill and competence at what is needed at the moment (not what was useful ten years ago) is of value and ought, in justice, to be rewarded.

Summary

To summarize, technological change is producing a work environment in which, although the work is pleasanter and offers greater scope and variety to the operator, and certainly higher incomes, the old hierarchies of skill and authority are reduced or sometimes disappear. The worker experiences a greater sense that he is equal to any other man, but at the same time there is nowhere to go in improving his position in life. Chances of promotion are much smaller, his control over the production process and the skill required to do his work continually diminish, his relations to fellow workers and supervisors become more impersonal and remote. It becomes difficult to satisfy either his achievement

desires or his need for recognition and prestige within the work situation. He therefore turns his creative urges, his ambition, his need for social support and recognition to his private and community world. His work loses most of its emotional and psychological meaning and becomes the means by which he can meet these needs outside of work. Affluence offers the means to achieve recognition, approval of his reference group, a sense of mobility and perhaps creativity, denied by the job. Meanwhile, because change is continuous, workers are continually threatened by loss of their jobs or their skills. A certain detachment from the job and a corresponding investment of self in a "style of life" facilitates the acceptance of this situation. It must be noted, however, that as long as a worker depends on his job for his living he can never be impervious to threat to it.

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
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Charts for Chapter III

Chart I

PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED OCCUPATIONS
IN FIVE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES*

Based on Average Employment for 1950-1952 and 1957-1959



*Electrical and Electronics, heavy machinery, household appliances, automobile, and automobile parts.

Source: Senate of Canada, Committee on Manpower and Employment, *Proceedings*, Feb. 1, 1961, Report No. 6, p. 339.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION

Rising Levels of Education

One of the most significant changes associated with affluence and the technologically advanced society is that the level of education for the whole population rises. To take only a few examples from the Western nations, in Sweden between 1866 and 1939 the size of the school population increased by a ratio of 1 to 1.4 while the number receiving the baccalaureate (a degree attained at about age 20 there) had jumped in the ratio of 1 to 9 in the same period. France, which was rather slower to develop in this and in certain other aspects of technological maturity, has nonetheless increased its number of young people in post primary education from around 12 per thousand in 1880 to a proportion of 50 per thousand of the population under 21 years of age.¹ In Canada, the proportion of the population 5-24 years of age attending school has moved from 49.3% in 1921 to 65.7% in 1961.² Looking at it another way, in Canada in 1965, 24.1% of the population aged 20-24 had finished high school

whereas of those people 65 and over (who would have attended high school around 1915) only 12% finished high school. The figures for the U.S. during this same 50 year period show an even more remarkable rise in the proportion completing high school: from 14.8% to 44.3%.³ Tables I and II support the thesis that as an economy becomes more technologically mature and affluent, the educational levels of the entire population rise and continue to rise.

At the university level in Canada, 6 out of 100 of the 18 to 21 year age group are in college as compared to 4 out of 100 twenty years ago. In the U.S. about 20 out of 100 in this age group are in college, and it has been estimated that by 1970 we will have reached a level in Canada of about 15% attendance.⁴ At the same time, we can expect that 60-70% of the next generation of adults (those now in school) will have completed a high school education. The relative lag in Canadian education is, however, worthy of note. Table II shows that the gap between U.S. and Canadian educational levels widened year by year until recently when the ratio of difference declined somewhat, suggesting that Canadian education may now be moving forward at a faster rate.

Fourastié has spelled out the significance of the

educational advance:

The increase in the school population appears...not as the result of fashion or of transitory impulses, but as a structural phenomenon related to the whole of contemporary economic evolution. This increase results directly from the rise in the average level of living and from the reduction of the duration of work necessary for a given national production. It is thus a direct consequence of technical progress, and will continue as long.⁵

This experience of more years of education, we believe, changes workers' attitudes in some ways that are crucial for industrial relations. For one thing, it leads them to believe they have a right to some of the improvements in their way of life which affluence leads them to hope and plan for.

The Demand for Higher Education

As we show in the sections on Affluence and Technological Change, the emergence of an affluent nation presupposes the existence of a level of scientific and technical training among the population to begin, carry through and sustain changes in the methods of production such that the economy can produce more than its inhabitants need for survival. Education, then, is necessary, at least for a minority, to start the ball rolling. As technology

advances, it requires more people who are sufficiently educated to take on work that becomes increasingly mental rather than physical, as machines replace men's muscles. Eventually they may replace man's brains too, but it is not yet clear to what extent this is possible, even if it were economical.

That this process is actually occurring is easily demonstrated. In Canada, the median years of schooling for males in each occupation for all occupations has risen from 7.5 in 1941 to 9 years in 1961. Managers now have a median of 10.6 years of education as compared to 9.1 in 1941, labourers and agriculture workers have come from 6.7 and 6.6 years respectively to 7.2 years of schooling, and service workers from 7.5 years in 1941 to 8.2 in 1961. (See Table III.) The Department of Labour's study, "Acquisition of Skills," found that among skilled tradesmen, after 1945, the rate of completion of and/or attendance at secondary school rose noticeably. For example:

Electronic technicians: From 50% completing during the war years to 74% completing in the post-1945 period.

Senior draughtsmen: 69% completing secondary school after 1945, said to be "considerably higher" than in the earlier periods.

Tool and die makers: Completion rate was lower after 1945 than during the war, but attendance at secondary school increased from 67% in the pre-1930 period to 88% after 1945.

Sheet metal workers: Attendance was highest in the post-1945 period, when it was 65%, compared with 29% in the pre-1930 period.⁷

This study then goes on to explain that educational requirements for all these trades have gone up at least as fast as the level of education has:

A major reason for the higher level of education among the formally trained is that, so far as organized training in industry, such as apprenticeship, is concerned, a certain level of educational attainment has usually been required, though this may vary from trade to trade. Thus education has been used in the past, and is being used to an even greater degree in the present, as a screening device for the selection of workers for formal training programs in industry. This situation has usually not prevailed in the case of workers trained through informal means. The resulting disparity between the education of formally and informally trained workers may be even greater today because of the trend in industry towards raising still further the academic entrance requirements for in-plant training programs for the development of skilled workers and technicians. This trend is a reflection of a technology, increasing in complexity, which dictates the need for workers with a better knowledge of mathematics and science and a better educational background generally. It is only to be expected that, in these circumstances, the selection of candidates for in-plant training programs will favour those with a higher level of education.⁸ (Underscoring is our own.)

Meltz found that between 1951 and 1961 demand for persons with thirteen-plus, i.e., post high school, education increased even more than the supply and that the demand came not only from the professions, but to a greater extent, from managerial and clerical occupations. In fact, every non-professional occupation experienced an upsurge in its thirteen plus proportion. He continues:

Thus, although the increase in the level of education of persons in the labour force shifted the supply curve to professional occupations, the demand for professionals and the demand for non-professionals with higher levels of education appears to have risen even faster.⁹

It is interesting that Meltz found this demand outrunning supply only after 1951. There had been little change in the level of education in non-professional occupations before that time. This coincides with Rostow's date for Canada's entering the stage of high mass consumption, when affluence may be said to have become really widespread.

We can assume then that Canada, like other technologically advanced countries, has and will continue to have rapidly rising levels of education for the majority of its citizens. Accompanying this are increasingly high academic requirements for jobs at all levels of the economy.

This is the result both of the greater supply of educated people available and of the greater intellectual demands made by modern technology on people at all occupational levels affected by it.

Relation of Education to National Economic Growth

A number of economists have, in the last few years, been trying to find ways to estimate the contribution of education to the economic growth of a nation. The assumption is that education is an investment in human capital, which in turn contributes some definable economic value, i.e., wealth and progress, to the economic system, much as physical capital does when put to use. The methods of measuring this elusive factor have been difficult to achieve and probably are still crude. However, E. F. Denison has estimated that increased education contributed 23% of the growth in the U.S. national income between 1929 and 1957 as compared with 15% contributed by capital inputs during this period.¹⁰

In Canada, Bertram has estimated that between the years 1911-1961 the rise in the educational level has accounted for almost one-fourth of the rise in the productivity per employed person. He further estimates that

improved education accounts for 12% of the growth in national income between 1911 and 1961.¹¹

One of the interesting uses to which this measuring of the economic value of education has been put is in estimating what is the optimum level of educational investment for under-developed countries. Nalla Gouden, for example, shows that for India the highest rate of return on educational investment in 1967 would be in a school system designed to permit every Indian child to complete primary school, whereas comparably, at India's stage of development, investment in secondary and university systems would be a poor investment.¹² Studies by the Department of Labour as well as Meltz's statistics demonstrate that Canada needs the educational level of the population to be raised, in general,

If demand is to be met, training and educational facilities at all levels of the educational system from primary school to post-graduate courses will have to be expanded in an orderly fashion,

but that the most pressing needs are at the level of university and post-secondary technical training.¹³ Canada has evidently done well so far as primary education is concerned but has failed to invest adequately in providing secondary and particularly university education. This is

borne out by the fact that until now Canada has had to depend on immigration for a large proportion of its professional and skilled manpower.¹⁴

Relation of Education to Individual Income

Not only does education add to the wealth of a nation, it also adds to the wealth of the individual. In fact, this relationship is as nearly a perfect correlation as we can expect in any study of human experience. Bertram's¹⁵ chart, reproduced as Chart I at the end of this chapter, shows clearly that throughout a man's life his level of education determines his income and that a university degree makes the biggest difference. A man with a university degree can expect that his earnings will go from \$7,000 at the beginning to around \$11,000 by the end of his career, whereas the man who attends university but does not finish will on the average only progress from \$5,000 to \$6,500. Every other level of education is proportionally lower to start and has less expectation of improvement. Miller¹⁶ has shown that in the U.S., also, not only is the income gradient steadily upward from \$2,551 for a person with less than 8 years of education in 1958 to \$9,206 for a college graduate, but that since 1939 the gap in dollars between the lowest

and the highest levels has steadily widened. Even the gap between the high school graduate's and the college graduate's earnings, which stood in the relationship of \$1,378 to \$2,607 in 1939, was in 1958 the difference between \$5,567 and \$9,206, or a jump from a difference of \$1,000 to almost \$3,000. (See Table IV.)

Lest one assume that these differences are due to the selective process whereby those of favoured cultural or socio-economic backgrounds and of high intelligence are the ones that continue in the educational system, this has been disproved by a study made in the United States of a sample of nearly 3,000 men graduated from Illinois, Minnesota and Rochester high schools.¹⁷ They were studied about 17 years after graduation. Table V shows that with intelligence held constant, for example, those in the lowest 45% of I.Q. test scores with a college degree made the same income as people of higher I.Q. but less education, and considerably more than men of the highest I.Q. but only a high school education. Another equally interesting table is Number VI, also from the Wolfe-Smith survey, which shows that the income of a labourer's son, if he gets a college education, exceeds that of the son of a professional man or manager who fails to get a college degree. The worker's son who

finishes college may make, on the average, \$1,000 more than the professional's son, if the latter had some college, and \$1,300 more, if the professional's son only finished high school.

As S. M. Miller remarks,

The general rise in the level of education has not reduced the importance of education; it has shifted upward the breaking point where education leads to high or low income. It is certainly better to be a high school graduate than a dropout, but it is much better to be a college graduate.¹⁸

Education and Mobility

Bertram points out several ways in which a higher level of education improves not only the income of the worker, but also his opportunities and capacities to be mobile, to adapt to technological change and to improve his occupational status.

Further years of schooling provide what has been termed a 'financial option' return, or the value of the opportunity to obtain still further education. Two other benefits that appear to be important are non-monetary 'opportunity options' involving wider individual employment choices, which education permits, and opportunities for 'hedging' against the vicissitudes of technological change.¹⁹

This capacity to be mobile, to take advantage of opportunities is, as we have shown, essential to both the individual and national prosperity. As Peitchinis says, "Economic expansion cannot be attained and sustained without labour mobility."²⁰

Richard Centers has shown that educational levels are positively related to occupational mobility, i.e., to moving up in job status, which is also a kind of social mobility, particularly for those sons whose fathers were in the lower status occupations. For example, of those manual workers' sons who had a better education than their fathers, 53% also had a higher occupational status.²¹ (See Table VII .) G. L. Palmer came to the same conclusion in her study of labour mobility in six major American cities. She found that education above certain limits provides roughly equal access to the white-collar occupations for sons of fathers from all occupational groups, while the lack of it severely limits access.

Thus the educational opportunities available to sons of fathers at different levels of skill are the primary influence in determining the levels attained by the sons.²²

Another way to estimate the mobility value of education is by observing the levels of education usually

found at different occupational levels. Lipset and Bendix²³ have included a table in their study of social mobility which shows clearly that the higher the status, the higher the educational level of the occupation. Managers, officials and proprietors seem to be a slight deviation from this pattern, but it should be remembered that this category includes owners of small businesses. These are often immigrants of little education, manual workers trying to break out of factory work and others of no particular training, all of which bring the educational level of the category down below what one might expect. (See Table VIII.) In the U.S. in 1950, 85.6% of professional and technical people had at least a high school education compared to 56.4% of clerical workers and 11.6% of labourers.

In discussing the rising educational requirements for different occupations, we have already quoted Meltz's table showing that over time the educational levels in each occupational category are rising in Canada. The same table also serves to show that higher education enables a man to be eligible for higher status occupations.

So far as geographical mobility is concerned, it can be inferred that education opens the mind to possibilities for advancement and wider experience, and as our political

attitudes survey will show, it certainly adds to the sense of potency, of capacity to control and manipulate the environment and reduces fears based on inability to understand. All these things, one can assume, make it easier for a man to leave the safety of the familiar community to take advantage of some opportunity beckoning elsewhere. However, we have been unable to find definite proof of this partly because, although the highly educated may be willing to move, they less often find it necessary. The unskilled and the semi-skilled, who have in general a low educational level, actually hold more different jobs, as Reynolds discovered, but not always as a matter of choice, nor even of achieving a better position.²⁴

That education, especially general academic education, is an aid to technical mobility is made clear by the examples we have quoted showing that, in Canada, factory training programs usually are made available to those having higher educational qualifications. Not only is learning new methods probably easier for those with better backgrounds in mathematics and science, but they are given opportunities to become "technically mobile" over workers with less education. In a study of automated steel plants in six European countries it was found that in the two countries,

France and Holland, where there were differences in educational attainment among the workers, the workers with higher general education were promoted over the heads of older, more experienced workers when automation occurred. Furthermore, younger men, with more educational qualifications, were more likely to be earning higher wages after the change. This was not true where seniority determined promotion chances, of course, but where it does occur, it seems to be largely a reflection of the greater ability of the more educated to adapt to new technical requirements.²⁵

This ability to take advantage of what Bertram has called the "financial option" return of education is also demonstrated by participation rates in adult education. These results are comparable to the findings concerning the greater opportunities workers with high general educational levels have to participate in factory training programs. However, they apply to the whole population. Table IX shows that in the U.S., for both blue and white collar workers, previous educational attainment was the biggest single factor influencing participation in adult education programs. Also, the influence of occupation and income on the rate is not very important.²⁶

Lipset and Bendix believe that, "education...has

become the principal avenue for upward mobility in most industrialized nations."²⁷ The authors also believe that this is an important fact underlying the belief and confidence of the American worker that he can improve his position in life, either in status or in income or both, if he has a 'good' education. And our review of the literature shows that this is, in fact, statistically a realistic assumption. That this idea is firmly planted, especially in the minds of workers in the blue collar occupations has been demonstrated by many researchers as we shall see in the chapter on life styles. Purcell found that packinghouse workers wanted their children to get an education so they would not have to be packinghouse workers.²⁸ Chinoy found that auto workers who ceased to hope for themselves transferred their aspirations to their children and saw education as the way out for them.²⁹ Berger, studying auto workers in a new California suburb, finds that an "overwhelming majority of the sample say they want college education for their sons."³⁰

In view of these responses, there is poignancy in the findings of Fortin and Tremblay that of 362 family heads in and around Ste. Julienne, Quebec, 59% advise their young people to work for wages, preferably in the city (51%), rather than to become farmers. In another study of three

metal-working plants in Montreal, Dofny and David found that when rural workers come to the city to work for wages, they are content for quite awhile because they expect to realize their dreams, whereas those whose fathers were wage earners before them have given up all but the smallest aspirations for themselves. However, 80% believe that through education their children can substantially improve their position in life.³² This same belief in the power of education to provide children with the opportunities the parents have not had is an important factor in the current exodus of Newfoundland families from the outports to the cities and towns. Among other reasons, the parents are no longer willing for their children to grow up illiterate.³³

Education and Consumption Norms

Education apparently has little effect on consumption patterns except in a few things. The higher the educational level, the more people read books, magazines and newspapers.³⁴ They also spend more on education, as we saw in the chapter on consumption norms, and in this chapter's discussion of adult education. Table X also shows that there are differences in leisure activities, other than reading. There may also be some difference in the quality

of goods as education increases, but Canadian expenditure patterns by education of head do not show, as we said before, any significant difference in what is bought, except in expenditures on education.

The most important effect of education on consumption is that it produces that confidence in oneself and the expectation of continued progress which produces the willingness to buy. Alex Inkeles, for example, quotes two international studies of the relationship between education and optimism about the future to show that "those who are better educated and trained, and hold more responsible positions, will be more optimistic specifically about those situations where the possibility of man's mastery of himself or his environment is involved."³⁵ Canada was not included in these studies, but Dofny and David found that among Montreal workers (English-speaking, French-speaking, old and new Canadians) the higher the educational level, the more optimistic they were about the possibility of improving their personal position in the plant and that of the working man in the society at large.³⁶

Education, also, because of the high association with increased income and occupational mobility which we have shown, produces the means to buy. Finally, this

combination of rising income and education produces an equalitarianism in the family and in the society which results in more women getting higher education and joining the labour force. The higher the educational level of wives, as we have seen, the more likely they are to work; this factor being almost as important as the income of the husband. They do not work entirely for economic reasons, but their jobs do add to the family purchasing power.

Rising Education, Rising Expectations,
and Dissatisfaction

Our investigation of the effects of rising levels of education lead us to assume that an individual will feel that he can expect a certain relationship between his investment in education and the return in terms of his income and status. We would expect, therefore, that rising levels of education will inevitably mean rising levels of expectation with respect to income and status, even when education is compulsory. Compulsory education might, in fact, be regarded as a way of raising the expectations of a society artificially, or even against the will of some members. In Nigeria, for example, when compulsory school education was introduced, all the graduates refused to work because they knew that educated men stayed in offices and,

by their definition, did not work. Therefore, unless levels of productivity and wealth of an economy can continue to provide opportunities for either status or income improvement, a great deal of dissatisfaction may be expected among workers whose jobs offer less than they feel their education entitles them to receive.

There is some evidence that this already occurs, at all levels of the occupational structure, whenever the occupant of a position feels that he has a right to a higher one, by virtue of his education. Drucker castigates American management for "the tendency to make the jobs of the young, educated people as unimportant as possible, as undemanding as possible and as boring as possible."³⁷ He believes this to be a major reason for business failing to attract and keep the brightest and best trained young men. In a study of engineers and scientists, 61% of whom were under 35 and 58% of whom had college degrees, Danielson found dissatisfaction was common, based on what these professionals felt to be inadequate wages, too slow promotions, and not enough interesting work. As one supervisor admitted:

"They are not promoted and paid according to their abilities."

And another,

"I think their big problem is that they feel their advancement will be slow... Some of this comes from the fact that they get the impression in school that they're going to shoot ahead fast... I think they get told by somebody in school that they should demand so much and nothing less."³⁸

Finally, Kornhauser, in a study of the mental health of workers, found that among unskilled and semi-skilled workers satisfaction with life and self-esteem decreased as education increased. Personal morale and sociability were higher as educational level rose, however. (See Table XI.) Kornhauser interprets these results:

Self-esteem and satisfaction with life can be presumed to depend to greater degree on vocational achievement in relation to aspirations than would feelings of social distrust (personal morale), social withdrawal, and other elements of mental health which are more likely to derive from lifelong influences apart from the job. These latter components might be expected to reflect the direct contribution of education in helping a person at any economic level more effectively come to terms with his world.³⁹

For our purposes, they also show that education leads to dissatisfactions unless the expected rewards and status are forthcoming.

We have been able to find in Canadian poll data,

compiled for this study, further evidence among Canadians of this dissatisfaction. In 1963 a sample was asked,

"On the whole would you say that you are satisfied or dissatisfied with the work that you do?"

The table below shows that for both white collar and blue collar workers, the percentage of those who say that they are satisfied decreases with each increase in the level of education. However, among managers the opposite is true: the proportion satisfied with the work they do increases with increases in education.

Men's Satisfaction with their Work
by Occupation and Education

Males - "Yes, satisfied"						
Occupation of head of family	Public School		Secondary or High School		More than High School	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Professional	100.00	(1)	100.00	(2)	100.00	(20)
Managerial	80.00	(5)	90.91	(22)	100.00	(11)
White collar	100.00	(3)	93.10	(29)	66.67	(9)
Blue collar	83.33	(60)	76.60	(47)	76.47	(17)

Source: A re-analysis of 1963 Gallup Poll data from the repository at Carleton University.

The implication of this table is that among white and blue collar workers education raises the level of expectation

higher than their job can satisfy. This is especially so among white collar workers, who, as Meltz's table shows, often have as much or more education than managers. Since we know that skilled workers are generally satisfied with their jobs, if we could break these statistics down by the various skill levels within blue collar, we might see that an even greater proportion of semi-skilled, but high school educated, workers are dissatisfied.

We know that education is also related positively to income levels, and this constitutes another expectation. The Canadian survey asked in November 1963,

"On the whole would you say that you are satisfied or dissatisfied with your family income?"

Of those with more than high school education, 100% of managers, 78% of white collar and 65% of blue collar workers were satisfied with their family incomes. Since the proportions of those who were satisfied in each occupational group decreases as educational level decreases, it would seem that in fact those with higher education are making more money, even if their status has not improved as much as they expected. On the other hand, we still must recognize that the same level of education seems to pay off less for

the blue collar worker than for other groups.

Men's Satisfaction with Family Income
by Occupation and Education

Males - "Yes, satisfied"

Occupation of head of family	Public School		Secondary or High School		More than High School	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Professional	100.00	(1)	50.00	(2)	90.00	(20)
Managerial	80.00	(5)	77.27	(22)	100.00	(11)
White collar	33.33	(3)	58.62	(29)	77.78	(9)
Blue collar	58.33	(60)	61.70	(47)	64.71	(17)

Source: A re-analysis of Gallup Poll data from the
repository at Carleton University.

The same sort of question asked in the U.S. by the
Survey Research Centre was sorted for us and yielded the
following results:

Question: "We are interested in how people
are getting along financially
these days. So far as you and
your family are concerned, would
you say that you are pretty well
satisfied with your present
financial situation, more or less
satisfied, or not satisfied at
all?"

Satisfaction with Financial Status among Those with
More than High School Education by Occupation

	(N = 113)	(N = 84)	(N = 123)
High School or more	Managers and Proprietors	White Collar	Blue Collar
	%	%	%
Very satisfied	61	40	37
More or less satisfied	32	43	43
Not satisfied	6	16	19

Source: A re-analysis of data from the 1964 election survey obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

The U.S. figures also showed that among both white collar and blue collar workers the percentage of people who say that they are very satisfied decreases with increasing levels of education although, at the same time, the primary school groups have the highest percentage who say that they are dissatisfied with their incomes. At this income level, it is probably a case of real inadequacy of wages rather than an inadequacy relative to expectation. Among managers, the higher the level of education, the larger the proportion of those who report that they are very satisfied. The U.S. and the Canadian figures both suggest that it is only at the managerial level that people with a high school

education or more have the chance to use it effectively and to gain satisfactory rewards.

Education and Political and Social Attitudes

Political attitudes of individuals or of groups in the society may be expected to be translated into action when the occasion demands and even to determine what kind of action is likely to be taken. Since unions are political organizations, it is of interest to this paper to determine whether a rise in educational levels may be expected to affect political attitudes of union members toward union officers and policies. In terms of public policy it may be interesting to know whether education affects the attitudes of the general citizenry toward labour and toward the government.

Fortunately, there has been a most exhaustive study of political attitudes and their relationship to numerous variables in five nations, the results of which have been compiled and were published in 1963 under the title, The Civic Culture. The findings with regard to the effects of education on political attitudes are numerous and important and worth quoting here. These results hold even when age and occupation are held constant.⁴⁰

It is of great interest, and among the most important facts we discovered, that most of the relationships between education and political orientation are of the first type; i.e., educational groups differ from one another substantially, and in a similar way, in each nation. The manifestations of this cross-national uniformity are the following:

- (1) The more educated person is more aware of the impact of government on the individual than is the person of less education.
- (2) The more educated individual is more likely to report that he follows politics and pays attention to election campaigns than is the individual of less education.
- (3) The more educated individual has more political information.
- (4) The more educated individual has opinions on a wider range of political subjects; the focus of his attention to politics is wider.
- (5) The more educated individual is more likely to engage in political discussion.
- (6) The more educated individual feels free to discuss politics with a wider range of people. Those with less education are more likely to report that there are many people with whom they avoid such discussions.
- (7) The more educated individual is more likely to consider himself capable of influencing the government; this is reflected both in responses to questions on what one could do about an unjust law and in respondents' scores on the subjective competence scale.

The above list refers to specifically political orientations, which vary the same way in all five nations. In addition, our evidence shows that:

- (8) The more educated individual is more likely to be a member--an active member--of some organization.
- (9) The more educated individual is more likely to express confidence in his social environment: to believe that other people are trustworthy and helpful.

In Charts II, III, and IV, we have presented some of the more striking evidence of the perfect association between level of education and the subjective sense of competence, or the feeling of potency with regard to the world around one, particularly with regard to the political process. These findings, that the more a man is educated, the more he is interested in politics, the more he participates, and the more he trusts his fellow man, are significant for our paper because they suggest that in unions involving an educated membership (and as educational levels go up this should include more and more of them) we should expect more active union participation. The trust in his fellow man makes an educated man more likely to act collectively, and his greater sense of competence is likely to make him feel that he can change union leaders and union policies if they do not suit him. The one possibility which

would negate this effect is that unions might fail so miserably to represent workers or to be effective in relations with management that the membership ignores the union organization and seeks redress through the political system itself. The important point is that a worker who is dissatisfied because his position on the job or in society is not as high as his level of education leads him to expect will also feel capable of acting politically to change this state of affairs and will be more likely to do so than his less educated brothers.

Various Canadian polls, as well as studies of U.S. political attitudes and the Almond study show that, in general, the educated man tends to be more liberal in his views than less educated ones. The Kraft report of the AFL-CIO in the U.S. showed that among younger workers was found the greatest amount of criticism concerning various AFL-CIO policy positions, for example. Among Canadian blue collar workers, the higher the level of education, the smaller the proportion who favour compulsory arbitration; who favoured the retention of the death penalty; who believe that the picket line should be restricted to union members in the plant. Also, the higher the level of education, the greater the number who approve bringing thousands of skilled

immigrants to Canada.

The differences in attitudes found between educated and less educated people in five nations by the Almond study are already, it would seem, causing trouble within unions.

An important element of emotional commitment to unionism has in the past been found in a strong identification with the working class. A re-analysis of the Survey Research Center's 1964 U.S. election survey shows that within all occupational groups, the higher the education, the larger the percentage of people who call themselves middle class. Blue collar workers defined themselves as follows:

Question: "There's been a lot of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong to either the middle class or to the working class. Do you think of yourself as being one of these classes? If yes, which one? If no, well, if you have to make a choice, would you call yourself middle or working class?"

Social Class Identification of Blue Collar Workers
According to their Level of Education

Class Identity	Level of Education		
	Grade School	High School	More than High School
Middle class	10.6%	20.8%	39.6%
Working class	89.1%	77.4%	57.8%
(N)	(76)	(417)	(123)

Source: A re-analysis of 1964 U.S. election survey obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

The majority of the working class still identifies with that class in the U.S., but education is eroding this allegiance, and as Goldthorpe and Lockwood in England found, affluence does also. This means that increasingly union leaders cannot count on the unquestioned support of rank and file members.

Another source of intra-union conflict attributable to rising educational levels is to be found in the fact that as management and government have become more specialized and complicated, unions have been forced to hire their own experts in order to be able to deal with these other groups adequately. One result has been conflict in union leadership between the intellectuals (a word frequently

used to mean highly educated) and the missionaries (those whose devotion to the union comes from the heart rather than the head). The intellectuals are often resented as 'outsiders' because they have not come up through labour ranks or experienced the rough battle of organizing the union in the early days, yet their expertise gives them positions of power. Wilensky says that this has been a feature of several serious internal wars in the labour movement in the U.S. and quotes two instances verbatim:

Excerpts from the CIO Rubberworkers
Convention Proceedings:

Delegate Robert Hill: "Your thinking on this matter...is fantastic. You are a legal mind; you are from Harvard, or Yale, or some other place like the rest of the guys up there, and you don't understand the thinking of the workers."⁴¹

And from a Wilensky interview with a staff expert for an unnamed union:

S.E.: "When things were dull, and someone wanted to get a rise out of the crowd, one thing was sure fire: make a speech about how the union has been turned over to a bunch of outsiders in the national office. End it with, "We want to give the Gadgetworkers Union back to the gadgetworkers!" and it'd bring the house down every time....."

H.L.W.: "Yes, I understand it became a badge of honor to say that you didn't have any education."

S.E.: "Yeah, X said he only went through grammar school. He was boasting about it. When Y (factional opponent) stumbled over a word he stopped and said, "I can't even spell it!" What a faker!"⁴²

In French Canada, since it is usual for labour leaders to come from the intellectual, educated élite, this division is not apparent. However, outside of French Canada, we have in the U.S. and the rest of Canada, a group of old-timers from top to bottom of the labour unions, mingling with and slowly being outnumbered by men too young to have been present "at the first hour" of union organizing, and not very much interested in it, probably, as anyone who tries to interest his children in the details of World War II knows. They are, furthermore, better educated and will have different attitudes toward many things than the old-timers. Whereas Wilensky found these staff experts on the defensive, the situation is bound to change as the educated, less emotionally committed union members begin to outnumber the old-timers in the ranks and eventually in the elected hierarchy of the power structure.

Summary

We have shown in this section how rising levels of education are an integral part of a technologically advancing economy and, at the same time, produce certain strains within unions and in the society. These strains are caused partly by conflict of views between the educated and the less educated and partly by a discrepancy between what people expect when they achieve a high level of education and what is actually forthcoming, although fortunately this is not true in general. Where it is true, however, we have shown that the educated worker has a greater interest in and feeling of capacity to act politically to change things, through the union or through the larger society, than the less educated worker. We hope that at the same time we have suggested that, whatever the stresses, rising levels of education have produced more people who are potentially better able and more willing to participate in democratic processes, whether in the union, in the factory, or in the nation. Fortunately or unfortunately, this does not necessarily mean more peaceful industrial or political relations.

As Victor Allen has pointed out:

...the newly emerging strike prone groups are the draughtsmen, schoolteachers and clerks. In the past the apprentice-skilled craftsmen were always better educated than other manual workers and at the same time were more effective in their industrial action. More effective and equitable educational and training facilities for shop-stewards might only result in better organized strikes or more sophisticated strike methods.⁴³

Footnotes for Chapter IV

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Tables for Chapter IV

TABLE I

Per cent of the population 5-24 years of age attending school, by age group and sex,
for Canada,¹ 1921-1961
Pourcentage de la population âgée de 5 à 24 ans fréquentant l'école, par groupe d'âge et sexe,
Canada¹, 1921-1961

Age group Groupe d'âge	1921			1931			1941			1951			1961		
	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F
Total 5-24	49.3	49.2	49.3	51.9	51.6	52.2	50.5	50.3	50.7	52.2	53.0	51.4	65.7	67.2	64.1
5-9	65.5	65.4	65.7	68.7	68.4	69.0	66.8	66.6	67.1	65.2	64.9	65.4	75.3	75.2	75.5
10-14	88.7	88.7	88.7	93.4	93.6	93.3	94.4	94.3	94.4	93.0	93.1	92.8	97.1	97.1	97.1
15-19	24.8	22.9	26.7	33.7	32.3	35.1	35.5	33.9	37.1	40.5	40.9	40.2	58.8	61.5	56.0
20-24	2.3	3.1	1.5	2.8	3.6	2.0	3.7	4.5	2.8	4.9	6.5	3.3	8.1	11.5	4.7

¹ Not including Newfoundland, Yukon and Northwest Territories. — Sans Terre-Neuve, le Yukon et les Territoires du Nord-Ouest.

Source: D.B.S., Bulletin 7.1-10, "Educational Levels and School Attendance", 1961, p. 10-5, Their Table 3.

The United States' Population, by Level of Education, Age and Sex, March, 1965,
and the Canadian Population, by Level of Education, Age and Sex, February, 1965

Sex and level of education	20-24		25-34		35-44	
	United States	Canada	United States	Canada	United States	Canada
per cent distribution						
Both sexes						
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Completed elementary school education or less.....	8.0	23.5	13.3	34.5	19.8	40.9
Some high school education	18.7	37.5	18.6	35.3	20.2	31.8
Completed high school education	44.3	24.1	43.2	19.2	38.6	17.7
Some university education or university degree	29.0	14.9	24.9	11.0	21.4	9.6
Male						
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Completed elementary school education or less.....	9.3	25.1	14.4	37.5	22.2	42.7
Some high school education	17.7	37.6	17.1	33.8	19.8	31.2
Completed high school education	39.0	18.8	38.9	15.8	32.2	14.1
Some university education or university degree	34.0	18.5	29.6	12.9	25.8	12.0
Female						
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Completed elementary school education or less.....	6.7	21.9	12.4	31.7	17.6	39.2
Some high school education	19.6	37.2	20.0	36.6	20.6	32.4
Completed high school education	49.1	29.4	47.1	22.5	44.3	21.2
Some university education or university degree	24.6	11.5	20.5	9.2	17.5	7.2
per cent distribution						
45-54						
55-64						
65 and over						
per cent distribution						
Both sexes						
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Completed elementary school education or less.....	30.7	47.0	45.7	61.1	63.7	69.7
Some high school education	20.0	28.4	18.3	20.6	12.4	15.2
Completed high school education	32.0	16.0	20.9	11.4	13.3	10.2
Some university education or university degree.....	17.3	8.6	15.1	6.9	10.6	4.9
Male						
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Completed elementary school education or less.....	32.9	49.9	48.8	63.2	67.4	72.6
Some high school education	20.1	26.2	18.0	19.4	10.5	13.9
Completed high school education	27.9	13.6	17.9	9.3	11.5	7.8
Some university education or university degree	19.1	10.3	15.3	8.1	10.6	5.7
Female						
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Completed elementary school education or less.....	28.5	44.1	42.9	58.9	60.8	67.1
Some high school education	19.9	30.5	18.6	21.8	13.8	16.4
Completed high school education	35.9	18.4	23.6	13.6	14.8	12.3
Some university education or university degree	15.7	7.0	14.9	5.7	10.6	4.2

Source: The percentages for the United States have been estimated from distributions provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.

as taken from D.B.S. Bulletin Cat. 71-505 "Educational Attainment of the Canadian Population and Labour Force, 1960-65", Their Table 16, page 19

MEDIAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING IN EACH OCCUPATION, FOR MALES AND FEMALES,
CANADA, 1941, 1951 AND 1961

	Males				Females		
	1941	1951	1961		1941	1951	1961
All Occupations	7.5	8.0	9.0		9.4	9.7	10.1
Managerial	9.1	9.9	10.6		9.1	9.5	9.9
Professional	13+	13+	13+		11.5	12.4	13+
Clerical	10.1	10.2	10.6		10.7	10.6	10.8
Commercial and financial	9.6	10.0	10.5		9.7	9.5	9.7
Manufacturing and construction	7.7	7.8	8.3		8.1	7.7	7.6
Labourers	6.7	6.9	7.2		7.9	7.4	7.7
Transportation and communication	7.5	7.9	8.4		10.0	10.2	10.3
Service	7.5	7.7	8.2		7.6	7.8	8.3
Agriculture	6.6	6.9	7.2		6.8	7.0	7.3
Logging	5.3	5.8	6.1		3.4	7.2	8.2
Fishing	5.9	6.2	6.5		--	7.5	7.0
Mining	6.8	7.1	7.6		6.8	7.3	9.5

SOURCE: See Table 14.

as taken from Meltz, Noah, "Changes in the Occupational Composition of the Canadian Labour Force", Economics and Research Branch, Department of Labour, Occasional Paper No. 2, March 1965, their Table 19, page 67

TABLE IV

EDUCATION AND ANNUAL INCOME (OR EARNINGS)—MALES, 25 YEARS OF AGE
AND OVER

Years of School Completed	1939	1946	1949	1956	1958
Elementary:					
Total	\$1,036	\$2,041	\$2,394	\$3,107	\$3,096
Less than 8 years	Not	1,738	2,062	2,613	2,551
8 years	Available	2,327	2,829	3,732	3,769
High School:					
1 to 3 years	1,378	2,449	3,226	4,480	4,616
4 years	1,661	2,939	3,784	5,439	5,567
College:					
1 to 3 years	1,931	3,654	4,423	6,363	6,966
4 years or more	2,607	4,527	6,179	8,430	9,206

Source: Herman P. Miller, "Money Value of an Education," Occupational Outlook Quarterly, Vol. 5 (September, 1961), p. 4.

Source: Miller, S.M., "The Outlook of Working Class Youth", in Blue Collar World, by Shostak & Gomberg, Their table I, page 125.

TABLE V
MEDIAN SALARIES OF MINNESOTA MEN WHO HAD
DIFFERENT POST-HIGH-SCHOOL EDUCATION, WITH INTELLIGENCE
TEST SCORES HELD CONSTANT *Dollars.*

INTELLIGENCE TEST SCORE	EDUCATION AFTER HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATION		
	NONE OR TECHNICAL SCHOOL	SOME COLLEGE	ONE COLLEGE DEGREE OR MORE
Highest 20 per cent	4,562	5,300	6,300
	24	49	171
Next 35 per cent	4,438	5,200	6,100
	88	107	197
Bottom 45 per cent	4,365	5,100	5,200
	163	159	191

SOURCE: Denison, E.F., "Proportion of Income Differentials Among Education Groups Due to Additional Education", in The Residual Factor and Economic Growth, OECD, Paris, 1964, p. 92, their Table A.4

TABLE VI
MEDIAN SALARIES OF ILLINOIS AND ROCHESTER MEN
WHO HAD DIFFERENT POST-HIGH-SCHOOL EDUCATION BY OCCUPATION
OF FATHER *Dollars.*

FATHER'S OCCUPATION	EDUCATION AFTER HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATION		
	NONE OR TECHNICAL SCHOOL	SOME COLLEGE	ONE COLLEGE DEGREE OR MORE
Professional and semi-professional	5,200	5,500 ¹¹	7,600
	12	24	141
Owners and managers	5,000	5,800	7,400
	58	43	145
Sales and clerical	5,183	5,200	7,300
	54	38	92
Service	4,611	6,200	7,200
	19	9	24
Labour	4,863	5,700	6,500
	208	98	161
Farm	4,176	5,400	6,000
	59	21	37

Source: Denison, E.F. "Proportion of Income Differentials Among Education Groups Due to Additional Education", in The Residual Factor and Economic Growth, OECD, Paris, 1964, page 94, their Table A 6

OCCUPATIONAL POSITIONS OF FATHERS AND SONS OF
VARIOUS RELATIVE EDUCATIONS

Education of Son in Relation to That of Father	N	Per cent of Cases Where Son's Posi- tion is Better than the Father's	Per cent of Cases Where Son's Posi- tion is the Same as the Father's	Per cent of Cases Where Son's Posi- tion is Poorer than the Father's
Son's Education Better	291	46	33	21
Son's Education Same	80	29	41	30
Son's Education Poorer	45	16	35	49

TABLE II. RELATIVE OCCUPATIONAL STATIONS OF SONS OF FATHERS FROM
TWO DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL STRATA

Occupational Stratum of Father and Relative Education of Father and Son	N	Per cent of Cases Where Son's Posi- tion is Better Than the Father's	Per cent of Cases Where Son's Posi- tion is the Same as the Father's	Per cent of Cases Where Son's Posi- tion is Poorer Than the Father's
<i>Business, Professional and White Collar</i>				
Son's Education Better	135	38	33	29
Son's Education Same	37	14	56	30
Son's Education Poorer	28	11	21	68
<i>Manual Workers</i>				
Son's Education Better	156	53	33	14
Son's Education Same	43	42	28	30
Son's Education Poorer	17	23	59	18

As taken from: Centers, R., "Educational and Occupational Mobility", in American Sociological Review Vol. 14, Feb. 1949, p. 144, their Table 1

TABLE VIII

PERCENTAGE OF MALE WORKERS IN EACH MAJOR OCCUPATION BY SPECIFIED LEVELS
OF EDUCATION: UNITED STATES, 1950

Occupational category	Four year high school and up	One or more years college
Nonmanual		
Professional, technical and kindred.....	85.6	70.3
Managers, officials, and proprietors.....	53.1	26.1
Sales.....	58.7	27.1
Clerical and kindred.....	56.4	21.6
Manual		
Craftsmen and foremen.....	28.5	6.5
Other services (except personal, house).....	22.4	5.8
Operatives.....	20.3	3.7
Private household.....	17.0	4.9
Laborers, except farm and mine.....	11.6	2.2
Farm		
Farmers.....	16.0	4.6
Hired farm labor.....	10.2	2.5
All categories.....	34.3	14.9

SOURCE: Lawrence Thomas, *The Occupational Structure and Education* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 349.

As taken from Lipset, S.M. & Bendix, R., Social Mobility in Industrial Society, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1959, page 92, their Table 3.4

TABLE IX

Rates of Participation in Adult Education, by Previous Educational Attainment, Occupation, and Family Income

(percent who studied any subject by any method)

OCCUPATION	GRADE SCHOOL			HIGH SCHOOL			COLLEGE		
	Under \$4,000	\$4,000-\$6,999	\$7,000 over	Under \$4,000	\$4,000-\$6,999	\$7,000 over	Under \$4,000	\$4,000-\$6,999	\$7,000 over
Blue collar...	7	8	11	20	21	23	37	40	37
White collar..	9	11	14	22	21	29	37	45	43

Source: *Continuing Education for Adults*, No. 32 (Chicago: Center for the Study of Liberal Education for Adults, March 1963), p. 5.

As taken from Venn, Grant, Man, Education and Work, American Council on Education, Washington, 1964, page 98, their Table 15

TABLE X

Per Cent of Population Engaging in Various Leisure Activities "Yesterday" by Personal Characteristics.

Rank	Activity	Educational Attainment of People 20 Years and Older					Annual Family Income			
		Less than 8th Grade	8th Grade	High School, Incomplete	High School, Complete	College	Under \$3,000	\$3,000-4,999	\$5,000-6,999	\$7,000 and over
1	Watching television	51	56	59	61	55	47	60	59	59
2	Visiting with friends or relatives	38	35	40	38	36	39	38	38	39
3	Working around yard and in garden	35	36	34	35	37	35	30	33	34
4	Reading magazines	12	19	24	29	40	23	25	27	33
5	Reading books	12	15	15	15	30	20	16	18	20
6	Going pleasure driving	10	11	17	18	18	13	17	18	17
7	Listening to records	8	8	11	11	13	13	12	14	15
8	Going to meetings or other organization activities	11	8	9	11	14	11	10	10	11
9	Special hobbies (woodworking, knitting, etc.)	9	9	11	11	11	8	12	11	11
10	Going out to dinner	5	6	7	9	12	6	7	7	12
11	Participating in sports	3	4	5	7	9	3	8	10	11
12	Playing cards, checkers, etc.	5	7	7	6	7	5	6	8	8
13	None of those listed	13	9	7	6	5	10	8	5	6
14	Spending time at drugstore, etc.	3	3	6	4	4	5	6	7	7
15	Singing or playing musical instrument	3	3	4	4	7	5	4	5	4
16	Going to see sports events	1	3	4	4	4	3	4	5	5
17	Going to movies in regular theater	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	4
18	Going to drive-in movies	1	1	3	2	1	1	3	3	2
19	Going to dances	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1
20	Going to a play, concert, or opera	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
21	Going to lectures or adult school	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1

Source: "The Public Appraises Movies," *A Survey for Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.*, Opinion Research Corporation, Princeton New Jersey, December 1957, Vol. II.

a. Day prior to that on which respondents were visited.

As taken from DeGrazia, Sebastian, Of Time, Work and Leisure, The Twentieth Century Fund, N.Y., 1962, p. 462 part of their Table 8, page 461

TABLE XI


Proportions of educational groups at two lowest occupational levels who have high scores on selected mental-health components

Mental-Health Components	Young		Middle-aged		
	Some High School or Less	High School Graduates	High Grade or Less	Some High School	High School Graduates
Life satisfaction	25%	11%	33%	33%	18%
Self-esteem	18	11	26	14	12
Personal morale	25	21	19	32	59
Sociability	32	47	21	44	50
Number of workers*	57	19	81	57	17

* Totals on which the percentages are based.
As taken from Kornhauser, A, Mental Health of the Industrial Worker, John Wiley & Sons N.Y., 1965, page 137, their Table 7-1

Charts for Chapter IV

CHART I



Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics,
1961 Census of Canada (Catalogue 98-502, Table B-6).

taken from Bertram, G.W., "The Contribution
of Education to Economic Growth", Economic Council
of Canada, Staff Study No. 12, June 1966, pp. 55,
Chart No. 3.

CHART II

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO SAY THAT THEY CAN DO SOMETHING ABOUT A LOCAL REGULATION THAT THEY CONSIDER UNJUST OR UNFAIR BY NATION AND EDUCATION




CHART III

PERCENTAGE OF LOCAL COMPETENTS WHO WOULD ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF AN INFORMAL GROUP IN ORDER TO REPEAL A LOCAL REGULATION THEY THOUGHT WAS UNJUST BY NATION AND EDUCATION





CHART IV

SUBJECTIVE COMPETENCE SCORE BY EDUCATION
PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS SCORING HIGH ON SUBJECTIVE COMPETENCE SCORE BY EDUCATION



Source: Almond, G. and Verba, S.,
The Civic Culture,
Princeton University Press,
1963, page 237,
Their Fig. 3.

EDUCATION LEVEL

- NONE
- PRIMARY
- SOME SECONDARY
- SOME UNIVERSITY

CHAPTER V

LABOUR MOBILITY

So far, we can see in the mass consumption society the ever changing interrelationship among several factors: technological development, which leads to affluence, which in turn leads to the ability and willingness to purchase the durable goods associated with a high standard of living, and education, which leads to more technological development, more affluence and a capacity to understand a wider range of opportunities, thus developing higher individual aspirations. Also, we have seen that being able to live as well as the next man tends to erode an individual's respect for social distinctions, at least for those which relegate him to an inferior station. He can, at least in material ways, feel himself equal to any one else.

As he or his children achieve higher levels of education, the worker believes that he has a right to expect to improve his status in his work-life, too, and perhaps also his social prestige. It is important, therefore, to know to what extent Canada is able to meet these mobility

aspirations, since frustration of what people believe to be legitimate aims often leads to conflict, economic or political. And here we would argue that it is the belief in equality of opportunity that is most important in maintaining the optimism so necessary to citizens in a democratic, mass consumption society. People need to feel that they are part of a fluid society where movement in any direction is never blocked except by lack of skills, and that the society encourages the development of skills in principle and practice for everyone able and willing to learn them. Just as we have seen in the education section that it is the sense of political potency, even if not exercised, which is associated with confidence in a political system, so we maintain that it is the sense of being able to move to a better job, whether he does or not, which is most important in developing the faith in the economy which makes a worker a good consumer and a willing adapter to technical change.

If a worker has confidence in the economy, he must also feel secure in his job and in his ability to progress and to succeed through his work. One could expect, under these circumstances, fairly peaceful industrial relations. Where and if these conditions do not exist, however, especially if education has raised expectations and aspira-

tions, we can expect the insecurity, dissatisfaction and frustration of workers to be expressed in criticism of union leaders, in grievances and in strikes, both legal and wild-cat.

Job mobility is of three kinds: occupational or social, which is the ability and willingness to move from one occupation to another and to move up or down in the scale of occupational hierarchies; geographic, involving the ability and willingness of individuals to move from one location to another in response to job opportunities; and technical, which is the ability to learn new skills and adjust to changes in the production process. Obviously, all three types of mobility are important to the individual's sense of "getting ahead." All three types of mobility also presuppose, not only willingness to change on the part of individuals, but also the existence of job opportunities and the means by which individuals can take advantage of them. There must be a job in the next town, or a position open in the same occupation with another company, or a different kind of job at a higher or lower status. The economy might, also, be demanding more and different kinds of technical proficiencies, or more clerical and fewer labouring people, for example.

Changes in the Labour Force Composition

Perhaps the most important kind of mobility that has occurred in the mass consumption society is that attributable to a change in the composition of the labour force. What has happened has been described by Fourastié,¹

In sum, the structure of consumption depends upon the structure of the labor force, and since the structure of consumption changes when the level of living rises, any rise in the level of living of a people presupposes mobility in its labor force, or in other words, is accompanied by changes in occupational distribution.

In Canada, between 1931 and 1961,²

- (1) Agricultural occupations plummeted from 28.8% of the labour force to 10.5%.
- (2) Labourers experienced the second (after agriculture) largest decline. In 1931 labourers were the third ranking occupation group, in 1961 they were ninth.
- (3) Clerical workers experienced the greatest increase in proportion, as they doubled their percentage of the labour force.
- (4) The manufacturing and construction group increased by almost the same number of percentage points as clerical workers, although this represented only a one-third gain. In 1961 manufacturing and construction occupations had taken over from agricultural workers as the largest occupational group.

- (5) Professionals also made large gains, moving from 6.1% of the labour force in 1931 to 10.3% in 1961. Between 1951 and 1961, professionals increased their proportion even more than did clerical, moving up by 2.8% as compared to 2.4% for clerical workers.
- (6) There has been a 10% increase in the female participation in the labour force, most of which has gone into clerical, commercial, and financial occupations, with a surprising increment in agriculture, due to the increasing mechanization of agriculture.
- (7) A decline in the number of males between the ages of 14 and 24 and past 65 in the labour force.

This last change, common to the U.S. and other technologically advanced economies, is caused by prolonged compulsory education, by rising educational requirements for job entry, and by the availability of married women, who are better trained and have more work experience than many adolescents, and who will take the kind of low-paid or part-time jobs previously held by youths. The decline in the number of employed older men is a result of technological unemployment and/or early retirement plans which are intended to ease men out of jobs which are disappearing because of technological change.³

Summarizing the changes listed above, we can say that as of 1961, in Canada, the managerial, professional, clerical, commercial and financial occupations accounted for 39.7% of the labour force as compared to 24.5% in 1931, most of this change having taken place since 1941. This compares to 22% in manufacturing and construction and 13% in mining, farming and other extractive industries in 1961. In 1931 only 16% of the labour force was engaged in manufacturing and construction, while extractive industries employed 32.6% of the working group. It is clear that in Canada the labour force distribution is that forecast by Fourastié for a technically advanced nation and by Rostow for a mass consumption society: fewer workers in agriculture and primary industries, more in manufacturing, with white collar and professional groups growing fastest of all.⁴

Speaking of what these changes mean to the United States, Peter Drucker has said:

For the first time in our history--or indeed in the history of any country--managerial, professional, and technical employees have become the largest group in our work force. They not only outnumber all other white collar groups, but they have even overtaken manual working groups, especially the machine workers.

Equally significant, for the first time in our history, and again for the first

time in the history of any country, people with a high degree of education--that is, people who have finished high school--constitute more than half our total labor force, including those employed in agriculture.

This trend is certain to accelerate sharply. The number of managerial, professional and technical employees is growing at the rate of 10% each year--three times as fast as the total population.....Here is a basic change in the structure of this country and of our economy.⁵

The importance of this trend for a study of mobility is that it shows clearly that the labour force is moving toward occupations of higher prestige, since the expanding occupations are those of higher prestige and the contracting ones (agriculture, labourers) are of lower prestige, in general. There exist then more and more openings from the middle to the top. People will believe that they could improve their positions if they want to and many of them actually have, as the growth curve shows. In short, just as the economy has raised the income levels for almost all workers, so it has also raised the prestige level of most of the jobs available.

Occupational and Social Mobility

The general raising of the level of the occupational

structure does not necessarily mean, however, that an individual has a better chance of achieving a higher social status than his father had or that he can go from rags to riches any easier than his father could have. In fact, the evidence is that this kind of individual social mobility has not changed much over the long term and varies little from country to country. There are even those who hypothesize that this kind of mobility may be antithetical to general economic advancement.⁶

M. Berman⁷, as well as Lipset and Bendix⁸, has shown that the degree or rate of inter-generational social mobility in the U.S. has changed very little over time and is very little greater than that found in various European countries. It is a difficult business to compare a son's occupational status and mobility with his father's (the method usually used to estimate social mobility over time), especially when social and monetary values are changing, and it is not our task to assess such techniques. However, it is important for us to note that Lipset and Bendix, who have done probably the most comprehensive work on the subject of social mobility, came to the conclusion, generally accepted by other authors, that the most important social dividing line is that between the manual and non-manual

occupations. Above and below this line movement is fairly free, but across it movement is rarer and often unstable. The most frequently employed means of crossing this line is by starting a small business of one's own. These authors attribute what upward inter-generational mobility there is to the expansion of the non-manual sector of the labour force. They continue,

However, most sons of urban dwellers have not changed their class position, as defined by a shift across the manual-non-manual line, and approximately 10% of them have fallen in status. About 80 per cent of this group have either not significantly improved their class position (from manual to non-manual status) or have declined in position as compared to their fathers.⁹

One of the few studies made of inter-generational occupational mobility in Canada was made in Quebec by Rocher and de Jocas. The comparison was made between the mobility rates of English-speaking sons and French-speaking sons in relation to the occupational status of their fathers. They found that the concentration of English-speaking fathers and sons was in the white collar and professional and managerial occupations and that manual workers' sons tended to take jobs as white collar workers. French Canadians, on the other hand, were concentrated in the unskilled labour category and their sons, if they moved up, became skilled

workers. There was not only evidence of greater mobility of English-speaking sons but the difference seemed to be growing. The increase in the proportion of French Canadian sons in the white collar group is not nearly so great as that for the English-speaking sons.¹⁰ (This is demonstrated by Table I included here.) This difference is subject, obviously, to various interpretations, but it is worth noting here that it is precisely what one would expect in comparing any affluent, mass consumption group or economy with a non-affluent, traditional group or economy. Until very recently, in Quebec, the educational system, the social system, and the value system of French Canada were in general not geared to mobility, to technological change, or to modern consumption norms. As Porter says:

Because of differences in wealth and education within the French Canadian society, particularly because secondary education was until the 1960's based on private fee-paying schools, Quebec was even more out of the general North American value-pattern of social equality than the rest of Canada.¹¹

Whatever may be the case with regard to inter-generational mobility, there seems no doubt about the experience of the individual worker during his own lifetime. The Palmer study of occupational mobility in six U.S. cities was the most extensive and intensive survey made of the

problem. R. Dubin quotes a Jaffe and Carleton study which, using the material from the Palmer study to estimate intra-generational mobility, discovered that for all occupational groups taken together, the chances are better than one in two (55.51%) that a person will end his working life in a higher occupation than the one in which he started. The odds are one in five (20.14%) that no change will be made to either a higher or lower occupation during the working life history. In sum, three out of every four members of the labour force in the U.S. will be as well or better off when they leave the labour market as they were when they entered. American workers not only move frequently from job to job, and industry to industry, but the majority also "get ahead" in the process.¹²

Workers, incidentally, do not have exalted ambitions and their definitions of advancement and occupational mobility are often modest. Reynolds found that,

the typical worker's conception of "promotion" is a very limited one... Few workers aspire to office jobs in the company, or to foremanships, or even to skilled maintenance work. Their aspirations are focussed on a job which is on a better shift, or in the next higher labor grade, or is pleasanter in some other respect.¹³

If even this small ambition is frustrated, they try to

better their position on their present job by getting the newest and best machine, or a better work location.

It also takes the form of getting more money for doing the same job. To many workers, indeed, more money is virtually the whole meaning of occupational progress.¹⁴

When asked if they had got promotions, a frequent response reported by Reynolds was: "Oh yes, I've had three raises since I came with the company." These findings were confirmed by Dofny and David, who found that workers in three Montreal plants expected only minimal promotions and considered that an increase in salary would be an improvement of their position.¹⁵ With such modest ambitions, it is not difficult in an affluent economy to have a "sense of mobility."

Geographic Mobility

There seems to be plenty of evidence of simple movement, i.e., that people in the American economy, using this for the moment as the prototype of the mass consumption society, hold many different jobs, especially during their first ten years of employment, often changing residence, employer and even occupation or industry. A study of six major U.S. cities (see Table II) shows that between 1940 and 1949 the mean number of jobs held per worker was 2.7, which involved changing employers one or two times.

One-third of the workers sampled had moved their place of residence during that time. There is an even greater rate of mobility among young men, those between 25 and 34 years of age having an average of 3.4 jobs, and 50% of these changes involve change of employer, industry and occupation.¹⁶ Palmer found that the difference in mobility rates among young workers resulted from their greater concern for wages and for the intrinsic interest of the work. After 35, not only does a worker lose interest in changing employment, but aspirations change and are modified. The worker past 35 is primarily interested in job security.

These findings prove true in general for Canada, also. A DBS study¹⁸ showed that 57.3% of single men in 1957-58 changed jobs, as compared to 49% of married men--a high rate in either case. Peitchinis also finds:

As one might expect, the older the worker gets the less mobile he tends to become... during the period 1956-60 an average of 38 per cent of persons 65 years of age and over changed jobs, compared with 66% of young men under 20 years of age.¹⁹

Technical Mobility

Technical mobility, or the willingness and capacity to adapt to technical change, will be discussed in

considerable detail in the chapter on Industrial Relations. Here we will discuss only those general conditions which contribute to technical mobility. It may, and often does, involve geographical or occupational mobility, and differs from the other two in that it is usually less voluntary. Technological change is usually imposed on the worker from outside and the incidence of technical mobility among workers is therefore not so much a product of desire for it as of the general level of technology in the environment to which they are exposed. A worker's mobility in this case is therefore measured in terms of his speed of relearning and his acceptance of the principle of change.

The same factors which predispose people to accept occupational and geographical mobility, or for that matter any other kind of change, seem to apply in the case of technical mobility as well. A young, unmarried man of few years on a particular job is likely to accept change much more readily than women, older, married men, or people with longer attachment to an occupation or a job.²⁰ There is evidence that a high general level of education makes technical change more acceptable, whereas skills which are acquired only through long experience such as fishing, mining, or highly skilled trades hinder a man's willingness

to change. Other factors which seem to be important in determining a worker's adaptation to technical change are: the degree to which previous work roles were integrated with community values, the extent of previous experience with modern methods or equipment, the personal gains or losses that the worker expects from technical change, and finally, the extent to which he is consulted and informed of changes which are about to occur in his work.

These points are best illustrated by contrasting a "modern" with a more traditional community facing change. In small fishing or mining communities everyone knows everyone else, work is the center of life, and who a man is in the community is directly related to who he is at work. Change of method or industry in such a case threatens not only a man's hard acquired skills, but all his social relations and often his cultural values as well. He will probably not have experienced many changes in production methods in his lifetime, nor be used to thinking in terms of highly mechanized or rationalized operations. A man who is faced with technical change in such a community and in such a situation will expect only loss of all those things that have had meaning to him, and is not likely to expect any gains. He will probably resist the change and remain

technically non-mobile.

On the other hand, in a larger or more diversified community change is more often experienced; the unity between working life and social life no longer exists, and it is easier to change employment. An OECD study found, also, that rural workers who had had some experience with modern agricultural machinery and methods adapted more easily to industrial work than those who had not.²¹ Pécaut believes that where change constitutes a reality of everyday experience, technical change is seen as having positive economic meaning, and perhaps even of social meaning to the individual, and these expectations lead to a positive attitude toward it.

Where community consciousness makes a change in behaviour less likely to occur, this is because it produces expectations which are limited to the existing social situation. Acceptance of change implies the creation of new expectations.²²

As we mentioned earlier, participation in modern consumption values is an experience in constant change which also creates expectation of personal gain to be obtained from technical change and predisposes people to accept it.

However, even workers in modern factories, especially if they are skilled and the change involves

downgrading or obsolescence of these skills, will resist the change, as evidenced by the efforts of many unions to prevent the introduction of changes threatening skilled workers. Like the fisherman or the miner, they see their social positions, at least in the factory community, threatened and their expectations of gains from the new technology are low. However, they and other workers are better able to respond positively and realistically to the prospect of becoming technically mobile when they have been consulted and included in management plans from the beginning.²³

Geographic and technical mobility, when they operate well, are both important means of allowing supply and demand to smooth out disparities in wage levels and opportunity structure which occur in every national economy, but which are accentuated by technological change. Thus, if the city offers better opportunities and higher wages, labour moves from rural areas to the city; if British Columbia can offer more, workers are attracted from the Maritime Provinces or other depressed areas; if a factory can offer higher wages because of more efficient methods, then that factory will draw the workers it needs from less efficient industries; and within a given plant, workers will be willing to learn new techniques and use new machines

because they believe that they will have higher wages or better opportunities as a result.

That geographic and technical mobility is not as high as it might be in Canada is demonstrated by two recent studies made for the Economic Council of Canada. In one of them, F. T. Denton shows that:

In the 1920s as in the 1960s, the earned income levels in Ontario and British Columbia were substantially above the Canadian average, those of the Atlantic Provinces substantially below. The Prairies have remained consistently close to the national figure, while Quebec has consistently fallen short of it.²⁴

In "Interregional Disparities in Income," S. E. Chernik shows that the disparities in income between regions in Canada are much more persistent than in the United States, where they have tended to grow smaller, or than in Australia, where they never were appreciable.²⁵ High economic activity for the nation as a whole has not affected this much. This certainly suggests that labour mobility, geographic and technical, works rather imperfectly in Canada.

The Sense of Mobility

That the existence of all three kinds of mobility

possibilities produces confidence and optimistic expectations is well documented by U.S. studies. The Palmer study²⁶ reported that when people change jobs voluntarily, more than half of them think they are getting ahead. Fortune magazine found in 1940 (not a year particularly good for optimism, since the depression was just ending and the U.S. was not yet in the war, so that the economy was not booming) that in a national survey 56.3% of the sample felt that "the years ahead hold for (them) personally a good chance for advancement."²⁷ Katona cites similar expectations based on Surveys of Consumer Finances conducted by the Michigan Survey Research Center in 1954 and 1962²⁸ (as seen in Table III). A breakdown by age and income of these responses shows definitely the greater optimism and expectations of the young, particularly in the higher income groups.

This "sense of mobility opportunities" is bolstered by the existence of other factors in the American situation:

- (1) a philosophy of equalitarianism generally accepted in the U.S. and supported by the emphasis on making education available to all so that everyone may have, insofar as possible, the same chance of success.
- (2) the absence of a feudal past (with its legitimation of hereditary social class).

- (3) the pattern of business careers at the bottom (small private entrepreneurs, usually from the manual worker group) and at the top which seem to reflect and support the same belief in equality of opportunity.
- (4) the combination of relative wealth and mass produced consumer goods which, as we have said so often, has had the effect of minimizing the differences between the standard of living of the working class and the middle class.²⁹

The American social structure has been characterized by Parsons in a classic article³⁰ as a relatively loose one characterized by a certain vagueness. This looseness reduces the strain in cases where there is a discrepancy between income and occupational status; for example, when a son makes more money or is in an occupation of higher prestige than his father is, or when a leading scientist makes less than a corporation lawyer. These people do not have to compare themselves directly with each other. Equally important, such indefiniteness makes it possible to believe that opportunities are open to all. It gives a "sense of mobility" even if not actually experienced, and the accompanying optimism so important to a mass consumption economy and a democratic society.

Blocks to the Sense of Mobility in Canada

In Canada, occupational, geographical and technical mobility opportunities, real and felt, are not quite the same as in the U.S., even though tending in the same direction. Let us consider, first, occupational mobility.

S. M. Lipset,³¹ in a study of the value structures of four English-speaking democracies, shows that in those values and qualities of mind now widely accepted as being functional to a technologically advanced society, Canada ranks third, the United States and Australia ranking first and second, Great Britain last (see Table IV). As Kaspar Naegele has put it:

...there is less emphasis in Canada on equality than there is in the United States.....In Canada there seems to be a greater acceptance of limitation, of hierarchical patterns. There seems to be less optimism, less faith in the future, less willingness to risk capital or reputation. In contrast to America, Canada is a country of greater caution, reserve, and restraint.³²

Lipset bolsters his argument that Canada does not encourage achievement as much as the United States or Australia by pointing out that Canada has less than one-third the United States' proportion in colleges and universities, twice that of the English but--amazingly--less than the Filipinos

or Puerto Ricans.³³ As Porter says, "Collective goals do not seem to have been defined, however vaguely, in terms of increasing opportunities through free universal education."³⁴ He demonstrates this point by comparing the situation in Quebec, which until very recently, had the poorest record for providing public education of any province. In 1931, for example, there were more immigrant males in Quebec in the professions and clerical occupations than there were of those born in Canada, although the opposite was the case in all the other provinces.³⁵

However, this mobility deprivation exists not only in French Canada but, relative to the U.S. and to the needs of Canadian industrial expansion, in the rest of Canada as well. The Department of Labour studied five skilled occupations which were typical of high level industrialization: tool and die makers, sheet metal workers, draughtsmen, electronic technicians and floor moulders. Eight hundred randomly selected people were interviewed. About 35% of all those interviewed received most of their training outside Canada. The survey concluded that "training facilities in Canada were failing to keep pace with manpower requirements, and this was particularly pronounced in the more highly skilled occupations."³⁶ Furthermore, the level

of education required for these jobs was going up and the report showed that those with the higher levels of general education were more likely to be selected for formal training (apprenticeship) within the industry.³⁷ Once again, those with educational tools tend to accumulate advantages and widen the mobility gap between themselves and those without adequate education or training.

Canadian immigration policy has tended in recent years to encourage the immigration of skilled labour and even of professionals, so that in 1955 immigrants accounted for about one-quarter of all professional workers in Canada. In the same period, 35.6% of immigrant workers were in this category or that of skilled labour, as compared to 22.5% of the total Canadian labour force.³⁸ (See Tables V and VI reproduced herein.) Closing off these avenues of upward mobility to the native population by importing better trained people from elsewhere could have the effect of making Canadian workers feel that opportunities are limited in Canada. John Porter feels that this policy of encouraging the immigration of skilled and professional manpower has had the even more important effect of making it unnecessary, or at least of relieving the pressure, to reform and renovate Canadian education in such a way as to offer the

native born worker better training and more opportunities. "Where Canadian immigration policy seeks skilled and professional workers as an alternative to educational reforms, mobility deprivation for Canadians continues."³⁹

Returning to Lipset's table of modernity, the greater élitism and lower equalitarianism are partly the cause of what Lipset sees as greater respect for law in Canada (greatest of all in Britain). The fact that there are fewer and less powerful extremist movements, such as McCarthyism or the Ku Klux Klan, in Canada and in Britain is also evidence of élitism, "reflecting the ability of a more unified and powerful élite to control the system."⁴⁰ Finally, he found interesting differences in values shown in the reactions to the demands of military life by the four groups during World War II:

The British and, to a lesser degree, the Canadians accepted the need to conform to the rigid hierarchical structure of the military; while Australians and Americans showed deep resentment at having to exhibit deference to superiors. I have been told by nationals of different countries that in London bars during both world wars Americans and Australians tended to associate with each other, while Canadians were more likely than the Australians to prefer British companions to Americans.⁴¹

The reason for belabouring here what may seem

obvious is that these traditionalist, élitist, ascriptive (a person is valued for who he is, not what he does) elements in Canadian society tend to lower the "sense of mobility." Finally, it is at least a plausible argument that in countries where mobility opportunities are felt to be low, there is a greater tendency for workers to try to improve their lot through changing the whole social system, i.e., through political action. Daniel Bell has called this ideological or social movement unionism, as opposed to market-unionism which is concerned simply with the conditions under which men sell their labour. The appearance of leftist labour parties in European countries such as Italy and France may be examples of this, as is the emergence of a strong Labour Party in Britain. In Canada, the support given by the CCL to the CCF and the CLC to the NDP indicates a tendency for unions to adopt ideological unionism, to a greater extent than unions in the U.S. have done,⁴² a difference we might expect to result from the differences in mobility possibilities in the two countries, if the thesis is correct.

This tendency for labour to try to improve its position through reform of the social and economic system was most marked during the Thirties when the U.S. lowered

its immigration quotas drastically, thus reducing still further the mobility opportunities of Canadian workers. In French Canada, where the mobility chances for the French-speaking worker are even less than for the rest of Canada, the emphasis on ideological unionism is unequivocal. To quote Jean Marchand at the time when he was President of the CNTU:

Modern trade-unionism aims at protecting the workers not only in the factory or at the office, but wherever their interests are at stake. Thus it is concerned with legislation, education, economic orientation, social security and even political problems. In the pursuit of its objectives, it will inevitably refer to an ideology, or a set of ideologies, and express its own conception of the enterprise, the State, social security, economic activity and mankind. From the moment it turns to these questions, it enters a world of diversity where opinions, convictions, beliefs are extremely at variance. Trying to crush these tendencies under artificially unified structures, on the pretense that more power and efficiency would be obtained, can only result in impoverished ideologies, social paralysis and a decline in the vitality of the labour movement.⁴³

We cannot say with certainty to what extent this relative lack of occupational and social mobility in the Canadian economy affects the average Canadian's aspirations and expectations. It can be argued that lack of this kind of mobility is not felt keenly because the Canadian worker

can always go to the United States if opportunities are not sufficient here. He can and often does do this, as indicated by the continuous concern in Canada over the size of the emigration to the U.S. On the other hand, the one survey of Canadian mobility attitudes of which we are aware, the Dofny-David, is again offered, this time in evidence against this point of view. One of the favourite mobility dreams of American manual workers is that of starting a little business of their own. The existence of this possibility has been cited as one of the important sources of the "sense of mobility." Lipset and Bendix, in their study of the Oakland, California area found that 66.7% of manual workers had thought of doing this and that 41.5% had actually tried it at some time during their working lives.⁴⁴ In Montreal, the number of workers who had dreamed of a business of their own was not very different--52.1%. The number who had actually tried it was sharply different--only 5.8%, which suggests a marked difference in optimism or belief in the possibility of mobility, at least by this means.⁴⁵

We have also seen that there is not as much geographical and technical mobility in Canada as in the U.S. or Australia. Greater physical and cultural distances between provinces and lower educational and income levels

than in the other two countries might be responsible for some of this difference. Moreover, to the degree that management is élitist rather than equalitarian and stands on management rights rather than accepting the principle that, in the interest of all concerned, the worker should be informed in advance about technical change, technical mobility may be more difficult in Canada than it need be. In any case, the fact seems to be that, because of inadequate mobility opportunities, we are unable to extend the benefits of our affluence at all evenly, and this is the cause of much discontent among workers, reflected in what may seem unreasonable demands on unions by members and on management by unions. If the only way a man can achieve success is through getting more money (whether through wages or fringe benefits), then workers' demands for money are going to be exorbitant indeed.

Conclusion

In this exploration of the environment, Chapters I-V, we can see that there are certain important interlocking factors in the mass consumption society which are necessary to its continuation. In view of the evidence that education, technological advance, affluence, consumption

norms, and labour mobility are each dependent on all the others, we hope that by the same token it is clear that the socio-psychological components or motivations, i.e., the desire to have all the good things the economy offers, to continually have the sense of "getting ahead" are motives to be encouraged rather than disparaged.

The importance of mobility which we have tried to show in this chapter is that in a society which stresses equality of opportunity and offers the means to success to a majority, if not all, a man tends to estimate himself and be estimated by others in terms of whether he does succeed. Social, financial, or job status improvements represent success, and fortunately, for most men, there are many different ways to demonstrate and believe in their own achievement. The society that offers opportunities to develop aspirations should also make serious efforts to offer mobility opportunities. Our study has suggested that there exist in Canada some serious disjunctures in this regard. Because of this, we can expect that workers will feel discouraged about promotion possibilities, about achieving recognition and responsibility rewards through their own efforts. Some people will react to this by giving up and losing interest, others by leaving to find better

opportunities elsewhere. These are often the most able to compete, to get good jobs in the U.S. Their leaving might be expected, in turn, to reduce the level of productivity of the remaining work force, as demonstrated in depressed areas such as the Maritimes. This in turn imposes limits on wage levels and leads to more dissatisfaction among remaining workers. Finally, there are those who will try to change things, be it within unions, through collective bargaining, or in such a way as to get better opportunities for themselves.

There are many who decry the materialism and the greed represented by a continual accumulation of goods, and the waste involved in disposing of them. They also fear the destruction of spiritual values and point to the tastelessness of much of the consumption and of the leisure activities indulged in by the mass of consumers. These complaints, however, seem always to have been voiced by old privileged groups confronted by new groups learning to use the same privileges. Voltaire said, "History is the sound of silver slippers descending the stairs and the clump of hob-nailed boots ascending." He had the misfortune to know the French Revolution. In the mass consumption society he might have witnessed the ascending of hob-nailed boots

without any descending of silver slippers. Or to put it another way,

A man who two centuries ago, would not even have learned to read, if he had survived to maturity, profits by his windows, the central heating of his apartment, and the 300,000 copies of the newspaper for which he writes, to announce that humanity has arrived at the last stage of barbarism.⁴⁶

N. Foote and Paul Hatt maintain that a mass consumption economy depends on a "massification" of taste, and that only to the extent that the customer will accept standardization can a particular article be produced at a price that all can afford--"because it is beneath the dignity of no one to eat Campbell's soup, everyone can afford it."⁴⁷ These authors go on to say:

Social demand for greater equality may thus lead to economic demand which may in turn make it possible to develop the productivity which makes possible the degree of equality.....that perhaps only an advanced society can afford. Thus in judging social values we may as a society be on the verge of discovering that general economic advancement and social equalitarianism are interdependent while retention of steep stratification and rivalrous personal mobility is economically stultifying.⁴⁸

This hypothesis, taken together with the levelling of hierarchies within automated industries and the general

social tendencies toward equalitarianism which we have seen in our discussion of education and consumption norms, suggests that occupational mobility of the individual may be in the future of much less importance than it has been in the past. As we have seen, where wages are high and work is meaningless, men will seek status, creativity and success symbols outside of work. This will take time, however, and where wages are not high enough to offer consumption possibilities as compensation for meaningless work, the ambitions of workers will still seek expression in demands for promotion opportunities on the job or pressure for higher wages, or perhaps in changes in the social order itself.

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Tables for Chapter V

Table I

Occupational distribution of French- and English-speaking fathers and sons in urban districts of the province of Quebec*

Occupational class	Fathers		Sons	
	French-speaking	English-speaking	French-speaking	English-speaking
by classes				
1. Professionals, proprietors, and managers	3.22	11.82	3.81	17.27
2. Semi-professionals and lower administrators	5.56	5.46	5.20	10.00
3. Clerical and sales	8.33	9.00	15.33	22.78
4. Skilled and semi-skilled workers	27.42	23.33	34.23	28.34
5. Unskilled workers	30.47	17.27	25.99	7.27
6. Public service	3.22	10.91	4.80	12.78
7. Personal service	3.41	.91	5.91	5.45
8. Farmers	17.74	18.18	1.97	.91
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
by class groups				
Classes 1, 2, 3, and 6	20.93	37.28	31.03	32.78
Classes 4, 5, and 7	61.60	44.54	33.18	36.83
Class 8	17.74*	18.18	1.97	.91
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

* More than 80 per cent of the English-speaking population drawn in our sample were born and grew in urban counties.

Source: Dr. Jodan, Yves and Rocher Guy, "Inter-Generation Occupational Mobility in the Province of Quebec", in Canadian Society by Blishen, B., Jones, F., Naegle, K. and Porter J., MacMillian, Toronto, 1964, page 445, their Table 4.

TABLE II

PERSONS WITH WORK HISTORIES AND MEAN NUMBER OF JOBS HELD PER WORKER, 1940-49, BY AGE*

Workers in thousands

Age in 1951	Chicago		Philadelphia		Los Angeles		San Francisco		St. Paul		New Haven		6 cities combined	
	Workers	Jobs	Workers	Jobs	Workers	Jobs	Workers	Jobs	Workers	Jobs	Workers	Jobs	Workers	Jobs
<i>Men</i>														
25 and over	989	2.5	510	2.4	515	3.2	212	3.0	78	2.6	40	2.6	2,313	2.7
25-34	237	3.3	131	3.2	137	3.7	45	3.8	20	3.4	13	3.3	582	3.4
35-44	269	2.8	153	2.5	161	3.5	62	3.5	20	2.9	10	2.8	675	3.0
45-54	245	2.2	126	2.0	120	2.9	56	2.7	18	2.2	8	2.2	574	2.3
55-64	183	1.8	74	1.6	70	2.6	37	2.1	14	1.9	6	1.7	384	2.0
65 and over	55	1.8	26	1.4	27	1.8	12	1.9	6	1.6	3	1.5	128	1.7
<i>Women</i>														
25 and over	456	2.4	203	2.1	239	3.0	111	2.7	32	2.5	19	2.3	1,059	2.5
25-34	154	3.0	66	2.5	71	3.5	28	3.7	10	3.3	7	2.9	333	3.1
35-44	133	2.5	57	2.2	78	3.0	34	2.8	8	2.3	5	2.4	316	2.6
45-54	108	2.0	47	2.0	51	2.6	30	2.3	9	2.1	4	1.9	250	2.2
55-64	50	1.7	23	1.7	29	2.5	14	1.9	4	1.5	2	1.6	121	1.9
65 and over	11	**	10	1.2	10	1.8	5	1.6	1	1.9	1	1.5	39	1.6

* Means computed from unrounded data for Appendix Table A-3. Data for 6 cities combined rounded independently.

** Base too small for presentation of means.

Source: G.L. Palmer, Labor Mobility in Six Cities, Social Science Research Council, 1954, page 52, Table 16

TABLE III

Relation of Recent Past and Expected Improvement
in Personal Finances to Age and Income
(Per Cent of Spending Units Saying "Better Off" or
"Will Be Better Off" in Various Subgroups of the Population in 1962)

A. Better off than a year ago

Income groups	Age groups					All age groups	
	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over	1962	(1954)
\$7,500 and over	59	42	37	33	11	42	(40)
\$5,000-7,499	52	30	26	23	7	34	(42)
\$3,000-4,999	40	31	14	19	9	28	(32)
Under \$3,000	31	20	18	16	5	18	(19)
All income groups:							
1962	49	33	27	24	8		
1954	(47)	(31)	(23)	(25)	(8)		

B. Will be better off a year from now

\$7,500 and over	50	53	46	37	14	47	(39)
\$5,000-7,499	56	40	40	17	10	41	(30)
\$3,000-4,999	47	39	37	22	13	39	(37)
Under \$3,000	50	51	20	23	6	26	(20)
All income groups:							
1962	51	46	40	25	8		
1954	(48)	(30)	(27)	(23)	(8)		

C. Income will rise during next ten years*

	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	All age groups 1962
\$7,500 and over	81	69	51	21	62
\$5,000-7,499	73	69	40	16	58
\$3,000-4,999	72	46	34	16	47
Under \$3,000	43	28	25	16	34
All income groups, 1962	73	60	43	18	

* Not included are such answers as "First it will rise, then fall" or "Will fluctuate, but will be higher ten years from now than it is now." Data for 1954 are not available.

SOURCE: Surveys of Consumer Finances, conducted by the Survey Research Center.

as taken from: Katona, George, The Mass Consumption Society,
McGraw-Hill, N.Y. 1964, p. 108
their table 4.

TABLE IV

Rankings of the four English speaking countries according to certain
variables (rankings according to first term in
parenthesis)

	United States	Australia	Canada	Great Britain
Materialism - Capitalism	3	1	2	1
Materialism - achievement	4	2.5	2.5	1
Materialism - universalism	4	2	3	1
Materialism - specialty	4	2.5	2.5	1

Source: Lipset, S.M. "Value Differences, Absolute or Relative: The English Speaking Democracies" in Canadian Society, Blishen, Jones, Naegle, and Porter, MacMillan, Toronto, 1964, p. 326 their Table 1

TABLE V

IMMIGRANTS TO CANADA, BY SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, 1946-55^a

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
(A) All immigrants.....	71,719	64,127	125,414	95,217	73,912	194,391	164,498	168,868	154,227	109,946
(B) Destined to labour force.....	11,852	35,219	71,636	50,285	37,988	110,522	85,029	91,133	84,376	57,987
% of (A).....	16.5	54.9	57.1	52.8	51.4	56.8	51.7	54.0	54.7	52.8
(C) Destined to farm l.f.	1,120	4,550	19,799	19,139	15,520	25,890	16,971	17,250	10,920	7,036
% of (B).....	9.4	12.9	27.6	38.1	40.9	23.4	19.9	19.0	13.0	12.1
(D) Destined to non-farm l.f.	10,732	30,669	51,837	31,146	22,468	84,632	68,058	73,883	73,456	50,951
% of (B).....	90.6	87.1	72.4	61.9	59.1	76.6	80.1	81.0	87.0	87.9
(E) Professional ^b	1,429	2,414	2,970	2,118	1,801	4,850	7,329	8,588	8,350	7,159
% of (A).....	2.0	3.8	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.5	4.5	5.1	5.4	6.5
% of (D).....	13.3	7.9	5.7	6.8	8.0	5.7	10.8	11.6	11.4	14.0
(F) Skilled.....	2,172	6,983	12,995	7,763	5,106	27,726	19,011	17,663	18,287	10,990
% of (A).....	3.0	10.9	10.4	8.2	6.9	14.3	11.6	10.4	11.8	10.0
% of (D).....	20.2	22.8	25.1	24.9	22.7	32.8	27.9	23.9	24.9	21.6
(G) Mining occupations.....	87	512	2,986	1,279	565	3,133	794	453	425	249

^a Based on classification of immigrants by intended occupation.

^b Includes occupations classified as professional in the 1951 Census of Canada. Before April 1953 the Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration used an occupational classification which is not directly comparable with the present one. Although most of the occupations concerned were regarded as professional in both periods, a few adjustments were made in the data before 1953 to produce a more consistent series.

^c The figures on skilled workers shown in this table represent the aggregate number of workers in occupations selected as closely as possible in accordance with the concept of skilled manpower adopted in this Report. Some of the occupations included in this selection were not coded separately before 1953. To produce a consistent series for the entire period the annual totals for these occupations up to 1953 were estimated on the basis of a sample tabulation.

SOURCE: Compiled by Economics and Research Branch of the Dept. of Labour from information supplied by the Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration.

as taken from: "Skilled and Professional Manpower in Canada, Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1957, page 59, their Table 19

TABLE VI

CIVILIAN LABOUR FORCE, PROFESSIONAL WORKERS AND SKILLED WORKERS, CANADA,
AT JUNE, SELECTED YEARS, 1931-56

(thousands)

Year	Civilian non-institutional population 14 years of age and over	Civilian labour force	Labour force as % of population	Professional workers	Professional as % of labour force	Skilled workers	Skilled as % of labour force
1931.....	7,116	4,151	58.3	201	4.8	456	11.0
1941.....	8,352 ^a	4,762 ^a	57.0	240 ^a	5.0	587 ^a	12.3
1946.....	8,768	4,862	55.5	263 ^b	5.4 ^b	661 ^b	13.6 ^b
1951.....	9,696	5,236	54.0	303	5.8	787	15.0
1956.....	10,699	5,764	53.9	357 ^c	6.2 ^c	940 ^c	16.3 ^c

Figures exclude Yukon and Northwest Territories, but include Newfoundland in 1951 and 1956.

^a Including persons on Active Service.

^b Interpolation.

^c Projections.

SOURCE: Labour Force Estimates, D.B.S., and Tables 5 and 6.

as taken from: "Skilled and Professional Manpower in Canada, Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1957, p. 40, Their Table 7

CHAPTER VI

CHANGING LIFE STYLES

Let us now turn to a consideration of how the changing environmental experiences we have so far been discussing have changed the attitudes of the worker in ways which might affect industrial relations. Insofar as possible, we will let the worker speak for himself.

The blue collar worker has not only experienced the most dramatic change in life styles of any group in the society, but he has also been most involved in union activities and his demands can be expected to have more frequent results at the bargaining table and for the public at large than those of any other group. On the other hand, we recognize that white collar occupations are growing rapidly and may in the future be composed of a majority of the workers in the economy. Certainly, white collar workers will be an important force, although the extent of their willingness to act collectively in unions is still in doubt.

There are at least three divisions among manual

workers which derive from their training, status and the kind of work they do: the skilled, the semi-skilled, and the unskilled. These divisions are important enough to produce different attitudes about many things, different life experiences and life styles. They are, however, more like each other in these ways than they are like the middle class or non-manual worker.¹

We have chosen to allow the semi-skilled worker rather than the skilled or the unskilled worker to speak for himself. The other two groups have experienced less change than the semi-skilled group has. The skilled worker, because he is too well trained in a specialty, is often less able and less willing to learn new methods than the semi-skilled worker who has less stake in the old system. As a result, he is often by-passed in the automated factory and semi-skilled workers promoted to better positions. Also, there is evidence that because of their control of the apprenticeship possibilities, skilled workers have tended to keep the trade in the family. The result has been that, since it is difficult to get into the trades, semi-skilled workers on their way up tend to by-pass the skilled worker and become non-manual workers, and that people who are downwardly mobile also tend to fall from white collar to

semi-skilled positions. "The skilled, with status satisfaction, relative job security, and traditional style of life, have little incentive to 'try out' for another set of life goals."²

The unskilled worker, on the other hand, is one who has been somehow denied the opportunities to participate in the mainstream of the economy and finds himself also by-passed. He is lacking in training or in general education; he may be a Negro, an Eskimo or an Indian, or he may have had the bad luck to be born in a Newfoundland fishing village, a Nova Scotia mining town, or the slums of Vancouver. The proportion of unskilled labourers in the economy is diminishing, but for those who remain, life is marked by poverty and frequent unemployment. It has changed very little because of affluence. In the general rise in the standard of living since World War II, it is probably the semi-skilled worker who has felt the greatest change in his daily life.

The Semi-Skilled Worker

For this reason, it is on the semi-skilled workers that we want to focus our attention. This group consists primarily of people who, although always threatened by

unemployment, psychologically if not technologically, have nonetheless managed on the whole to be steadily employed. As we have said, it is this group which is most important for mobility and on whom affluence has had the greatest effects. Are there changes in the expectations, the way of life of the semi-skilled worker which can be expected to have an effect on industrial relations?

For the purposes of this paper we shall define a "modern worker" as (1) having at least a high school education, (2) having a relatively high income for the work he does, and (3) working in an automated or semi-automated plant, i.e., his work experience is at the forefront of technological change. We wish to emphasize that this is a model of the semi-skilled worker as he exists in some places, but certainly is not a definition of the average, semi-skilled worker of 1968 in Canada. Rather it is an attempt to see into the future. Based on experience in the U.S., we think we can assume that, by the time Canadian public policy on labour relations is formulated and implemented, this kind of worker with these attitudes will be far more numerous than today and may be in a majority in the near future, as he is in the U.S. now.

The life of a man can be roughly divided into

three principal sectors: family and personal life, work life, and community life. We will contrast this modern worker with the "traditional" worker, who has less education, lower income, and less experience with technical change. We do not necessarily imply a time element. The "traditional" worker exists in the present as well as the past and is so defined by his social, educational and work experiences and attitudes, rather than by his age or time.

Community Life

To begin with the setting, the traditional urban worker lives in flats or apartments near the center of the city. It is a city neighbourhood, usually, of workers like himself and often he lives within walking distance of parents, brothers and sisters, and other relatives. He probably belongs to a union and his wife might attend church, but their affiliation with other community organizations is practically nil. Husbands spend their free time drinking in pubs or playing cards with the boys. Wives spend their free time with relatives and often do not even accompany their husbands on holidays, which often consist of fishing or hunting trips. If sickness or unemployment strikes, the extended family closes ranks and cares for its members, insofar as possible. In general, hardship and adversity,

frequently experienced, produce withdrawal symptoms and a sense of helplessness rather than determined efforts to cope. As Eli Chinoy found among automobile workers, "only if at first you do succeed do you try again."³ W. F. Whyte tells a story illustrating the dependency of the old style worker on his family network, rather than on community organizations and services.

During the depression four children were born to the Elnos. They had to flee to steadily smaller and poorer apartments, and the children were reduced to half-starvation rations, which kept them sorely undernourished and chronically ill. Unemployment and their hopelessly large family wore away the determination and the morale of the parents, especially of Jim. They separated twice, and Jim deserted once but returned. He was arrested two or three times for panhandling while drunk. He beat his wife several times, when he was drunk.....

But Pearl still had her own parental family. Her father and mother, and her sisters, together with their husbands, formed a closely organized and loyal clan, which repeatedly rescued her and her seven children. The sisters took them in, when Jim was violently drunk, or when they were evicted for inability to pay the rent. They bought the children clothes, and helped feed them. Pearl's mother, still able to hold a job at sixty, borrowed money on her home to lend to Jim, when he was employed by the Works Progress Administration. She came up from southern Indiana repeatedly to care for the children, so that Pearl could work as a waitress, and as a machine operator, to help

feed the children while Jim was unemployed. One of Pearl's sisters opened a tavern recently and employed the mother, who in turn helped Pearl's family.⁴

That this traditional pattern of dependence on the extended family exists in Canadian cities has been documented, at least in part, by Pineo in Hamilton and by Garigue in Montreal.⁵

The modern worker lives in a working class suburb, where he probably owns his own house. The Kraft report recently discovered that nearly 75% of all union members in the U.S. under forty years old now live in suburbs, a figure that gives some idea of the strength and speed of the change in this part of workers' life style. Owning his own house gives the worker a great sense of having moved up in the world. Berger interviewed workers who had been moved from city flats to a new suburb by the Ford Company. Their reactions to the move are reflected in such statements as:

"I'm sure glad the plant forced us to move: if it hadn't we'd probably still be in housing (government flats); it was just too cheap to leave."⁶

Eli Chinoy found that automobile workers in Detroit regarded house owning as an important index of mobility. A welder living in the slums said:

"We're all working for one purpose, to get ahead. I don't think a person should be satisfied. My next step is a nice little modern house of my own. That's what I mean by bettering yourself--or getting ahead."⁷

British workers were even more enthusiastic about their move from council houses to houses of their own:

"It's the best thing I have ever done in my life."

and,

"Everybody should have a house of his own, something to work for."⁸

The move to the suburbs also changes the pattern of social relationships. Zweig found that people on the new estates in England "are more house-proud, but less gregarious. You can walk for a mile or two before you see anybody on the estates."⁹ There are no pubs in the new suburbs and so husbands tend to stay home in the evenings, working in the garden, fixing up the house, watching TV. In the words of one U.S. worker,

"Before I was married I used to spend time with a bunch of friends making all the bars. Was out raising hell a lot. Now I bring my beer home."¹⁰

or another,

"I'm a homebody. We don't go out much. I chew the rag with my wife, or someone stops in. Like last night. The friend that lives across the street, the tin-smith, was here...we had a beer. Not that the beer was important. Just something to talk on."¹¹

and,

"I putter around the house and make myself a nuisance to the missus. I take her out for a ride when it's hot."¹²

Berger found that visiting with friends and neighbours increased with the move to the suburbs, but not much. There was still a tendency either to visit with relatives, if there were any available, or for the family to keep to itself.

S. D. Clark has recently completed a study of Toronto suburbs in which he was able to confirm much of this description of modern working class suburban living. He concluded that the majority of suburbanites around Toronto were under 40, Canadian born, Protestant, of British origin and earning incomes between \$3,000 and \$10,000 per year. Their occupations were those of unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled workers, white collar employees and small businessmen. Only two of the fifteen suburbs studied were of the upper

middle class, planned community type described in Crestwood Heights. His investigation can be compared with Berger's study of a working class suburb in the U.S., or Zweig's in Britain, and the findings are very similar. He finds that Toronto workers are proud of their houses, would not leave the suburb even though buying the house is often a financial burden, that they do not join community organizations, at least not for quite a while, and they entertain very little. They are "privatized" or family-centered. Clark, however, believes that this lack of sociability is less a matter of innate working class attitudes than that, with young children and debts, neither husband nor wife has the time, energy or money to participate. He quotes one wife:

"It is difficult right now--you see people are just getting settled. They cannot be interested in organizations. Added to that there is the problem of baby-sitters. We can't get any around here. None of my friends is interested in organizations. They can't go out as they, too, have small children. We do not even go to movies. We sit and watch TV. Husbands are tired too.....Most of us here have to work hard in the house. We are poor....."¹³

And another says,

"I look after my neighbour's children while she works from 7:45 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. And then I go home and get meals and look after my own place--there's no time left over.

My husband doesn't belong to any organizations either. He works shifts. We're both too tied up. I didn't belong to any organizations before we came up here. I worked there too."¹⁴

There is one important influence tending to change the pattern of informal relationships of the blue collar worker. The wife is either home most of the day and so begins, after a time, to participate in such middle class activities as kaffeeklatsching, going to PTA, and consulting teachers, doctors, dentists about the children, or, if she works, is likely to have a white collar job and meet middle class people. In either case, wives exert a certain pressure on the family to adopt new sociability patterns and new values. The men spend almost their entire time with other blue collar workers in the plant, and their social life or organizational life, if any, will be with the same kinds of person that they are. The wife, on the other hand, especially if she works, or if she lives in a normally mixed suburban community, has a wider range of contact with non-manual workers or their wives. Husbands in Berger's working class suburb seemed to display a certain mock indignation about their wives' participation in these kaffeeklatsches because it isn't the kind of thing factory workers' wives usually do. He then goes on to comment:

"The ability of the wives to be sociable is without doubt related to the fact that on the whole they are considerably better educated than their husbands." Twenty-six per cent of the men and 40% of the women had a high school education or better.¹⁵

Hurvitz also found that "the wife is more likely to develop middle-class values and attitudes faster than her husband."¹⁶ Parents magazine was found by Berger to be the authority on child rearing most frequently consulted by wives of auto workers, although Spock is mentioned too. Both of these introduce wives to child rearing practices not previously known in working class families.

Buying a house in the suburbs, then, changes the social setting of the working class family and brings them into the general standard consumption pattern and consumer financial arrangements such as mortgages, credit, and insurance which are typical of the mass consumption economy. To go in the new house the family buys a refrigerator, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, and TV. A car becomes essential for commuting. To finance this, the modern young worker is more likely to use credit, and his wife, especially if there are no children, is more likely to work than was the case with the traditional working class family. In this

new setting there is less chance of depending on an extended family for support or sociability, so that the family becomes more "privatized," spending most of their time together. There are, at the same time, discernible pressures to adopt new social patterns and values, involving closer relationships with friends and neighbours and middle class ideas of "keeping up appearances" which easily leads to "keeping up with the Jones-es." An example of this is the comment of a British worker concerning the way in which the house is used:

"In the previous house the front door was never meant to be used; we had a settee across it. Everyone, including the postman, called at the back door. Now it is different. We've moved to the front."

or again,

"In the other house the front room was never used except for Christmas. If I lit a fire in the front room we always seemed to get back into the kitchen. I suppose we were used to it. Now it's different."¹⁷

All these tendencies are further reinforced by the new leisure patterns of the working class which reflect both affluence and the emphasis on the nuclear family. This centering on the immediate family is both a necessary

condition for job mobility, particularly geographical and occupational, and is a change which mobility brings about. As we have shown earlier, the same leisure pursuits can, and often are, followed by all social classes, and workers are aware that this and other forms of consumption have reduced the differences between classes. It is one of their strongest motivations for acquiring the standard package of consumer goods.

On the other hand, the modern worker does not join community organizations any more frequently than the traditional one does, and his union allegiance seems by most accounts to be considerably lessened. Perhaps of even greater concern is the level of alienation among workers who do belong to unions. One study estimated that the average attendance at union meetings is between 2 and 6% of the membership.¹⁸ There may be many reasons for this, some of which are discussed in other parts of this paper, but it is generally believed that traditional militant unionism was a product of strong class consciousness. The modern worker certainly has less of this than the traditional worker had. For example, British workers told Zweig;

"Classes are coming nearer--the top grades of the working class are middle class really."

and,

"There are no differences: I live in the same neighbourhood as my manager, have the same kind of house and have a car."

or,

"Actually I don't see any difference: I earn as much as a shopkeeper."¹⁹

It is interesting to note, on the other hand, that all studies have shown that affluence and/or the move to the suburbs have not changed the way workers vote. In the U.S., workers have traditionally voted Democratic, and the Kraft poll taken in January, 1967 showed that 58% identify themselves as Democrats, 16% as Republicans, 17% as independents and 9% as not sure. These are workers, 78% of whom make \$5,000 to \$15,000 per year, and 46% are in the \$7,500 to \$15,000 range (family income). Fifty per cent of all union members in the U.S. now live in suburbs. In spite of this, the proportion of those who would vote Democratic has not changed appreciably since 1964 when these same workers polled voted 60% for Johnson and 12% for Goldwater.²⁰ Berger found, similarly, that the move to the suburbs had no effect on the voting patterns of automobile workers.²¹ In Britain, Lockwood and Goldthorpe found that:

our affluent workers have been quite stable in their support of Labour: 69% have been regular Labour voters from 1945 onwards, or from whenever they first voted, as opposed to 12 per cent being regular Conservative supporters.²²

To summarize, we may say that house owning in the suburbs, higher educational levels, affluence, mobility, and contact with mass consumption and mass leisure values have eroded the class consciousness of the modern worker considerably. This may affect his union allegiance, but it has not yet affected voting behaviour nor his low level of interest in community organizations. These influences, however, have lessened extended family ties and strengthened those of the nuclear family, a circumstance that may be expected eventually to lead to greater dependency on and interest in community services.

Family Relationships

The changes which have occurred in family relationships are striking. The traditional worker is authoritarian in his relationship to both wife and children and given to physical punishment for children and wife-beating under the influence of stress and alcohol. Husbands rarely talk about their work and often wives know only vaguely what their

husbands do for a living. He lives an almost entirely male life, spending his working and leisure life with other men of his own educational and economic background, and usually of the same neighbourhood. His wife spends her time entirely in "doing for others": taking care of the children, washing, ironing, housekeeping, cooking, etc. She has no hobbies, no outside interests and "restricted to the house, more than one out of three have 'never learned to drive a car' and would be hard pressed to find recreational outlets away from home."²³ She sees her mother or other members of her or his family almost every day. She feels that the world is chaotic, that economic insecurity is a constant threat, if not a reality, and that she has no power to shape her life or external events.

She seems to lack the inner resources--the self-direction, the confidence, the assertiveness, the will--to move about freely in the larger world.²⁴

A study called Workingman's Wife revealed through various psychological tests that the blue collar wife, especially of the traditional kind, is in these circumstances, emotionally and financially, totally dependent on her husband, whom she nonetheless sees as "insensitive and inconsiderate, sometimes teasing, sometimes accusing,

sometimes vulgar, always potentially withholding affection."²⁵

In their sexual relations, she often feels that he treats her as an "object for his own personal gratification without the kind of tenderness she so much wants."²⁶

She is basically an unorganized person without enough education and self-confidence to understand and manipulate the world she lives in. She tends to be anti-union because the union ignores her and her only contact with its activities occurs during and as a result of strikes, which threaten her livelihood.

In strikes at J. I. Case, Ford of Canada and elsewhere, the disgruntled housewife, unmoved by union élan, uninformed about strike issues and without money to run her house--has sparked back-to-work movements.²⁷

It is possible that the increased status and influence of the wife in the modern working class family, combined with these anti-union attitudes, may be one factor in causing workers to be more alienated or rebellious toward their unions than they were in the past.

The self-deprecatory feeling of most semi-skilled workers, based on the low prestige of their jobs, on their frequent inability to care for their families adequately, particularly if the families are large, is a basic fact of

life which influences all the family relationships. The wife and soon the children are aware that the father's job is not as successful as others and it is responsible for some of the economic insecurity from which they suffer. His wife, who shares his self-deprecatory feelings, may go to work, if necessary. Both parents will encourage the children to get enough education to go into a different line of work from their father's or, for the girls, that they marry someone of a higher occupational level. It is not easy for parents to say to their children, "Don't be like us." In the words of a West Virginia miner:

"My boy, he wants to be a mechanic and he hopes they'll take him in the Army when he gets old enough. This girl of mine, she's thirteen going on fourteen, and she wants to be a teacher. They talk about this all the time and while they're talking I'm hoping. And every night I pray: They've got to get out of here."²⁸

In general, parents feel that children have to be tough to survive and the father, who doles out discipline when he is around, makes it strict and often harsh. As a Negro adolescent in Detroit remarked:

"He (the father) tells us what to do, and if we don't do it he kicks the hell out of us."²⁹

In the modern worker's family, husbands and wives act more as a couple and, if they have friends, they are mutual friends. The husband, as we have seen, shares his leisure time with his wife. Within the family, the husband expects to participate more in helping his wife and in rearing the children. Zweig found that,

There is little doubt that the image of the stern, bullying, dominating and self-assertive father or of the absent father who took no interest in the children, leaving them to the mother, is fast disappearing, and the new image of a benevolent, friendly and brotherly father is emerging.³⁰

And fathers remarked,

"My father had power over us: I can't boss them."

or,

"I never saw in my younger days, a man pushing a pram; he would have been a laughing stock. Now you see a great many men pushing them proudly."

or,

"I am not bossy,³¹ I try to be friendly to the children."

The status of the wife has improved, as shown by

her husband's sharing of her life, and this is demonstrated even more clearly by the greater equality enjoyed by the modern worker and his wife and their greater mutuality in sexual relations. Zweig found that two-thirds of the women in his group of modern workers felt that they were the equals of their husbands in family matters, and one-third professed men's superiority. By and large, younger women asserted their equality more firmly than older women. They made such remarks as, "it is stupid, the idea of a master;" "He doesn't keep me, so he is not in a position to order me about;" "We are equal, no bosses"--remarks which hardly sound like the traditional, bewildered and insecure working class wife.³² Rainwater and Handel, who studied the traditional wife, make a distinction between the relationship between husband and wife of traditional and modern working class families. They found that where man and wife shared most of their daily life and interests, in 57% of cases, both spouses speak of sexual relations as highly gratifying to both of them, as compared to 11% of couples in the traditional, highly segregated role relationships.³³

Mirra Komarovsky found that the attitudes of blue collar workers toward shared leisure between husband and wife, or conversely, the husband's right to go out irrespective

of his wife's feelings, is correlated with education in a rather striking way. Couples were asked to comment on a hypothetical situation in which a wife objected that two nights a week was too often for her husband to leave her alone with the kids--she wanted his company. The wife's view in the case was upheld by 41% of the high school graduates and only 26% of those of less than high school education. Conversely, the husband's right to do as he chooses was defended by 57% of the less educated, but by only 35% of the high school graduates. Since our modern worker has a higher level of education than the traditional one, we should expect him to have the higher evaluation of the wife's feelings and consequently of her status in the family.³⁴

Some of this improvement in the wife's status, and the accompanying improvement in husband-wife relationships, is certainly due to the fact that increasingly the wife goes out to work, not because she has to (which often undermines the relationship between them), but in order to improve the family standard of living. On the other hand, the fact that she shares in family financial responsibilities leads also to certain strains in the blue collar family. As we have seen, she is more likely to get a white collar job than is her husband, and in other ways, such as her higher

level of education and greater exposure to middle class values, she may adopt standards and values which are different from her husband's and which perhaps add to his feeling of inadequacy or, at least, make him uncomfortable.

This strain is most clearly seen, when it exists, in child rearing patterns. It is expressed, on the wife's part, by such statements as:

"But why does he always complain about the kids? Who is he to talk? He wasn't such a big success to tell me how to raise the kids. If they grew up his way, they'd end up in the shop like him"³⁵

In such a situation, the children are likely to prefer the more permissive mother, and the father who still clings to many of his traditional ideas is

then left feeling superfluous in the family, despite his sincere efforts to help his children grow up in a way that he believes will enable them to compete in the harsh world he has come to know.³⁶

In general, however, the modern working class couple are united, particularly if they are young and educated, in a desire to obtain the best for their children--all the things they missed, or all the things they think the children are entitled to. This consists of plenty of the

good things of life--food, a house, toys, medical care, etc., and education. The traditional and the modern working class family are alike in that they tend to transfer many of their own frustrated ambitions to their children, as we have seen. The modern family realizes even more clearly, however, that the way to a better, more secure life lies through education.

This cherishing of the individual child is a product of, first, the diminishing size of the blue collar family. Families of modern orientation and education tend to limit the number of children to three or four--another way in which the middle class and the working class, starting from different positions, are reaching a new consensus. The middle class family, which used to limit itself to two children, now tends toward three or four.³⁷ Second, the moving away from kinship networks of the traditional family has turned the blue collar family in on itself for entertainment, for companionship and for self-realization. Each child then becomes important in the social and psychological structure of the family; all the family members are more important to each other than they were in the traditional family. Third, general prosperity which has existed for a generation now, plus rising incomes and the general rise in

prestige levels of the occupational structure, has provided hope for the future and the means to reach goals, previously only dreamed of, for the majority of workers. Children then become one's investment in a dream of the future--"What I can't accomplish my children will be able to do."

In the traditional working class family, the continually arriving children are an important cause of chronic economic difficulties. A miner in West Virginia has to ask his oldest son to leave school so he can afford to send the younger ones.

"In school the kids have to buy books, they got to buy lunches or take them and they got to have clothes..... You know kid's shoes. You can get them for \$4 a pair made out of stuff like cardboard and the first rainstorm they're gone..... Right now four of my kids in school need shoes so bad if they don't get them they can't go to school no more."³⁸

A Negro worker, who in good times made \$120 a week, said:

"The main problem with us has been that while our income went up, our family got bigger, so big that my income just couldn't keep up with it."³⁹

Medical care is almost non-existent for the traditional worker's family. Dentists or doctors are sought only when pain or illness is acute, and even then they may

have difficulty getting a doctor to come to them. Corresponding to the general sense of helplessness, of low self-esteem, of mistrust of the future, and of ignorance, which plagued workers before the age of affluence and which still plagues some groups in our society, was the lack of interest in preventive medicine, dental care, or even medical care, except in emergencies. Just as these people tend to let machines and houses run down rather than keep them in good repair, so they seem to regard the body as simply another class of objects to be worn out but not repaired. Perhaps even more important, with large families, there was never enough money for anything except necessities of the moment. Children suffered a great deal in this state of affairs. A Negro worker who left North Carolina to work in Norfolk, Virginia, as a sheet metal worker, has passed from traditional to modern experiences and attitudes in his own lifetime. He describes the change:

"From \$27 a week to \$54 sure looked good. And don't let anyone fool you. It wasn't just the country boy looking at a lot of cash. Things really were better. We lived in three big rooms in a place that had a nice yard. Don't forget we had all lived together in one room before. We had never had our own private beds. We had slept in a house where rain came through the roof and soaked the bedclothes, where lots of nights when it was cold we couldn't take

our clothes off to sleep. Here I was, 24 years old, and I had my first private bed, my first steak, my first pork chops. We'd raised hogs at home but we always had to sell the chops for cash. The family ate the fat. Now we had meat every day. Corned beef hash. Chops. Hamburger. Steak. Milk. Orange juice. My kids were getting strong.

Back home when a kid got sick there were home remedies but not much else. Now these kids were healthy because they ate well and they were in a clean house and out of the weather and they saw a doctor who made sure they were growing right. Back home on the farm when a kid didn't eat right and missed vitamins he didn't grow right and he could never make it up. It is not a word of lie when I tell you that going from my father's farm in Zebulon to a city job in Norfolk was like going from darkness to light."⁴⁰

In addition to making it possible for the working class parents to give proper physical care to their children, affluence and education have also given these parents reason to hope for an even better life for their children and to believe that in providing them with comforts and advantages which they never had, or at least not to the same extent, these children will be spared the insecurity they knew and learn how to make the most of their opportunities. On this point there is little difference between the traditional and the modern worker, except that the latter will have higher aspirations for his children. He will want them to go to college and be professionals.

A logger in Quebec, who feels trapped by his lack of education in a job that will "burn him out" by the time he is 35, even if he manages to support his family that long, comments:

"La prison, vous savez, c'est pas pire qu'icitte. Qu'est-ce que j'aimerais, ça serait de frapper une petite 'job' qui me donnerait assez d'argent pour faire vivre ma famille de 7 enfants. J'voudrais leur donner une chance de s'éduquer. J'sus prêt à faire tous les sacrifices pour eux autres, parce que je veux pas que mes enfants aient autant de misère que moi....."^{41*}

The same sentiments were expressed by automobile assembly line workers:

"I never had a chance, but I want my kids to go to college and do something better than factory work."

or,

"If he goes into the factory (instead of finishing high school) I'll beat the hell out of him--except if he

* A rough translation: "Prison, you know, is not worse than this. What I would like would be to get a small job which would give me enough money to support my family of seven children. I would like to give them a chance to get an education. I'm ready to make any sacrifices for them, because I don't want my children to have as much misery as I have had."

just goes in for a visit or if he goes to engineering school or learns a trade first."⁴²

These exact feelings are echoed in the remarks of a logger whose wife had recently written him that his son had quit school to take a job as a clerk:

"Heureusement qu'il n'avait pas choisi le bois, parce que je serais allé le chercher par les cheveux et je l'aurais ramené à la maison. Jamais un de mes enfants connaîtra dans le bois ce que j'ai connu. J'en ai un deuxième aux études et celui-là je vais le garder aussi longtemps que je le pourrai. Je suis un peu pauvre mais tout le revenu que j'aurai je vais lui donner pour son instruction."^{43*}

British workers in modern plants say:

"It is the finest thing there is to give the children every advantage."

or,

"My boy has everything he wants."

* A rough translation: "Happily he didn't choose the woods, because I would have gone after him and brought him back to the house by the hair. Never will one of my children know what I have known in the woods. I have a second son at school and I am going to keep him there as long as I can. I am poor, but all the income that I have I am going to give him for his education."

or,

"I scrubbed and scraped to give my children every chance."⁴⁴

Packinghouse workers in the U.S. say:

"I come from a pretty large family of six boys and one girl, and things was pretty rough, you know. And we never had too much--we always had somethin' to eat and a clean place to live in. But as far as that, that was about as far as it went. Now I got two children now: I got a boy three and a half and I got a boy one and a half, and I try to do everything in the world for those kids. I give them anything they want. In fact, it costs me quite a bit of money. They cost me all I make."

and,

"I tell you what I'm doing. I buy war bonds. I have \$2.50 a week taken out of my pay every week; I don't even miss it. It's for the kids' education. I got about--oh I guess I got 25 or 26 of those \$25.00 bonds, and that money I won't touch. I'll have to be awful hard up before I'll touch it. That's for the kids' education..... I figure on the kids living like--like they should and not having to put up--I don't want 'em workin' in a packin'-house."

and another,

"I'd like to have my boy get an education so he wouldn't have to beat his brains

out on piecework..... I would like him to be a draftsman, or a building engineer--some profession like that."⁴⁵

On the Job

By our definition, the young, educated and affluent worker should also work in an automated or semi-automated plant, if he is to qualify as "modern." The reason for this is that there are differences in the experience of working in such a plant which tend to colour a man's view of work, of management and of the society he lives in. We will, in the chapter on industrial relations, go into these changes in the work environment in some detail and attempt to analyze them. Here we would like to let the worker speak for himself: to explain what feelings he had about his work, which he brings home, to union meetings, or to his political activities and interests.

The remarks quoted above concerning the blue collar worker's hopes that his son will not go into a plant or factory express, by implication, the worker's dislike of his work and his feeling that it is of low status. His self-deprecatory feelings are always there--he cannot avoid being aware that his semi-skilled job marks him as a failure. If, in addition, the conditions of the job are unpleasant

(as they often are in mass assembly plants--by our definition one of the "traditional" kinds of work experience), then a man's work experience becomes largely one of frustration and deprivation. To go to work each morning is to face a daily beating of the ego. The family naturally feels this. A child whose father expressed deep dissatisfaction with his job said:

"Daddy is cranky all of the time. He used to take us to the movies, but now he doesn't any more."

and the wife said:

"He is very unhappy with his job and it naturally reflects in his attitudes and conversation at home. His naturally happy-go-lucky attitude is disappearing. The reasons he doesn't like his job are--he gets no paid vacation unless he threatens to quit, his job is dirty and hard, and he doesn't like the caliber of people he works with."⁴⁶

The man himself expresses his frustration, not only by his determination to save his children from his fate, but also by his hopes and dreams of getting more enjoyable work. For example, Guest was told by various automobile workers:

"When you get home from that place (Plant Y) you have no ambition. Unless it's a must

and has to be done, you don't do anything.
All I want is to get out of there."

Or as another put it simply,

"I just want out of that plant."⁴⁷

And Walker was told by another assembly line worker:

"When the plant was running only a few cars through an hour I used to install the whole front and back seat assemblies. But when the cars speeded up, I was put on the job of installing the rack that the front seat slides back and forth on and my job was broken up and simplified. I'd like to do a whole fender myself from raw material to the finished job. It would be more interesting."⁴⁸

A common dream of escape is to have "a little business of my own" which Lipset and Bendix found to be the most commonly tried escape route, although the failure rate of these small businesses is extremely high. The automobile workers are no exception:

"I'm going to go into my own business, I guess. If I get enough money salted away and times look good, I'll open up for myself. I think I can make out good that way..... You work just as hard, but it's for yourself."

or,

"I'd like to have a little stationery store. Sell cards and stuff. But it takes a lot of money to start, and I can't give up my seniority."⁴⁹

In the automatic factory, a number of these complaints and sources of dissatisfaction have been removed. The plant is safer, more pleasant and newer. The work is cleaner; in fact, a man may not need to get his hands dirty. Also, because of reintegration of work tasks, each worker has responsibility for a larger portion of the work and can understand how his part fits in with the whole production process. There is also some prestige attached to working in "the finest," "the most advanced," or the "most automatic" plant in the industry or in the area, which helps to restore the pride of even the lowest paid operator. Men in a recently automated plant of the Ford Company remarked about the new plant that it was "more interesting," "gives you more things to do," "you don't have to work so hard."⁵⁰

Another worker at a Burton factory said:

"The job is not nearly so monotonous. I like the changing around. You get a chance to run this machine and then you run that machine. They've made it a lot nicer for us than it used to be."

Another worker responded:

"I like to walk around and move around. That I can do on this job and I couldn't before. Just had to stand at one machine and do the same thing all day. You have to learn more machines, though, but that makes it interesting."⁵¹

and,

"Sure I like it better. It's a lot easier. I can tell you one thing--I'll last a lot longer on this job. I've worked 27 years for this company and I couldn't have held to the old job much longer. It was too hard on me shoving those heavy blocks around. But this job's easy. I just watch these lights and push these buttons. Of course, I ought to have more money for this job."⁵²

The reason that this worker felt that he should have more money for an easier job is that he felt that he had more responsibility and because the worker is aware (he can see it) of the increased productivity which automation makes possible. On both counts he is likely to feel slightly disgruntled if he does not get higher pay. He likes the responsibility, on the whole, and he feels only that he is not given credit for exercising it or encouraged to take more. Workers become aware that they are now being paid for "brain work" rather than physical work that can be measured in pounds, hours or pieces.

"I get my best ideas about my job and the new passes from the nine-stand when I'm

in the can or at lunch, or on the way home. But under the incentive plan that isn't true work."⁵³

or,

"I recognize that the company has to put out a lot of production to get back the money on their investment, but the general feeling among the men is that the company is getting a lot more out of increased production than the men are sharing."⁵⁴

or,

"If I was the boss, I'd treat a man right, and I'd ask his advice."⁵⁵

or,

"On my old job...my muscles got tired. I went home and rested a little bit and my muscles were no longer tired. I also had nothing to worry about. On Number 4 (automated rolling mill) your muscles don't get tired, but you keep on thinking, even when you go home."⁵⁶

Workers find the greater frequency of shift work under automation is disruptive to home life, which, as we have seen, is very much more important to him now than it was in the traditional, segregated family. They also object to there being fewer rungs on the promotion ladder, even though this means that his superiors are fewer. Also, he

begins to realize that his wages are a result of the productivity of the system. He wants higher wages, but realizes he can do little individually to effect this, "the system sets the pace for all" and he is integrated with a team. Correspondingly, he is less likely to believe that his union can deliver wage increases except as they are tied to productivity. However, if he is safely in an automated plant, he has job security and usually higher wages than other workers, so he has little room for complaint on these grounds.

What he does want, however, is more recognition on the job. Some of these feelings come out in complaints about the more impersonal and remote supervision usually associated with automation:

"We were a lot closer to supervision when the mill started up. They wanted to help out. They asked us questions and we made suggestions. X is one of the only ones who will talk about anything."

or,

"The higher-ups don't talk to us nearly as often as they used to. It's a funny thing, but they just don't seem to be the good fellows that we thought they were at first. They used to be really interested in the problems and come around and ask our advice. Now it is only when we have a breakdown that they come in and try to push us to get it fixed or give us dirty looks if they thought

it was our fault. A lot of things that are wrong with that mill can be explained just by the attitude that is now built up between the bosses and the men."⁵⁷

Finally, when asked what he would do if he were boss of the automated seamless pipe mill in which he worked, one man replied:

"I would go up to the man and say, 'This is your mill. I want you to feel that you're not in a prison, but you're in something that we are all in together and where we can all benefit. I want you to feel that you really want to work here--and I am willing to do anything I can to make you want to.'"⁵⁸

Conclusions

The modern worker's life style is changing in ways which make him more adaptable, more mobile, more able to meet the onslaught of perpetual change which technology produces in every aspect of his life. He also leads a more enlightened, secure, self-directed life than does the traditional worker. His family is smaller, his aspirations for his children and his expectations of improvement in his own life increase with education and the experience of affluence. He gets more of his emotional satisfactions from the family and from leisure and consumption than from work

or community ties which makes it easier to change jobs, occupations, and communities. His home life as well as his work life is more democratic, which may be expected to lead to more working wives and should prepare children for the more equalitarian world which is emerging.

We wish to emphasize the increasing status of the working class wife. The fact that she has been ignored by unions in the past and so has developed anti-union feelings, plus her greater involvement with middle class values, may, now that her husband listens to her opinions, influence the semi-skilled worker's attitude toward his union officials. Again, whether he will turn toward apathy or rebellion will depend on circumstances, but it is not likely that he will be as unquestioningly loyal as the traditional worker was supposed to be.

The modern worker's education, his awareness of his ability to learn new work methods and new skills gives him a new pride in himself, less fear of the outside world, and more confidence in his ability to manipulate his environment for his own benefit. This chapter also suggests that as a worker's needs for a good livelihood and security of employment are satisfied, new and different demands arise. In this connection, it should be noted that one, if not the

most persistent, complaint of workers about automation has been that they should be consulted and rewarded for the responsibility of such expensive equipment and so much productivity. They realize that they are being asked to do brain work, that they have the capacity to do brain work, and they want the recognition and the status which they associate with such work. They feel that under the circumstances they have the right to be considered partners with management in the production process, and therefore should be consulted before, during and after any change, as well as in day to day operations. It is interesting to observe that workers are in some ways beginning to function like management in relation to their jobs. The quotation above in which a worker said that he got his best ideas in the can or at lunch is highly reminiscent of the remark made by a member of top management in another survey. When asked how much leisure he had, he replied that it was hard to know since he was always thinking about the job. "I don't know whether I'm working or fishing."⁵⁷

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CHAPTER VII

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

People become concerned about industrial relations, of course, when there is industrial conflict, and the general direction of effort is to insure and promote peace. It is our view, however, that strikes and other manifestations of labour-management disagreement are endemic to capitalism. There are two basic sources of conflict which are built into the system: the distribution of the rewards and the authority or control over the work. Since there is no rule of law which says exactly how these two things shall be divided between the contending parties and since each group, labour and management, would, if it were possible, take all the rewards and all the control, conflict is inevitable in our system of industrial relations. Furthermore, we would argue that its expression is, under the circumstances, a healthy thing, since only repression of the interests of one group or the other, or some rigid definition of the division of rewards and authority could eliminate conflict altogether. This is not meant to suggest that methods cannot be found to minimize the conflict or to find

more constructive ways of expressing it. What we do want to emphasize is that it is not the conflict itself with which we should be concerned; it is what underlies it that is important. When there is evidence that the distribution is no longer realistic or just, when the conflict reaches such seriousness as to threaten the functioning of society itself, steps should be taken to treat the cause, not the effect.

Union Problems

The first thing to note about Canadian union members is that 70% of them belong to affiliates of American trade unions and, as such, are often concerned with the same problems and situations as the American parent body, whether or not they apply particularly to the Canadian situation. Therefore, we will begin with the elements both have in common.

There is evidence, some of which we have cited, to show that union power and prestige has been weakened, in the post World War II period, by a number of factors. Until recently the unions, both in the U.S. and in Canada, had ceased to grow and were even declining in membership. This was at least partly caused by the changing composition of

the labour force toward service, white collar and professional workers, who are notoriously hard to organize, at least by traditional methods and appeals.

Also, whereas workers once felt that their only hope of improving their wages and working conditions lay with a strong union, since the Second World War, management has tried, through enlightened personnel policies, to exceed unions in keeping workers content. Workers also are now better educated to understand the world they live in and the effect of increased productivity on wages. Furthermore, as we have seen, the worker's awareness of working class identity or that his interests and those of management are opposed is much diminished in the mass consumption, technologically advanced society.¹ Clearly, unions will have a hard time selling the idea, basic to union organization heretofore, that the power of capital is arrayed against workers and only collective action provides them with effective counter-power.

Unions, being political organizations, have the problem of persuading the membership that the union is effective and useful. They must show, continually, such improvement in the lot of the workers that workers will continue to support and follow the union leaders. This problem

has been made vastly more difficult by technological change. To keep pace with the rising expectations of wage earners and the rising cost and standard of living, unions must press for higher wages. On the other hand, if they raise the cost of labour too much, industry has an incentive to introduce automation or other labour saving machinery, thus threatening workers with loss of jobs, downgrading, early retirement or at least loss of previous status and skills.² For this reason, and perhaps also because of the necessity to keep their incomes dependable in order to meet installment payments, many workers seem more interested in job security than in wage increases, although this is not consistent.³

Raskin sees automation as the chief contributor to the weakening of the power of unions.

The march of technology is like a pincer movement in its impact on unions. It eliminates large numbers of blue collar jobs in manufacturing and transportation, thus chipping away the bedrock of union enrollment. To the extent that new jobs are created, they involve hard-to-organize engineers, technicians, and white collar workers. That is one side of the nutcracker.

The other is the degree to which automation makes businesses invulnerable to strike harassment. When push buttons and electronic control devices regulate every operation from the receipt of raw materials

to the loading of finished goods, a handful of non-union supervisors and clerks will be able to keep acres of machines producing in the face of a total walkout by unionized factory crews... Even with existing production methods, our ability to make goods is so much greater than our ability to market them that most major industries can satisfy all the consumer demand of a prosperous year by operating their plants eight or nine months.⁴

An example occurred at the Clarkson plant of British American Oil in September, 1965. Six hours before the strike deadline, the staff and management took over the plant from workers in a show of force, proving that they could run at full production without workers.

Under these circumstances, of course, it becomes increasingly difficult for unions to deliver impressive gains to their membership and members are increasingly rebellious or indifferent.⁵ This loss of contact between labour leaders and their members is a widely noted fact, attributed variously to the existence of corrupt, indifferent, undemocratic or too affluent leadership; to the nature of collective industry-wide bargaining (which by covering too many workers in too many conditions satisfies no one); and to automation itself. What has not received enough attention is that this gulf between leaders and the rank and file is also caused by changes in the union member himself. The

educated, younger workers are a different breed with different self-conceptions, expectations and attitudes than their leadership. Some may react to disappointment in their unions with alienation, others with rebellion. Seligman discusses the weakening of labour solidarity:

When Automation comes, the consequences are such that dissension among unions is often the result. As jobs are abolished, occupations realigned, and tasks mechanized, a scramble ensues to see which union will exercise jurisdiction..... Mechanization and automation, however, have their most immediate effects on local plant problems, something that national bargaining can deal with but tangentially and ineffectively. The consequence is a dissatisfaction in the ranks that frequently leads to a rebellion against the international officers. Although Gleason may obtain a settlement he thinks is "the greatest in the history" of the I.L.A., the rank and file believe otherwise, and they strike all the ports along the Gulf and East Coast. Local union leaders decide to negotiate their own agreements in order to deal with local work conditions.⁶

To be exact, in 1966 in the U.S. 11% of the agreements reached between labour and management, with the help of federal conciliators were rejected by the members--the highest percentage in history. Also, during the past two years, the presidents of four of the biggest unions, whose members make up one-eighth of the AFL-CIO have been voted

out of office. The struggle of Walter Reuther to stay ahead of the members and save his leadership is another example.⁷

This kind of internal rift is both a source of weakness for unions and the sign of a new militancy which may lead to new labour strength. The same can also be said of union rivalry, such as that between the CNTU and the CLC in Canada. It seems wasteful and destructive in a particular local situation, but has perhaps been responsible, at least partially, for rapid growth in union membership. In any case, there are signs now of a new upsurge in unionism and a new militancy, based, we expect, on quite different philosophy than the traditional union organizer had in mind. The young, better educated workers will not accept authority based on particularistic criteria, i.e., a man's proven loyalty to the union, his early experience as a union fighter, his emotional and ideological attachment to the past. These things are largely meaningless to young men who did not live through the organizational struggles and the depression of the Thirties.⁸

On the contrary, through their longer experience in the school system, the young workers have had training in universalistic criteria. If we accept the findings of Inkeles' study of the modernization of man, we can assume

that they believe in rationality, the over-riding importance of technical competence, the rule of objective standards of performance, and the principle of distributive justice.⁹ We would suppose that these criteria are being applied to union policy and structure by younger workers. If so, union practice must be often found wanting. We have already mentioned that old-timers in the unions feel themselves threatened also by the "experts" they have had to hire to deal with specialized areas. These highly educated specialists bring the same universalistic criteria to bear on union problems. It is no wonder that the old-timers feel beleaguered.

In Canada, the 1965 gain of 9.3% was the highest annual increase in union membership since 1952, when it jumped by 11.4%. The total number at that time was 1,735,000, representing 24.5% of the labour force. The Financial Post estimated that the gain was a result of the expansion of the labour force, near full employment, and vigorous organizational efforts, particularly on the part of automobile workers (the union with the greatest growth that year). Also, the CNTU competition with the CLC caused both to sharpen up organizational drives.¹⁰ Union membership did not change in 1966, but in 1967 was up 10.6% over 1966, to a total of 1,921,000.¹¹

White collar workers in Canada have proved somewhat easier to organize than in the United States, possibly in part because of the greater dissatisfaction with the work they do, as we saw in the section on Education. This in turn, we hypothesize, may be because of the greater disparity between their educational levels and their position in the occupational structure as compared with managers, for example. In any case, these workers, whose organization is now seriously under way, may cause the union membership in Canada to continue to grow, whatever happens in the U.S.

Militancy in Canadian unions shows no abatement, however. 1966 was a record year for industrial conflict and, although we have no figures for 1967 yet, it is doubtful if much improvement can be expected. Most observers have made analyses of the situation which support our thesis of what can be expected of the young, educated worker, within the union and in the society. The Monetary Times speaks of labour as being in a "mood of unmatched militancy" and goes on to say:

The younger workers are those with more education, different values, no background of unemployment and with many alternate job opportunities.....

Surveys have shown that it is primarily the younger workers who are responsible

for the new wave of militancy. They are, on the whole, more aggressive and readier to take strike action than older employees.¹²

In the same vein, John Crispo and H. W. Arthurs in a paper entitled, "Industrial Unrest in Canada: A Diagnosis of Recent Experience," prepared for the meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association and the Canadian Law Teachers Association last June,¹³ made the point that:

To begin with, much of the unrest is characterized by militancy that is less the product of labour leadership than the spontaneous outbreak of rank and file restlessness.

Both observers mention a good many of the ideas we have explored and attempted to find empirical evidence for in this paper: educational differences between new and old workers, which means that unions cannot count on automatic support from rank and file; mobility opportunities and affluence, which make workers less willing to accept compromise; the weaker position that many unions find themselves in, partly because of these internal rifts. We would like to add to this the findings on the effects on political attitudes caused by simply staying in school longer: the subjective sense of competence, the greater persistence in keeping informed on issues, the increased

egalitarianism. Affluence or rising income and occupational levels support the same attitudes. These attitudes are consistent, where dissatisfaction with work or rewards exist, with militancy. We would also like to add the importance of consumption norms. This "desire for more," whether we like it or not, seems to be an important part of the structure of our economy. Unfortunately we cannot have the advantages of this urge without its disadvantages.

Management Changes

Management, meanwhile, has also changed. As we have shown, managers are better educated, in general, along with the rest of the population than they were twenty years ago, before the sharp rise in both affluence and educational levels began. Increasing automation or other levels of technological advance have made it necessary for management to be able to organize men of widely different skills and levels of authority on a vast scale. This includes specialized scientific and professional personnel involved in the technical aspects of research and production as well as human relations specialists: the psychologist, the sociologist, the personnel man, the medical and safety specialists, who concern themselves with the motivations,

problems and satisfactions of the men who work in a given industry. Their activities must mesh with the structure of responsibility and authority to get the work done and to this end management also must organize workers, foremen and superintendents. Peter Drucker maintains that this skill of organization is a recent development of great importance not only to industrial relations, but to the society at large:

The new organizing capacity creates a middle-class society of men who are professionals in their work but rank as employees, managerial in their responsibility but middle-class in their outlook, expectations, rewards.

This new organizing ability has already created a new social reality. It has given us a new leadership group and a new leadership function: the employed professional manager... It creates a new social problem--the integration of the professional man, both specialists and managers, into the organization--which bids fair to become the social question of the twentieth century.¹⁴

In any case, in hiring human relations specialists and in discovering their usefulness in preventing grievances and smoothing relations in general, management has taken over many of the problems previously handled as grievances by the unions. This undermines union strength because it corrodes the image of the union as the protector of the

interests of the worker. At the same time, managers must often feel that unions, with their opposing interests, are simply frustrating them in carrying out their jobs.

Principal Issues in Industrial Conflict

The public has become increasingly concerned over the number and duration of strikes, particularly in public service industries, and a wage-price spiral in product industries. Although most contracts are quietly negotiated without public inconvenience, some of the most important issues, especially those associated with automation, seem beyond the reach of collective bargaining. J. T. Dunlop feels that the society has expected too much of collective bargaining and has burdened it with problems beyond the capacity of the participants to solve: for example, price stability, economic growth, full employment, industrial peace, etc.¹⁵

From the point of view of this paper the most important issues basic to industrial disputes in an age of automation and affluence are: (1) the conflict between management's right to organize work as quickly and efficiently as possible and the worker's right to control of his work, (2) the conflict between productivity and higher wages on

the one hand and job security and unemployment on the other. The two are really two parts of the same question, of course, and cannot, we believe, be decided by the contestants in industrial disputes but must be decided by public policy.

Management Rights vs Workers' Rights

The conflict between management's right to organize work as it sees fit and the worker's right to control of his work is not new. Rapid technological change has simply made it more acute and changed its formulation. The struggle of the employer to control and determine the conditions under which he will pay for work and the struggle of the worker to control and determine the conditions under which he will sell his labour are as old as the first business transaction. But the nature of the new work environment, with its equalitarianism, its spread of responsibility on the one hand, and its basic insecurity due to continuous change on the other is leading to a new definition of the terms of trade. Here we should emphasize that, although the modern worker is far more adaptable to technical change than is the traditional worker, for reasons we have discussed, such change is always some threat insofar as a man may lose his job as a result of it.

For various reasons, in the last few years, management, previously at bay in the power battle with unions, began to take a stiffer attitude toward unions in general, and collective bargaining in particular. The discovery of the economic value of keeping workers content, combined with management's capacity to do this through personnel specialists without reference to grievance procedure, probably facilitated this. In general management no longer fights unions in principle--it is assumed that the unions are here to stay. Management has, however, felt that the combination of government and labour has in the past tended to infringe on their right to manage and so have fought hard against union efforts, for example, to be kept informed and consulted about technological change.¹⁶ Managers contend that this concerns the organization of work, which is their prerogative.

A recent study has defined succinctly this difference in basic view of the work situation between labour and management:

Business is often a conservative force on social questions. But when it comes to production, it is as radical as it can be. To the enterpriser feeling the sting of the competitive lash, there is no such thing as the status quo in

technology or in the organization of production. He hunts feverishly for new materials, for new machines, for new ways of organizing work. When he finds them, he does not hesitate to uproot the established way of making or doing things in order to replace it with a better way.

On the other hand, trade unionists and trade unions are often the pioneers, the radicals, in changing social institutions. But they tend to be the conservatives in their approach to changes in the methods of production. The status quo represents, they think, job security and certainty; change, presented in terms of the promise of a glowing long-run future, is often accompanied by an uncomfortable, if not menacing tomorrow.¹⁷

Canadian businessmen are somewhat more conservative than this picture of U.S. managers suggests and less eager to risk capital in new ventures. In this way Canadian workers may gain a little more time to get ready for change, but basically the situation is the same in both countries.

The search for greater job security under conditions of continuous change has led, first, to an effort on the part of unions to establish the necessity for management to consult unions on work rules and imminent technical change. But this has the disadvantage of requiring continuous renegotiation, even if the principle of consultation is accepted. The Freedman report in Canada is, of course,

an important step in the acceptance of this idea. A second line of defense has been an effort to have the principle accepted that a man has a "right to his job," a property right in it, which may not be taken away from him or radically changed in nature without his consent.¹⁸ This "professionalization" of labour deserves particular attention. Durand, in the OECD study of workers' attitudes to technical change, finds that trade unions in most western countries are moving in this direction. Again, in holding that the worker has an equity in his job, the Freedman report supports this trend in Canada.

The effort to change a job into a career has become more realistic since automation, because the reintegration of work has made manual skills less important than theoretical understanding, which is applicable from one plant to another or one job to another. Another way in which jobs are becoming more like professions is that what a man sells is not so much his time (he may sit around in an automated factory doing very little except when something goes wrong or some decision has to be made) as his general knowledge, capacity to understand a process and his willingness to take responsibility. In his new feeling of equality, and in his search to improve his position and standard of living, what

the worker wants is a career, which Foote defines as a "procession of statuses and functions which unfold in a more or less orderly though undetermined sequence in the pursuit of values which themselves emerge in the course of experience."¹⁹ The guaranteed annual wage is simply another word for salary, and the right to a job and the portable pensions issue may all be regarded as an effort to have the rights associated with a job become the property of the worker, so that he can take them with him wherever he goes.

An interesting new demand in this respect is the right to continuous training or "re-cycling." Claude Jodoin, in an article published in April, 1965, wrote that in an age of automation "training will become a factor in collective bargaining because it is so essential to the security of the worker."²⁰ Italian trade unions are demanding that there should be established, through multi-dimensional training, "an occupational qualification attaching to the person of the worker instead of to the job."²¹ To the extent that all these schemes make it more difficult to organize the work, managers may be expected to resist them as infringements of management rights. On the other hand, workers who are "professionals" might prove to be far easier to integrate into the work process and willing to be more responsible.

Rise in Productivity vs Job Security

It is unlikely, however, that Canadian workers themselves would be entirely happy about job security at the expense of a continued rise in productivity and, therefore, of wages.

Jamieson believes that rapid economic growth and expansion in Canada since World War II is responsible for more industrial conflict than is any other factor. Rising prices, wage differentials between rapidly growing industries and slow growth industries, between high wage and low wage occupations in the same industry, between American and Canadian workers in the same union or industry have led to discontent often expressed in strikes. He notes that, "among the highly unionized industries in Canada strikes have been least prevalent in the one that has paid rates closest to those in the United States for several years, namely pulp and paper, and most prevalent in the one paying wages farthest below American standards, namely, coal mining."²²

After all, the Canadian worker, who reads American magazines, watches American T.V., often works in Canadian subsidiaries of American companies and belongs to an international union with headquarters in the U.S. is subjected to

continuous "demonstration effect," i.e., he compares himself and his standard of living, directly and realistically, with his American counterpart. Naturally, he wants the same things, since he participates, with only slight differences, in the general North American consumption pattern. The issue of wage parity with American workers in the same industry and the same union has become a very difficult one and it was necessary last year for Federal Minister of Industry Drury to warn:

U.S. productivity is some 30% above the level of Canadian productivity. This explains the fact that, on the average, U.S. wages are well above Canadian levels... The sudden introduction of wage parity in a key industry, without being matched by comparable productivity growth for the economy as a whole, would tend to spread to other industries and to result in inflationary pressures, deterioration in the external trade balance, unemployment, then perhaps devaluation...²³

It would be very surprising indeed if Canadian workers were in the long run willing to accept less than parity with American workers. We can assume that the pressure for increased wages and for equalization of wages and benefits throughout Canada will continue. After all, the work environment, the demonstration effect, the consumption norms, and rising levels of education all propel Canadian workers

in that direction. Parity can only be achieved, however, if productivity steadily increases as a result of technological change. In that case, the worker will certainly attempt to protect his job through "professionalization" of work or some steps in that direction, which will involve a diminuation of management rights as now defined. It is unlikely that this struggle will be finished soon or that the contestants will be able to settle it between themselves.

Obstacles to Adjustment to Technological Change in Canada

Meanwhile, we should reiterate that there are certain circumstances peculiar to Canada which tend to hamper adjustment to technological change and perhaps cause industrial disputes to be more bitter, if not more numerous, than they might otherwise be. In the section on education and the section on mobility we have shown that, although the educational level is rising, it is not rising fast enough to meet the needs of a technologically advanced economy. As a result, an immigration policy which relies on highly trained people from outside discourages Canadian workers, who tend to leave to take advantage of better opportunities elsewhere when possible. Furthermore, a generally traditional, élitist, ascriptive society fails to

give Canadians a "sense" of mobility, i.e., that they have as good a chance as anyone to succeed and an optimism about the future on which an affluent society seems to depend.

Finally, geographic dispersal of industries, wide diversity of local interests, disparate labour laws in different provinces, together with dissension between national and international unions makes it nearly impossible to bargain on an industry-wide basis. As Woods points out, an important consequence of Canadian labour policy has been the creation of a collective bargaining system based on small units at the level of the establishment or the firm.²⁴ The real problem is to achieve enough centralization to allow management, labour and government to formulate consistent and workable adjustments to technological change and the manpower needs of the economy, as Cardin pointed out in 1966.²⁵

New Assumptions in Industrial Disputes

In spite of difficulties, collective bargaining will continue to be an important tool for resolving the inevitable conflict of interests and the infinite details of industrial relations between workers and management. It may and ought to be improved, perhaps by becoming more centralized. Labour-management consultative committees may

help to establish more rapport or to find solutions to problems before they have a chance to cause trouble. But the difficulty with all these solutions is that they assume that management and labour have private business of their own that does not concern the public. The assumption is made that these two groups can be separated from the rest of society and that, by leaving them to work out their problems alone, the interests of the rest of society will be served also. Only if they cannot settle their problems by themselves does the public (government) step in.

That these notions may be very erroneous and unrealistic is demonstrated not only by the experience of many Canadians during, for instance, the Seaway strike, the doctors' strike in Saskatchewan, or the M.T.C. strike in Montreal, but also by a study of the steel strike in the U.S. which lasted from July 15 to November 7, 1959.

R. L. Raimon found that in this case there were certain new conditions based on high productivity and affluence which challenge previous assumptions about industrial conflict.

We have in the past assumed that (1) both labour and management have more to lose than to gain from interruptions to production. (2) When strikes or lockouts do take place, the hardships they themselves entail will be the chief instrument making

for prompt settlement. Promptness is measured by the notion that the staying power of the parties will be less than the staying power of the public. These ideas are challenged by the following new conditions in the more affluent industries:

- (1) Technically advanced industries have an over-capacity to meet demand and operate most profitably at high or near-capacity production levels. Therefore, a company will show a greater profit if it works at near-capacity during half a year and shuts down the other half than if it must work at low levels all year round. A long strike may be a good thing for the company, especially if
- (2) Stockpiling is feasible. With the amount of warning usually necessary to the calling of a strike, buyers can buy all they need for a very long period.
- (3) Industry-wide bargaining makes it impossible for individual firms to resume operations and capture their rivals' customers during a strike.
- (4) Workers' incomes are high enough so that their staying power is as great as the public's. In 1958, despite the recession and the consequent infrequency of overtime earnings, the median earning of wage employees in steel exceeded the median income of American families in that year.²⁶

Under these conditions, it is clearly possible that either party to a dispute may welcome, or at least passively accept, a strike and that both can outlast the public. We must agree with Cardin that, "it is today a paradox that a system of industrial relations should be, for all practical purposes, based on the absolute liberty of the parties to

the negotiation, and on bargaining within a perspective of private law in which only the interests of the opposing groups count."²⁷

Conclusions

The central problem for labour-management relations in an age of rapid technological change, of affluence, and of rising levels of education is integration: integration, as Drucker has said, of professional managers and professional specialists and, as Durand foresees it, professional workers into the production process, and integration of all these with the general society.

Mass production assembly was based on breaking work down into small segments which resulted in alienation from the work task and an isolation of workers as a group from a sense of direct participation in and contribution to either the work or the society. Their group feeling of antagonism toward management and their belief that "capital" was exploiting them was evidence of this. Workers had their own working class values in a working class subculture, wherein they were involved in a reciprocal set of relationships which integrated them there, but tended to set them in

opposition to other parts or classes of the society. Unions, at that time and under pre-affluent, pre-automated conditions, were a political expression of working class values and working class needs. But the working man in North America and elsewhere has less and less consciousness of his affiliation with a working class. He is confident that the future looks reasonably bright (barring world wars and depressions) for himself and even more for his children. His style of life, made possible by affluence and rising levels of education, and his work experience confirm a growing equalitarianism, in spite of certain obstacles which Canadian society erects. Apathy and rebellion in union ranks suggest that unions have failed to keep up with this change. But so far workers have failed to find responsible, integrative roles for themselves in this vast middle class.

Specialization has been for some time characteristic of all parts of society. However, the nature of modern technology now requires that these specialists be re-integrated and organized into a smoothly functioning work force of independently responsible individuals. This is true not only in automated factories, but in the professions as well. For example, the increasing demand for medical services which at first required the separation of

of the doctor's skills into many separate functions, divided among as many practitioners (the anesthetist, the radiologist, the lab technician, the physiotherapist, the psychologist, the surgeon), now requires the re-integration of all these specialists into hospital teams. Through organization, various combinations of these specialists must now act together to perform the functions once performed by the individual doctor. But their integrated activities make possible an efficiency, a level of proficiency, and a durability quite impossible to the family doctor working alone. Most important, each member of such a team feels he makes a contribution and has a responsibility, and he recognizes that this is true of all other members too. This kind of integration of the worker is lacking in industrial relations at the present, but is what must come.

We feel that industrial plants must increasingly reflect on a social and psychological level what is happening on a functional level. Both on the job and in the society there is an equalization or levelling occurring, with more people in the middle than at either end as regards income and status and less social distance between the top man and the lowest. If the mistake of a machine operator is as costly as that of a supervisor, then the operator's

importance should be recognized, not only through wages, but also through increased responsibility for decisions and planning. Such integration, we believe, would go far to restore workers' interest in their work and to ease a source of strain in industrial relations which is likely to increase in the future.

Footnotes for Chapter VII

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CHAPTER VIII

STRUCTURAL STRAINS AND DISLOCATIONS

In this chapter we turn from the description and analysis of changing environmental experiences and attitudes and their bearing on industrial relations to a consideration of what these changes mean when we look at society in more abstract and theoretical terms. Our focus is on the problems or strains which are introduced.

The Modern Worker - Alienation and Rebellion

In many parts of this report we have described the ways in which the younger, affluent and educated workers differ from traditional workers. While both live up to the "standard package" of home ownership, television, automobile, vacations, and hobbies, they differ in the frames of reference which they bring to reality. The modern workers bring from education those ways of dealing with reality which Inkeles refers to as "modernization"; a capacity for universalism (holding impersonal and objective standards), specificity (dealing only with those aspects of

the situation and arguments logically relevant to it), independence (working alone without direct supervision), and achievement. Robert Dreeban maintains that these are a product of long immersion in modern educational organizations, that they are learned inadvertantly from such immersion, and that they may be more important to survival in the modern world than academic knowledge.¹

These modernizing orientations are in turn reinforced by working in modern, highly technical industries which themselves "teach" the workers how to use them. They are, of course, the orientations of bureaucracy and a high degree of rationality, and they are necessary to functioning in and understanding a highly bureaucratized and rationalized society. We repeat, they are the product of education and of experience in such a society. They mark off the modern worker from the traditional worker. They have many implications for the role of the modern worker in unions, in industry and in the community, which we will deal with shortly. However, before doing so we should describe the frames of reference and the social order which developed around the traditional worker and why they constrain and frustrate the modern worker.

The mark of the older working class culture noted

in many studies is that the orientations of its members were not universalistic and specific. Instead, they reacted to others in terms of their personal qualities and made allowances for these characteristics. They relied on family and friends for support and security. They stressed sharing and loyalty to the group instead of competition. They had very low aspirations. When these were coupled with such low levels of education that a great many workers were, in fact, functional illiterates, one can understand their total incapacity to deal with modern technological developments. These are, in fact, almost childlike dispositions, which would encourage paternalism. Indeed, whether it was true paternalism, in the personalistic sense of that term, or the kind of corporate paternalism now a constituent part of Bulwarism, it did treat the worker as though he were a child. In fact, we would even go further and note that, even within the structure of the unions with their highly oligarchical tendencies, the worker tended to be treated in the same way. To some extent, this attitude was appropriate, for such workers were not equipped either to understand or to function efficiently in modern industry. Authority was left to management and to union leadership.

The social structure which developed around such

workers had to be one in which they were closely supervised, and given very little responsibility. This need for supervision, in turn, set up a complex hierarchy which inadvertently provided ways in which those workers with talent or education could work their way up. Their leaving the working group, however, left the rest of the work force rather uniformly helpless and non-responsible.

Certain categories of workers should be exempted from these generalizations, particularly the skilled workers and craftsmen. They have almost always been better educated than other workers and more independent and affluent. Furthermore, one should understand that, even for the rest of the work force, our remarks are not intended to be a description of these workers but to describe a tendency within them as a body, or among a sufficient number of them to necessitate the kind of social organization which we have described.

With the increased technological complexity of modern industry, this traditional work force was left further and further behind. The gap between what they knew and what was required for managerial decisions widened even further and, with the widening, upward mobility became more difficult. Increasingly, members of management held college degrees.

Naturally, with this level of a work force, management felt that it had to make all decisions. True, this idea was also linked to management's possession of power and its ownership of the means of production, but it was also supported by the nature of the work force. Regardless of its etiology, it is clear that management did come to believe that it had the right to make all the decisions about production, sales, remuneration, and even workers' rights. The "residual rights" theory, still current and supported by much legal precedent, is based on the assumption that management has all original rights, and any rights not specifically given away in collective agreements remain with management. The Freedman report questions the legitimacy of this view.

One can find a similar set of conditions in both the unions and the community. Except for some unions, such as the printers, the unions have been notoriously undemocratic, being ruled by extremely durable oligarchies of traditionalists. In the community, the blue collar worker is noted for his low level of participation in almost all activities. He belongs to almost no clubs or associations, he tends to be politically inactive, and he has certainly never been asked to appear on the boards of

community institutions like hospitals.

This, then, is the picture of the institutional frames within which the blue collar worker now finds himself. But times have changed. Many workers are now affluent, and an increasing proportion of the younger workers are well educated. These new workers bring to these old organizations new skills, a highly modern orientation, a different sense of self, a much more equalitarian and liberal attitude towards their relationships and responsibilities to others, and new standards of competence. They do not accept the factory system devised for the traditional worker. They find the fragmentation and routinization of tasks devised to make them efficient (by men like Taylor) repulsive and demeaning. They are dissatisfied with their work, and increasingly they challenge the competence of foremen and the rights of managers. All signs point to this.

As we have indicated elsewhere, surveys have shown that the more educated the blue collar worker, the more he is likely to be dissatisfied with his work, the more he will want to make some of the decisions connected with his job. If he works in an automated or semi-automated plant, he will reject the obsolete competence of the older workers and foremen, feeling that his part of the job is as

important as anyone's. He turns away from work as a source of satisfaction and expects his home, his family and his leisure to meet his needs for recognition, status and creative outlets. Whatever the meaning of work to the traditional worker, it is clear that to the modern worker it is merely the means to a high standard of living. This worker has then become, or is becoming, alienated from society in the major way in which he is attached to it. When these workers do have the chance to exercise these skills, as they do in some continuous process industries, they express satisfaction with and involvement in their work.

The experience of the modern worker in the union has also been stressful. In the first place, evidently, he has little respect for the oldtime union leaders. He has not experienced the early union battles in terms of which they made their reputations, nor does he respect very much the values so important to them, such as loyalty and hard work. Instead, he is likely to apply the bureaucratic standards he has internalized with his longer schooling, valuing the rationally competent and technologically knowledgeable man. He, himself, probably has these skills, and feels himself more competent than the leader. Furthermore,

he is not satisfied with the goals which the older leader brings to collective bargaining. In short, he rejects the leader and his bargains. He may favour a different kind of participation in the union, replacing loyalty to the union and regular attendance at meetings with competence in committees. Whereas the older leader was a mass politician, using and abusing the mass meeting to achieve his ends, the modern worker will prefer bureaucratic politics, the meetings of experts, the effective committee. In the blue collar unions, then, these modern workers will be dissatisfied with the way the union is run, with the competence of the leaders, and with the bargains they make with management. There is some evidence that these are the leaders of the wildcat strike.

Finally, the modern worker may become disenchanted with the community in which he lives, for he certainly is not respected by the community institutions which he uses. Neither hospital nor school boards, social agencies, nor recreation commissions have many representatives from among the workers. Though the workers are probably the principal users of these institutions, they have almost nothing to say about how they are run. These institutions were also developed to serve the traditional worker who was thought to

be, and probably felt, incompetent to direct them. Of course, the result is that most of these institutions are run according to the interests of the middle class who dominate them, or at least according to what the middle class considers good for the workers. That this can be both fallacious and unjust has been shown in a number of instances. Great public hospitals, whose primary clientele are workers, are built in areas of the city relatively inaccessible to them. If the workers had been members of these boards, such locations would not have been chosen.

Our point, then, is that this new affluent, educated worker cannot find a place in his society, nor in industry, nor in the union, and not in the community. Yet, being competent, with high aspirations and expectations, and feeling politically potent, he is dissatisfied and restless.

The Work World as a Status System

In 1953 Peter Drucker wrote an article called the "Employee Society" in which he described modern industrial enterprises as status systems. He was referring to the fact that rewards (pay) are allocated, not in terms of the contribution of the worker, but in terms of his relative status in the system. He argued that management had the

power of deciding how the profits of the enterprise would be redistributed; that is, how much would go to each status position. Pursuant to this, he maintained that it is the function of labour to challenge management in this right of redistribution. What is particularly valuable for us is his conceptualization of the work world as a status system. It focuses attention on the mechanism and criteria for allocating people to statuses as well as the ways of granting prestige. Status distinctions, like those between blue collar workers, white collar workers and management, have in the past represented prestige levels within industry paralleled by differences in pay and usually life styles, education, skills, sex, age, and ethnicity--differences which functioned to legitimate the status system and consequently the distribution of power and the redistribution of profits.

This is made strikingly clear by the findings of sociologists that management and labour are differentiated in terms of class and ethnicity, so that in North America one often finds that management is primarily in the hands of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, while labour, particularly unskilled and semi-skilled labour, is largely composed of other ethnic groups. This is the grounds for the French

Canadian complaint that industry in Quebec is dominated by the English. This same differentiation seems to be true wherever industry is introduced from the outside and even to some extent where the industry is developed, owned and operated by members of the native population.

Similar differences occur between the different levels of labour, although these are usually not based on class but rather on ethnicity, sex, age or personal relationship.

Though these differences were clearly the result of ethnic and class nepotism and inimical to a democratic ideology, they had the important latent function of legitimating the power and advantages of management by implying that this was part of the natural order.

The question is, why do the participants accept these differences? Partially, it is because they feel that the people occupying different statuses are in some way fundamentally different. In societies like India, caste differences are considered to be part of the divine and natural order. In the West, these differences are justified by the principle that property confers power and privilege, i.e., owners of an enterprise have the right to say whom

they will hire, for what job, and under what circumstances. Although the logic of this has become rather tenuous in a society where managers are for the most part employees, not owners, the argument is still used. However, except for those in the upper echelons, it is probably not really accepted.

Today, education is probably the most important legitimization for these status differences. The gross distinctions between white collar worker, blue collar worker and management have for a long time been supported by major differences in their levels of education. Therein men could find the reason for the superiority of others. This is why education has become, in the minds of North Americans, the most important avenue to success. Men "understand" why others get ahead in terms of their superior education and, if they have hopes for their children, they are adamant about giving them a "good" education. In fact, education has become so closely associated with status that people expect increases in education to result in a better job, as well as more respect and deference. For these reasons, education has become one of the primary ways in which the status system of industry is legitimated.

Life style has somewhat the same function, though

its influence is more subtle and indirect. It has the double function of symbolizing and legitimating status. It legitimates because when men live differently they are thought to be different, so that a man with a bigger income and a much more luxurious style of life is somehow thought to be a better man. Thus, as long as the manager had a dramatically different life style from that of the worker, far from causing dissatisfaction, it probably helped convince the worker that there was a real difference between them and that the manager was a better man. When this is no longer true, the status difference, which was supported and articulated by differences in life style, is also eroded away.

Together, educational and life style differences have been important legitimations for the status system of industry and for the differential allocation of power and pay. But now, with rising levels of affluence and education, both these differences are disappearing and with them the legitimation for the differences in power and privilege.

Among younger workers, there is certainly a very small educational gap between the blue collar and the white collar worker, and a great reduction in that between the blue collar worker and the manager. The distance between a

grade school education and a college education is, psychologically and cognitively, far greater than that between a high school and a college graduate. Often the man with the grade school education is actually a functional illiterate, not accustomed to thinking in abstractions nor to using printed matter. He is thus clearly distinct from the college and even high school educated manager. This was the condition of what we have called the "traditional" blue collar worker, a condition suitable for the status system we find in industry.

Now, increasingly, workers have a high school education. Such workers are not likely to see much difference between themselves and the white collar workers (except that the latter may not be as well paid), and they feel able to speak to the managers. They will, in other words, be far less willing to concede that the status differences are justified. Furthermore, they will expect that their greater abilities, arising from their greater education, will be recognized. In a multitude of ways (like the criteria of competence he uses, his appreciation of the world and his cognitive and social skills), today's younger worker is a different man. Being different, he will need new modes of participation and new sources of satisfaction.

There is no indication that a system grounded on the traditional worker provides such outlets or satisfactions.

With these two effects in mind, we can say that, in the most affluent and highly educated sectors of the economy, workers (and, to some extent, managers) will tend to reject the status system and be restive in its confines.

If we accept Peter Drucker's thesis that modern industry is a redistributive system geared to social status, with the power of redistribution in the hands of management, then the erosion of the legitimacy of this system will have serious effects. The disappearance of differences in education and life styles which legitimated the status system means that, unless we are prepared for continued, serious, structural strains, that system too must change.

We would also note that the privilege of power is linked to these status differences and that accordingly the exercise of power is legitimated in terms of the legitimacy of the status system. To the extent that this legitimation disappears, management, which up to now has been seen as the only group with the right to redistribute profits and to exercise control over the work, will be increasingly challenged by the unions or the workers themselves. Whether

the challenge comes from the unions will depend on whether it is traditional members or modern workers who achieve dominance. Where the former is the case we may expect wildcat strikes and local rejections of the settlement brought back by their leaders. The modern worker will not be satisfied with the control over redistribution achieved by the traditionalist leaders and, probably, not even with the share of the profits they bring back.

To sum up, we have suggested that the effects of affluence and increased education on the status system of modern industry is to erode the legitimacy of this system. This in turn means that the involvement of the modern, affluent, highly educated worker is weakened and is unsatisfactory to him.

We predict that this dissatisfaction will be expressed in a claim for increased control over the redistribution of profits and over the production process itself. Unions which contain both traditional and modern workers will experience intense internal struggles for power. Where the traditional group is in power in the union, the other group will lead wildcat strikes and rejections of settlements.

Structural Dislocations

Studies of slums, of schools, of colleges and of prisons point to another type of strain in modern society which has been created by technological-economic-educational change. This strain arises out of two interconnected and simultaneous developments: the increasingly high standard of life, education and performance, and the widening gulf between the advantaged and disadvantaged. The high standard has become the unit by which every man measures himself and, against this standard, the disadvantaged see themselves as failures. This finds its starkest consequence in the pockets of hard core unemployed who constitute a serious social problem for the nation. There is, however, an even more pernicious way in which this occurs, mainly in the loss of hope for the young and their alienation from the social system in which they are involved.

The classic explanation of this phenomenon is that offered by the sociologist Robert K. Merton who pointed out that increasingly, in modern mass society, people are being presented with goals, but denied access to the means for achieving them. He specifically referred to the income and life style goals presented in the mass media, and to the

fact that disadvantaged groups such as unskilled workers and ethnic and racial minorities simply could not get the education and/or connections necessary to reach these goals. Merton then suggested that the person who faced this problem could deal with it in a number of ways--for example, he could deny the goals (become a hippie), reject the means (become a criminal), reject both the goals and the means (become a revolutionary), etc. Whatever the choice, he suggested that such a frustrating situation would lead to a loss of faith in the validity of the social norms and that anomie or moral lawlessness would ensue.

The applicability of this theory to juvenile delinquency is obvious. The slum boy who is taught to want what everyone else wants (the effect of ideological equalitarianism and a mass media society) but finds himself a failure at school and unable to get a good job, bands together with others of kindred fate to form the juvenile gang. Such gangs are noted for their rejection of social values by engaging in both destructive and hedonistic activity. By these actions the delinquent is saying that he knows that he will not be rewarded for participation in the society. He has become alienated.

Merton's theory may also apply to a range of

other phenomena such as high school and college rebellions, convict apathy and perhaps even rebellion in and alienation from the union. In these cases, people often feel that there is little or no relationship between their present activities and their future prospects. Arthur Stinchcombe in his Rebellion in the High School found that those high school students who rejected their role as students and insisted on adult privileges were those who felt that what they were learning or what they were doing in school would do nothing to help them in later life. Since they (most lower class boys and those middle class boys who were failing) did not feel that participation in the school paid off, they rejected it and the role they were asked to play (adolescents and students), and demanded that they be treated as adults.

A similar interpretation could be made of college rebellions, except that here it is the middle class students who are rebelling (the lower class boys in college feel that they have really made it and are quite satisfied). These students tend to reject the competitive system since they know that through a lifetime of struggle they have just managed to stay in place (where their fathers were). Finding no pay off in continued competition, they, too,

reject the system and the role which the system assigns to them. They demand adult status. In this case, it is a demand for participation in the government of the university.

Something of the same process is at work when the young business school graduate or engineer feels disgruntled because he is not given enough recognition and responsibility right away.

Our interpretations of college rebellions and the difficulties of junior executives may be tenuous. They are presented simply to illustrate the ways in which rebellions can be generated. The description of slum delinquents and high school rebels has, however, been firmly established. In each instance, the rebellion is rooted in a situation where the person feels or knows that his participation in the system will not pay off for him. This means that he does not believe that his participation will result in the kind of life style which the system promises or which he has come to believe he should have. His belief is, of course, a product of his experience and of the standards of society, and the frequency with which it occurs will depend on conditions in that society, as well as the height of the standard applied.

Paralleling this development is another, arising out of the increasingly technological nature of work. Jobs are clearly becoming more complex and require more training. Many such jobs cannot be done in a semi-skilled way. Computer programming is a case in point--a poor job of programming is absolutely useless. The growing gap between unskilled and skilled work makes it increasingly difficult for the novice to learn on the job. Unlike the boy on the farm who can do almost everything his father does, albeit poorly, and still know that he is useful, the son of a computer programmer simply cannot do what his father does and would be a pure nuisance around the office.

This development makes most entry jobs increasingly unpromising. They are not ways of learning the business. They tend to be dead end. To accept them is either an admission of failure or, since these jobs are increasingly occupied by married women returning to the labour market, they may be regarded by boys as jobs for females only. As a consequence, working class boys in school find it increasingly difficult to see a meaningful relationship between what they are studying and what they will be doing on the first job. A Canadian study of a high school indicated that many working class boys definitely felt this

way.² The point is that this growing skill gap makes young people feel that they are useless and that there is little relationship between their schooling and their work. It becomes increasingly punishing to be young, particularly if you are working class. Middle class children do not feel this as much because they see high school as the preparation for college where they will learn the skills of modern work. Yet they, too, share and clearly resent the feeling of being useless and being unable to participate seriously in their society. They, too, have tendencies to reject the system and the role it assigns to them and demand adult status.

With this perspective in mind we would argue that the increased levels of affluence and education have raised the standard by which men measure themselves. The affluent and educated workers set the pace in life styles, required education, etc. For example, a study of English workers showed that the educational requirements of a job were those of its last occupant, and that other things being equal, the man with the highest education tended to get the job. The new life styles and educational levels then become the standard by which men measure their present or anticipated success or failure. Of course, the higher the

standard, the further the uneducated man must go, and the greater the chance that he will anticipate failure.

Rising standards of living and education tend to be accompanied by rising levels of expected competence or performance. Spread by mass media and human dreams these standards are accepted by more and more men. They become shared by the schools, they creep into job qualifications and the thinking of personnel men, and then become part of the picture of the successful or adequate man projected in stories, television and movies.

Under these conditions, disadvantaged groups will tend to reject schooling, noting its lack of relevance for the entry jobs they will take. They develop what Paul Goodman has called "reactive stupidity" (an emotional incapacity to learn and express their feelings) and in Arthur Stinchcombe's terms show "expressive alienation", rejecting their role as students and insisting on adult activities like sex, driving cars, smoking, drinking, etc. This is, of course, the springboard for entry into the corps of the underemployed or the hard core unemployed. Being ill-educated, they cannot compete for good jobs and are not adaptable enough to avoid obsolescence.

Conclusions

We have, then, three broad developments arising out of changes in education and affluence which result in structural strains and/or dislocations within our society. First, the working man becomes transformed by increased affluence and education in such a way that he can and wants to play a new role in his work place, his union and his society. However, since these institutions are geared to the relative incompetence of traditional workers, there is no way in which the modern worker can play a new role. Even in automated plants this problem is not solved because, although the worker feels he has more responsibility and is expected to think, he does not feel that he obtains the recognition and status he deserves. He is, therefore, frustrated and dissatisfied, rebellious when he can be, often alienated when he cannot. This is probably one of the underlying reasons for the considerable amount of labour unrest and militancy which has occurred in Canada recently.

The strains arising out of the worker's being a new man in an old society are amplified by the gradual deterioration of parts of that society. The status distinctions based on education and life style (which were the basis for the rights of management and the difference in

power and pay between management and the workers) are disappearing. Therefore, in the eyes of the worker these managerial rights and the manager's much greater power and pay are no longer justified. The worker thus demands more control over his own work, pay more equal to the manager's, and he challenges management's rights to decide these things unilaterally.

Finally, the new worker sets a new and higher standard for work and living. These higher standards are more difficult for disadvantaged groups to reach, with the result that more of them fail and many of their children reject even the effort to achieve them. Thus, while the modern worker becomes alienated through the frustration of his needs and the meaninglessness of work, the traditional worker becomes alienated by the seeming impossibility of success. He then becomes dislocated from the structure of his society to become part of the underemployed or hard core unemployed.

Elsewhere, we have pointed out that some environmental influences, such as affluence, mass consumption norms, mobility and an instrumental view of work tend to ease some of these strains, particularly for the modern worker. In this chapter we have deliberately emphasized

the potential sources of conflict and difficulty, particularly for industrial relations, because it is to these areas that public policy should address itself.

Footnotes for Chapter VIII

1. Dreeban, Robert, "On What is Learned in School," Harvard University, March, 1966, unpublished manuscript.
2. Hall, O., and McFarlane, B., Transition from School to Work, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1962.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

We have been concerned throughout this paper with the importance and the necessity in an affluent, technologically advanced society, of the adoption by all members of the society of mass consumption norms. Ambition, the desire to reach a higher and higher standard of living, to achieve a style of life worthy of respect--these motives, far from being reprehensible, are essential. They, plus automation, hold out the possibility of freeing man from his ancient servitude to debilitating physical labour and to degrading social classification.

But freedom for what? Leisure pursuits and avocational creativity have sufficed as a reason for existence to aristocracies in the past, but such groups, if they were not to be corrupted, had always a sense of involvement and responsibility to the community of which they were a part. If we are about to witness an aristocracy

of the common man, how can he achieve this sense of involved responsibility?

The simple and infantile desire for more and more is clearly present in most people, but it is not all that is there. A man cannot be satisfied simply to consume endlessly; to get and not to give. His sense of worth and dignity requires that he give something in the bargain. Work, when it was the measure of a man, could be also a gift of himself, the most important thing he could offer. Therefore, in the industrial bargain, a man's labour was regarded, and not only by Marxists, as contributing real value, if not the true value of products. But as machines take over more functions, as the meaning of work changes to an instrumental one, what can a worker contribute which will maintain his self-respect, his sense of belonging to and contributing something of real value to the work environment and to the society?

Bright and Walker, separately, found that workers appreciate the added sense of responsibility over a greater span of the operation that occurs with automation. And both found that one of the common complaints was that, although they (the workers) had ideas for making the machines work more productively, they were rarely asked for advice.

Many observers of adolescent unrest believe that the young person's sense of being without function or value in the larger society is partly to blame for his alienation and rebellion against its values. An example from industry of these untapped resources is the case of eight girls in the paint room of a toy factory who were allowed (after many complaints) to arrange the work flow in what they thought would be the most efficient way. Within three weeks these girls had increased their productivity from 30-50% above the level expected by production engineers when they themselves had planned the work flow. Instead of the work moving at a constant pace all day as the engineers planned, the girls simply devised a varied pace which prevented their becoming either bored or tired.¹

The argument is often raised that workers do not really want more responsibility. Although this may be true in individual cases, statistically it is not true, as demonstrated by two surveys made by the Survey Research Center--one of office workers (580 of them), the other of production workers in heavy industry (5,700 in number).²

The results for office workers were:

Employees making no decisions who would <u>not</u> like to make any	11%
Employees making some decisions who would <u>not</u> like to make more	13%
Employees making no decisions who would like to make some	30%
Employees making some decisions who would like to make more	46%

This shows that, even in offices, 41% of the workers feel that they make no decisions, although 76% would like to make some or more.

In the case of factory workers, the majority of workers (68%) felt that they had little or nothing to say about how their jobs should be carried out, but 65% of them were convinced that the work would be better done if the men had more chance to make suggestions about such things as design, setups, and the layout of the work. When asked why men did not make more suggestions, the following responses were given:

Men don't get credit for suggestions	50%
Top management won't use suggestions men make	28%
Foremen won't use suggestions men make	23%
Other men don't think a man should make suggestions	11%
Men don't know where to make suggestions	10%
Men don't know what suggestions to make	7%

The important figures to note here are the tiny proportion who believe they or their fellows have nothing to contribute and the large proportion who feel frustrated in their desire to take some responsibility for their work.

It seems obvious that we now have workers whose increasing general education equips them to handle the kind of abstract problems represented by automatic factories. They can, therefore, think and will be expecting to be able to use this capacity. Furthermore, from the point of view of productivity and the full development of human resources, means must be found to utilize the capacities of workers for involvement and responsibility in the productive task. As we observed at the end of the Industrial Relations chapter, industrial plants ought to reflect in their social organization what is actually happening in their technical organization: a spreading of responsibility and a flattening of hierarchies. Including workers in the work planning process is a realistic recognition of their responsibility in technologically advanced plants, and it also may help to make work meaningful and to ease frustrations which will otherwise undoubtedly lead to individual grievances and industrial disputes.

Recommendations

A paper of this general kind can offer, obviously, only general recommendations and we do not pretend to address ourselves to the mechanics of implementation. What we would like to do is to suggest a direction in which we feel public policy should move, with some concrete, illustrative examples. The major effort of public policy, as we see it, should be directed toward including the worker in the decision-making process at every level of his experiences: on the job, in his union, and in his community; and secondly, that the interests of labour and management should be integrated with the interests of society in a responsible way.

A. Integrating the worker on the job:

1. We would support vigorously the recommendations of the Freedman report and suggest that wherever possible it be implemented, particularly those sections dealing with the importance of consultation between management and unions regarding technical change. We think also that the government would be well advised to reduce, where necessary, the scope of management rights, as presently defined,

in favour of permitting the individual worker more rights and greater control over his job.

2. Management should be encouraged to consult with workers on a regular basis, at the level of the smallest work unit, as to methods and organization of the work. Unions should be encouraged to regard the interest of the worker in the planning and organizing of his work as an important right. This consultation should be a genuine exchange of ideas, not simply a polite, round-about way of telling workers "how it's going to be." Rather, there should be a dignified assumption that a man who has worked with a given piece of machinery, in a particular process, is likely to have useful ideas about how the work should be done.
3. The right to introduce continuous change in technology within a plant should carry with it the obligation to introduce workers to the continuous training and retraining necessary to cope with it. If such training programs were a regular part of the working day, adaptation to technical change would be much easier and psychologically less threatening to the worker. Such training programs

would, or might, also have the function of informing the worker of all the interlocking work problems of the industry, which would make him feel more competent and responsible toward his part of the work, and make his opinions more valuable.

B. Integrating the member in his union:

1. Through any legal means available, governments should insist upon democratic procedures and democratic control in labour unions. This has rarely been a serious problem in Canada, but as unions grow older, bigger, more powerful or richer, it could become one and should be guarded against.
2. The Labour College of Canada should be encouraged and subsidized substantially, with the idea that it offers training for all union members in collective bargaining, economics, labour law and other branches of knowledge important to effective functioning in labour-management relations. From such groups of trainees can be expected to rise the kind of labour leaders needed to run a modern, democratic union.

C. Integrating the worker into the community:

1. The government should regard general education,

particularly at high school and university level, and technical schools and apprenticeship training as of first priority. This should be developed to the point where it is no longer necessary to import professional and skilled manpower from abroad. Correspondingly, we would suggest an immigration policy which encourages entrants of a more normal distribution of training and occupational levels, so that mobility opportunities are better for both native born and foreign born workers.

2. The government should insist that all public service agencies receiving public grants include representatives of workers on their governing bodies, if possible on a proportional basis. This includes university and school boards, hospital, welfare, social service agencies, etc. Preferably workers, through unions, should select their own representatives, rather than have them selected by the governing bodies themselves.

D. Integrating workers and management with public interest:

1. We feel that permanent Labour-Management Consultative Committees should be encouraged, not only at a

provincial level, but at as many levels as practicable. We feel, however, that these or similar bodies should include neutral or public (not governmental) representatives with voting rights. Our model is the Office of Collective Bargaining now functioning in New York, recently discussed by David Anderson at the McGill Conference of Industrial Relations. These neutrals sit in on collective bargaining from the beginning of negotiations, and in case of an impasse would presumably act as mediators. Such permanent committees can also consider any major problems that arise during the life of a contract and should have the power to make decisions. The function of neutral members is, at all times, to represent the public interest.

These are only a few suggestions, valuable if at all, to illustrate what we feel should be the aim of public policy. What we wish to emphasize is the importance of trying to find ways whereby advice and opinions can move up from the bottom of the hierarchy, rather than only from the top down, as tends to be the case now in unions, in industry, and in the community. The purpose of this is threefold. First, it helps to relieve the frustration and

consequent alienation from society of workers who feel they have something worth saying and deserve to be heard.

Second, it restores the dignity of giving to people who have taken more and more from their society. Third, it makes available to the society at all levels the skills, the intelligence, and the creativity of a sizeable number of citizens whose talents are, at the moment, seriously under-utilized. We would hope, and have every reason to expect, that our recommendations, if implemented, would prove that modern workers have, indeed, valuable ideas to offer that could contribute substantially to the effective running of a plant, a union, or a community.

Footnotes for Chapter IX

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2. Katz, Daniel, "Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life," in Industrial Conflict, Kornhauser, A., et al, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1954, p. 93.

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